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THE PERSONAL JURISDICTION PROBLEM




HE Class Action Fairness Act became law in early 2005.1 A prin-
cipal aim of the Act was to broaden the jurisdiction of federal
courts so that they could hear more nationwide (or multi-state)
class actions-class actions that purport to resolve claims of persons
throughout the United States. Previously, state courts had been the pri-
mary forum for many nationwide class actions, but in the early 1990s,
critics increasingly complained of a variety of problems and abuses in
state court class actions. This view was not universally shared, and for
over a decade, debate raged about the fairness of state courts hearing
nationwide class actions. The debate about class action fairness over-
looked one fundamental fairness issue: whether any court (state or fed-
eral) may properly assert personal jurisdiction over a defendant on all
claims of the nationwide class, when only a small portion of the class
claims arise out of the defendant's forum state activities. In federal court,
this issue principally is one of policy, but in state court, personal jurisdic-
tion raises constitutional questions, primarily due process issues but also
some dormant commerce clause concerns. This article examines all of the
personal jurisdiction issues arising in nationwide class actions in both
state and federal court.
In Part I, I look generally at the phenomenon of nationwide or multi-
state class actions. I start by examining the procedural changes and Su-
preme Court decisions, such as Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts,2 that
enabled multi-state class actions to flourish in state court. I next report
how this growth caused critical backlash, which eventually led to the
Class Action Fairness Act ("Act" or "CAFA"). I conclude by describing
how the debate about "class action fairness" largely ignored personal ju-
risdiction from the perspective of the entity defending a nationwide class
action. This is a surprising and critical oversight. The personal jurisdic-
tion problem encompasses many of the concerns that critics raised about
class actions in state court-procedural fairness, forum shopping, and
* Professor of Law at the University of Alabama School of Law.
1. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005).
2. 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
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state court overreaching-but the objection to the state court's personal
jurisdiction puts these concerns in terms of constitutional mandates, not
mere policy preferences.
In Part II, I examine the personal jurisdiction issues as they arise in
state court. I start with an overview of the Supreme Court's cases ad-
dressing the constitutional limitations on a state court's personal jurisdic-
tion. I focus on how and why relatedness-the degree to which a claim
concerns the defendant's forum contacts-has become a critical factor in
testing state court jurisdiction. I next examine four arguments that might
justify state court personal jurisdiction over the defendant on out-of-state
claims in a nationwide class action. The first argument is that even
though the non-local claims do not directly arise out of the defendant's
forum activities, they are sufficiently related to the defendant's business
in the forum state to justify specific personal jurisdiction. The second
argument is that the defendant conducted sufficient business in the forum
state to justify assertion of general jurisdiction over all suits, regardless of
whether the claims relate to the defendant's forum state activities. The
third argument is that by registering to do business in the state, as many
out-of-state corporations do, the defendant corporation consented to gen-
eral jurisdiction on all claims. The final argument is that class actions are
unique devices that warrant special jurisdiction rules without regard to
whether each claim individually satisfies jurisdictional standards. I con-
clude that none of these arguments justify jurisdiction in every case and
that the Federal Constitution does not permit state court jurisdiction in at
least some nationwide class actions.
In Part III, I examine the personal jurisdiction issues in federal court. I
begin by explaining the constitutional standards that govern a federal
court's personal jurisdiction. I next look to the current statutory author-
ity of federal courts to assert personal jurisdiction over defendants. I con-
clude that federal courts do not have a constitutional problem in asserting
personal jurisdiction in nationwide class actions, but that federal courts
face a statutory limitation. In most suits based on state law, federal long-
arm statutes limit a federal court's jurisdiction to that of its state court
counterpart, which means that federal courts are without statutory power
to assert personal jurisdiction in many nationwide class actions.
In Part IV, I conclude by assessing the implications of the personal
jurisdiction problem. Identification of the problem does not mean an end
to multi-state class actions. Federal courts can assert personal jurisdiction
in most nationwide class actions if Congress expands the federal long-arm
statutes and rules. In addition, state courts will remain proper forums for
many class actions. Class counsel has many options, including filing in
the defendant's home state, filing in the forum of common action by the
defendant, or limiting the class so that it properly relates to the chosen
state forum, such as a statewide class. These may not be the class plain-
tiffs' preferred alternatives, but the personal jurisdiction problem over-
rides strategic preferences. Moreover, the CAFA already has motivated
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some class counsel to consider more moderate forms of class actions. The
personal jurisdiction issue puts those considerations into constitutional
terms.
I. THE PHENOMENON OF NATIONWIDE CLASS ACTIONS
Class actions as we know them today are a relatively modern procedu-
ral innovation. The multi-state class action seeking large sums of dam-
ages was primarily the creation of the 1966 amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. The nationwide class action has had two brief
periods of relative prosperity in federal court, only to be met with judicial
backlash, which caused litigants to resort to state court. The increase in
class action filings in state court, in turn, prompted criticism and debate,
which ultimately resulted in the passage of the Class Action Fairness Act
in February 2005. The new Act modifies federal subject-matter jurisdic-
tion statutes to permit federal courts to hear more class actions based on
state law, but it does not speak to the ability of federal courts to assert
personal jurisdiction over the defendant in nationwide class actions. In-
deed, essentially none of the general debate about class action fairness,
including the Supreme Court's seminal decision concerning multi-state
class actions in Shutts,3 addressed the problem of personal jurisdiction
from the perspective of the defendant in these actions.
A. THE PROCEDURAL CHANGES THAT ENABLED NATIONWIDE
CLASS ACTIONS
Modern class action practice came about largely as a result of amend-
ments made in 1966 to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Class actions existed earlier,4 but they were not class actions in the mod-
ern sense. Under prevailing procedural standards before 1966,5 class
members in class actions had to have some form of united interest or
3. 472 U.S. at 797.
4. See STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN
CLASS ACTION 228-30 (1987) (summarizing early history of class actions); see generally
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. et al., An Historical Analysis of the Binding Effect of Class Suits,
146 U. PA. L. REV. 1849 (1998) (summarizing early history of class actions).
5. See generally JACK FRIEDENTHAL, MARY KAY KANE & ARTHUR MILLER, CIVIL
PROCEDURE § 16.1 (West 4th ed. 2005) (summarizing procedural rules before 1966) [here-
inafter FRIEDENTHAL].
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privity. 6 Moreover, class actions had uncertain binding effect. 7 For ex-
ample, Rule 23 of the 1938 federal rules permitted a damages class action
based on common interest alone,8 the "spurious" class action, but this suit
typically bound only the named class representatives. 9 Unnamed class
members could wait and intervene if the judgment was favorable to
them.' 0
In 1966, federal rule-makers substantially revised Rule 23, governing
class action procedure in federal court. Rule 23(a) specified four prelimi-
nary standards for certification that applied to all types of class actions:
numerosity, typicality, commonality, and adequate representation."
Rule 23(b) set additional standards for each of three new types of class
actions, based on functional distinctions, such as the relief sought. 12 Fi-
6. See Adolf Homburger, State Class Actions and the Federal Rule, 71 COLUM. L.
REV. 609, 615-25 (1971) (discussing privity in state court class actions under Field Code);
id. at 629 (stating that the "net effect" of the 1938 federal rule was to "impart[] to the
federal system the notion of privity-lock stock and barrel"); Glenn A. Danas, Comment,The Interstate Class Action Jurisdiction Act of 1999: Another Congressional Attempt to Fed-
eralize State Law, 49 EMORY L.J. 1305, 1310 (2000) (noting that the 1938 federal rule gov-
erning class actions was burdened by "two main limitations: (1) the requirement that there
be a 'jural relationship' between the parties ... and (2) the rule that negative judgments
were not binding on all class members"); but see Hazard et al., supra note 4, at 1918 (dis-
cussing late nineteenth century treatise reporting that "overwhelming authority" argued
for not imposing privity standards on class members).
7. See generally Hazard et al., supra note 4 (discussing binding effects of early class
actions).
8. The 1938 version of Rule 23 had three categories of class suits. The first two were
narrow and concerned either a "joint" or "common" interest (the "true" class action) or a
"several" interest in a specific property (the "hybrid" action). FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a). The
third (the "spurious" action) had a far broader standard, requiring only a common ques-
tion of law or fact and common relief. Id.
9. The 1938 rule was silent as to binding effect, but the principal drafter of the rule,Professor Moore, proposed a sliding scale of binding effect: the judgment would bind all
members of a true class action; in hybrid class actions, it would bind all appearing parties
and would be conclusive as to all claims concerning the property; and in spurious actions, it
would bind only the appearing parties. See James William Moore, Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure: Some Problems Raised by the Preliminary Draft, 25 GEO. L.J. 551, 571 (1937).
Most courts adopted Moore's view. See Hazard et al., supra note 4, at 1938-39, nn.409-10
(collecting authorities).
10. Amends. to R. of Civ. P., 39 F.R.D. 69, 99 (1966) (noting problem of intervention
under 1938 rule). See Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966Amendments of the FRCP (I), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 385 (1967) (collecting criticism of
"one-way intervention" in spurious suits).
11. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a); 39 F.R.D. at 95-96.
12. The 1966 version of Rule 23(b) provided:
An action may be maintained as a class action if the prerequisites of subdivi-
sion (a) are satisfied, and in addition: (1) the prosecution of separate actions
by or against individual members of the class would create a risk of (A) in-
consistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the
class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party
opposing the class, or (B) adjudications with respect to individual members
of the class which would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of
the other members not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or
impede their ability to protect their interests; or (2) the party opposing the
class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class,
thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declara-
tory relief with respect to the class as a whole; or (3) the court finds that thequestions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate
1316 [Vol. 58
nally, the 1966 rule added new procedures for the conduct and mainte-
nance of the class action, including notice to class members.
1 3
The new rule revolutionized class action litigation, making class actions
available under more circumstances than previous procedural rules. The
primary difference was the new damages class action.1 4 Rule 23(b)(3)
permitted class actions in damages cases where the members were united
only by a predominance of common factual and legal issues. 15 The Rule
23(b)(3) suit was a class action in the full sense of the word. Unlike the
"spurious" action, the Rule 23(b)(3) class action had a binding effect on
the entire class.1 6 The new class suit could involve hundreds or thousands
of unnamed parties, as opposed to the small number of named plaintiffs
and interveners under the spurious class action. 17 The 1966 rule thus ena-
bled what has become the paradigm class action. Rule 23(b)(3) allowed
persons with minimal damages to come together and present a case of
considerable magnitude. In short, Rule 23(b)(3) created a new form of
class litigation that is commonplace today but was relatively unknown
only a half-century ago.
B. NATIONWIDE CLASS ACTIONS BEFORE THE 1980s
The Rule 23(b)(3) damages class action is more conducive to classes of
persons from multiple states than actions brought under earlier rules.
Multi-state class actions were theoretically available under earlier class
over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action
is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication
of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include: (A) the
interest of members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or
defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation con-
cerning the controversy already commenced by or against members of the
class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of
the claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encoun-
tered in the management of a class action.
Id.
13. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2); 39 F.R.D. at 97 (requiring notice and opportunity for
opt-out in Rule 23(b)(3) class actions).
14. See James Underwood, Rationality, Multiplicity & Legitimacy: Federalization of the
Interstate Class Action, 46 S. TEX. L. REV. 391, 400 (2004) (noting that the Rule 23(b)(3)
class action had "dramatic effects" and was "the source of an enormous increase in class
action litigation since 1966").
15. See Homburger, supra note 6, at 630 (stating that the 1966 revision to Rule 23
"opened for class action treatment a wide new area, formerly deemed off limits, where
common questions of law or fact form the only bond of union among the members of the
class").
16. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2); 39 F.R.D. at 97 ("the judgment, whether favorable or
not, will include all members who do not request exclusion"); see also 39 F.R.D. at 99 ("all
class actions maintained to the end will as such result in judgments including those whom
the court finds to be members of the class, whether or not the judgment is favorable to the
class").
17. See Underwood, supra note 14, at 419 n.101 (stating that although the spurious
class had potential for larger classes due to its broad commonality standard, its interven-
tion requirement meant that large class actions were rare) (citing Edward F. Sherman,
Group Litigation Under Federal Legal Systems: Variations and Alternatives to American
Class Actions, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 401, 404 (2002)).
"Class Action Fairness" 13172005]
SMU LAW REVIEW
action rules,18 but the privity and other restrictions of the earlier rules
tended to localize class actions. 19 A class of persons claiming title to a
single property, for example, was likely to be smaller and more localized
than a class of consumers who had claims against a national corporation.
Soon after the 1966 rule change, federal courts saw increasing numbers of
large, multi-state class actions.
In the 1970s, however, the Supreme Court issued three rulings that
made federal courts unattractive and, in many cases, unavailable forums
for large class actions.20 First, in 1973, the Court in Zahn v. International
Paper Co. 2 1 interpreted the federal diversity statute to require that every
class member meet the statutory jurisdictional amount, 22 which today is
$75,000.23 One year later, the Court in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin24
held that Rule 23(c)(3) required individual notice to class members in
Rule 23(b)(3) damages suits, 25 and that during the pendency of the ac-
tion, the plaintiff class, as opposed to the defendants, had to bear the
expense of the notice.26 In 1978, the Court in Coopers & Lybrand v.
Livesay,27 held that the "final decision" statute governing appellate juris-
diction 28 did not permit interlocutory review of class certification
18. See generally Note, Multistate Plaintiff Class Actions: Jurisdiction and Certification,
92 HARV. L. REV. 718, 725-26 (1979) (concluding that the multi-state class suits before
1966 involved "circumstances of unique state interest or competence not generally present
in multistate common-question suits" and categorizing the older multi-state cases in two
groups-first, unique state regulatory interest such as liability of stockholder for debts of
state-chartered corporations, and second, common fund cases) [hereinafter Note, Multis-
tate Class Actions].
19. Id. at 724 ("Before the general acceptance of binding common-question class ac-
tions reflected in the 1966 federal rule, the issue of jurisdiction over absentees who had no
contacts with the forum state could have arisen only infrequently.").
20. See Danas, supra note 6, at 1319 (noting that state courts immediately following
the amendment of Rule 23 were relatively hostile to damages class actions, which initially
increased class actions in federal courts, but that the tide turned when the Supreme Court
restricted federal procedural rules in the 1970s); cf. Comment, Expanding the Impact of
State Court Class Action Adjudications to Provide an Effective Forum for Consumers, 18
UCLA L. REV. 1002, 1021 (1971) (noting that despite numerous filings, not a single suc-
cessful nationwide class action was litigated to conclusion in federal court in the five years
following the 1966 revision of Rule 23).
21. 414 U.S. 291 (1973).
22. Id. at 301. Four years earlier, in Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 338 (1969), the
Court held that small claims could not be aggregated to meet the jurisdictional amount.
See Zahn, 414 U.S. at 301. In Zahn, the Court held that all class members, not just the
named plaintiffs, must meet the jurisdictional amount. Id. The Zahn focus on the entire
class was contrary to the Court's earlier ruling that only named class representatives are
relevant in determining whether the plaintiffs and defendants are of diverse citizenship.
See Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356, 364-67 (1921). The jurisdictional
rules of both Snyder and Zahn were modified significantly in 2005. See infra notes 113-28(discussing Supreme Court interpretation of CAFA supplemental and jurisdiction statute).
23. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2005).
24. 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
25. The Court held that Rule 23 required individual notice only to "those class mem-
bers who are identifiable through reasonable effort." Id. at 175.
26. Id. at 177-79.
27. 437 U.S. 463 (1978).
28. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (granting jurisdiction to the federal courts of appeals over "ap-




These three decisions, issued within five years of each other, curtailed
the use of federal courts for class actions. The paradigm class action-
large numbers of persons with small dollar claims joining together-could
not go to federal court at all if the claims were based on state law. Even
class suits permitted in federal court met procedural obstacles. Claims
with large dollar damages were difficult to certify because the presence of
large individual claims is a factor arguing against class treatment under
Rule 23(b)(3). 30 Class counsel had to front the cost of notice to class
members, which was prohibitively expensive in many class actions with
large classes seeking small dollar claims.31 Adverse class certification de-
cisions were effectively unreviewable, 32 thus ending litigation of many
class actions.
33
State courts did not present the same obstacles. State courts did not
have jurisdictional amount limitations on their subject-matter jurisdic-
tion. In addition, states could offer more flexible procedures. To be sure,
many states adopted a class action rule based on the federal rule. In fact,
state adoption of Rule 23 facilitated class action procedure in state
courts,34 but state courts were free to apply their own interpretations of
Rule 23. Some states adopted class action rules that were more liberal
than Rule 23. 35 Finally, states could allow their appellate courts to review
class certification decisions. Thus, although federal courts were effec-
tively closed to many small claims class actions, state courts were not, and
29. Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 467-76; see generally FRIEDENTHAL, supra note 5,
§§ 13.1-13.3 (discussing law governing final decision rule and exceptions permitting inter-
locutory appeals).
30. Large individual claims can be pursued in individual actions without class joinder.
Rule 23(b)(3) requires the court to find that the "class action is superior to other available
methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy," and a "pertinent" factor
is "the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution ... of
separate actions." FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3); see supra note 12 (1966 version of Rule 23).
31. The named plaintiff in Eisen argued that he could not and would not bear the costs
of notice, which prompted the Court to remand with instructions to dismiss. Eisen v. Car-
lisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 179 (1974).
32. Plaintiffs in class suits could seek interlocutory review of class certification orders
only under the discretionary certification procedure of section 1292(b). 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(b). The availability of appellate review of certification orders was broadened by
rule amendment in 1998. See infra note 106 (discussing amendment of Rule 23).
33. The Coopers & Lybrand Court acknowledged this potential effect, but it noted
that class suits "often survive an adverse class determination" and whether the claim is
abandoned depends on a variety of factors, such as the plaintiff's resources, the size of his
claim, and the chance of success on the merits. 437 U.S. at 470.
34. By the early 1970s, twelve states had adopted class action rules modeled on the
1966 federal rule. Homburger, supra note 6, at 631 n.133 (listing 12 state rules modeled on
the 1966 version of federal Rule 23, as of 1971). Many states followed. See ROBERT H.
KLONOFF & EDWARD K. BILICH, CLASS ACnONs 439 (2000) (reporting that as of 2000,
two-thirds of the states had adopted class action rules based on Rule 23).
35. See Note, Multistate Class Actions, supra note 18, at 718 n.8 (surveying state rules
as of 1979 that had more liberal terms than federal Rule 23, including relaxed notice provi-
sions and claim procedures); see also Donald Ricketts, The Ebb & Flow of Class Action
Lawsuits, 27 L.A. LAW. 12, 13 (June 2004) (describing California's "broad, sweeping en-
dorsement of class actions" after the federal rule revision in 1966 and subsequent state
procedural innovations, including "fluid recovery").
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by the late 1970s, many legal observers considered state courts as the only
viable judicial forum for multi-state, small-claim consumer class actions.36
C. THE IMPACT OF SHUTTS
By the early 1980s, large class actions with plaintiff class members from
all over the nation began to appear with added frequency in state court.
This is not to say that there was a groundswell of such suits. The new
phenomenon, if it could be fairly called a phenomenon in the early 1980s,
initially faced cautious skepticism by courts and commentators. 37 Large
nationwide class actions were new to state court, and legal observers
raised due process concerns with the new class actions. First, courts and
academic writers speculated as to whether a state court could properly
assert personal jurisdiction over unnamed plaintiffs in multi-state class
actions.38 Indeed, state courts divided on the issue; some entertained na-
tionwide class suits39 while others held that they had no jurisdiction over
out-of-state plaintiff class members.40 Second, courts and scholars ques-
tioned whether a state court may apply its own law to resolve all claims,
including non-local claims, in a multi-state suit.4 1 In 1985, the Supreme
Court addressed both questions in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts,42 and
even though the opinion was mixed, the case ultimately encouraged filing
of nationwide class actions in state court.
The Shutts case was one of several large class actions brought in Kansas
state court against natural gas producers, including Phillips Petroleum
36. Barry Abrams, Toward a Policy-Based Theory of State Court Jurisdiction Over
Class Actions, 56 TEX. L. REV. 1033, 1033 & n.4 (1978) (stating that "[r]ecent Supreme
Court cases have effectively closed the federal courts to many nationwide or multistate
plaintiff class actions" and that this "foreclosure. . . has focused increasing attention on the
state courts as the only available judicial forum"); see generally Miner v. Gillette, 428 N.E.
2d 478, 485 (Il1. 1981) (Ryan, J., dissenting) (surveying cases and commentary and observ-
ing that "[s]ince the Supreme Court has severely limited the availability of the Federal
courts for class action litigation .... those seeking to litigate consumer claims have been
urging the use of State courts in which to maintain multi-state plaintiffs class suits") (cita-
tions omitted).
37. CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR MILLER, & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1757 (3d ed. 2005) (collecting authorities that raised "serious"
questions concerning the viability of state courts as forums for nationwide class actions
after the Supreme Court restricted federal court class action procedure and caused the
shift of such suits to state court) [hereinafter WRIGHT]; FRIEDENTHAL, supra note 5, § 16.4,
at 755-56.
38. See Abrams, supra note 36; Andrea Martin, Consumer Class Actions with a Multis-
tate Class: A Problem of Jurisdiction, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 1411 (1974); Thomas D. Waterman,
State Court Jurisdiction Over Multistate Plaintiff Class Actions: Minimum Contacts Under
Miner v. Gillette, 69 IOWA L. REV. 795 (1984).
39. Miner, 428 N.E.2d at 483 (affirming jurisdiction over nationwide consumer class
action); see supra note 36 for further discussion of case.
40. Feldman v. Bates Mfg. Co., 362 A.2d 1177, 1180 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976)(denying class certification on ground that class members lacked minimum contacts with
New Jersey).
41. See Note, Multistate Class Actions, supra note 18, at 712 (noting in 1979 that the
Full Faith and Credit and Due Process Clauses "may limit the ability of the court to judge
the defendant's liability to the entire multi-state class solely according to the law of the
forum").
42. 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
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Company. The plaintiffs were royalty owners who sought interest on roy-
alty payments delayed by the gas companies during the period in which
rate hike approvals were pending with the federal government. 43 Ira
Shutts and Robert and Betty Anderson filed suit against Phillips on be-
half of approximately 28,000 royalty owners. 44 Shutts was a Kansas resi-
dent, and the Andersons lived in Oklahoma. They owned gas leases in
Texas and Oklahoma.45 Phillips was incorporated in Delaware and had
its principal place of business in Oklahoma.
46
The lawsuit had only a peripheral connection to Kansas. The gas leases
were located on land in eleven states, including Kansas, but Kansas con-
stituted a very small portion of the leases: "[o]nly a miniscule amount,
approximately one quarter of one percent, of the gas leases involved in
this lawsuit were on Kansas land."'47 The plaintiff class members lived in
all fifty states and in foreign countries.48 The Supreme Court acknowl-
edged that "some 97% of the plaintiffs in the case had no apparent con-
nection to the State of Kansas except for this lawsuit."' 49 The Andersons
were a good example. They were citizens of Oklahoma, who had leases
with an Oklahoma company for royalties on gas taken from Oklahoma
land.50
The Kansas court applied Kansas law to every claim in the action 5' and
found Phillips liable on all claims.52 Phillips apparently did not challenge
personal jurisdiction as to it, the defendant. 53 Instead, Phillips raised two
other due process objections in the United States Supreme Court: (1) that
the Kansas court lacked personal jurisdiction over the thousands of un-
named class members who had no contacts with Kansas and (2) that the
Kansas trial court improperly applied Kansas law to resolve the
thousands of claims that had no connection with Kansas.54 The Supreme
Court split its decision: it upheld jurisdiction over the plaintiff class but
held that the Kansas court improperly applied Kansas law to the claims
that had no connection to Kansas.
55
As to personal jurisdiction over the plaintiff class, the Court held that
"a forum State may exercise jurisdiction over the claim of an absent class-
action plaintiff, even though that plaintiff may not possess the minimum
43. Id. at 799-800.
44. Id. at 800-01.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 799.
47. Id. at 801. The total royalties paid on Kansas leases were less than $3,000, com-
pared to the more than the $11 million total royalty payments at issue in the Shutts class
action. Id. at 815.
48. Id. at 799.
49. Id. at 815.
50. Shutts v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 679 P.2d 1159, 1165 (Kan. 1984).
51. Shutts, 472 U.S. at 815.
52. Id. at 801.
53. See infra Part I(F) (discussing possible bases for and assumptions regarding juris-
diction over Phillips Petroleum Co.).
54. Shutts, 472 U.S. at 802.
55. Id. at 823.
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contacts with the forum which would support personal jurisdiction over a
defendant. 56 This difference is justified, according to the Court, because
"[t]he burdens placed by a State upon an absent class action plaintiff are
not of the same order of magnitude as those it places upon an absent
defendant. '57 Unlike an absent defendant, who must travel and hire
counsel to defend itself at peril of a default judgment, 58 the absent class
member already has representatives in court and "is not required to do
anything."'59 This does not mean that class members are not entitled to
due process, but rather that due process is satisfied by different procedu-
ral protections of the class, including adequate representation and an op-
portunity to opt out of the class.60
As to the application of Kansas law, the Court stated that the Due
Process and Full Faith and Credit Clauses of the Federal Constitution
impose only "modest restrictions" on a state court's choice of law.6 1
These restrictions require "that for a State's substantive law to be se-
lected in a constitutionally permissible manner, that State must have a
significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts, creating state in-
terests, such that choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally
unfair."' 62 Significantly, the Court held that the fact that the suit was a
class action did not give Kansas sufficient interest to apply its own law to
all claims.63 Kansas needed independent, significant contacts with and
interest in the claims of each class member. 64 These contacts were lack-
ing even though Phillips owned property in Kansas, conducted substantial
business there, and had hundreds of leases with Kansas residents.65 The
Court stated that "an important element" in the consideration of fairness
56. Id. at 811.
57. Id. at 808.
58. The Court detailed these burdens:
An out-of-state defendant summoned by a plaintiff is faced with the full pow-
ers of the forum State to render judgment against it. The defendant must
generally hire counsel and travel to the forum to defend itself from the plain-
tiff's claim, or suffer a default judgment. The defendant may be forced to
participate in extended and often costly discovery, and will be forces to re-
spond in damages or to comply with some other form of remedy imposed by
the court should it lose the suit. The defendant may also face liability for
court costs and attorney's feed. These burdens are substantial, and the mini-
mum contacts requirement of the Due Process Clause prevents the forum
State from unfairly imposing them upon the defendant.
Id. (emphasis in original).
59. Id. at 808-10. "He may sit back and allow the litigation to run its course, content in
knowing that there are safeguards provided for his protection." Id.
60. Opt-out was of critical importance: "due process requires at a minimum that an
absent plaintiff be provided with an opportunity to remove himself from the class by exe-
cuting and returning an 'opt out' or 'request for exclusion' form to the court." Id. at 812.
61. Id. at 818.
62. Id. (quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 312-13 (1981)).
63. Id. at 820-22.
64. "Kansas must have a 'significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts' to
the claim asserted by each member of the class, contacts 'creating state interests,' in order
to ensure that the choice of Kansas law is not arbitrary or unfair." Id. at 822.




was "the expectation of the parties" and that there was "no indication
that when the leases involving land and royalty owners outside of Kansas
were executed, the parties had any idea that Kansas law would control. 66
Accordingly, the Court concluded that "[gliven Kansas' lack of 'interest'
in claims unrelated to that State, and the substantive conflict with juris-
dictions such as Texas .... application of Kansas law to every claim in this
case is sufficiently arbitrary and unfair as to exceed constitutional
limits." 67
The Shutts case at first seemed to be a mixed blessing for class action
litigation. Legal observers predicted that Shutts would confuse and per-
haps curtail class action practice.68 Academic commentators criticized
the personal jurisdiction holding, primarily for its potential negative im-
pact on other forms of class actions.69 They likewise questioned the im-
plications of the choice of law holding, fearing that the prospect of
applying the law of multiple states would weaken commonality, impede
class management, and cause courts to deny certification. 70 Despite this
criticism, nationwide class actions persisted and arguably thrived. Shutts
removed the doubt about the propriety of jurisdiction over absent class
members in damages class actions under Rule 23(b)(3), the primary form
of multi-state class actions.71 Even the choice of law prong of Shutts did
not prevent nationwide class actions. As the Court noted in Shutts, the
constitutional limitations on choice of law are "modest, 72 and "in many
situations a state court may be free to apply one of several choices of
66. Id. at 822.
67. Id.
68. See generally Kurt A. Schwartz, Note, Due Process and Equitable Relief in State
Court Multistate Class Actions After Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 68 TEX. L. REV. 415,
415 n.3 (1989) (collecting commentary and noting that the "eagerly awaited" Shutts deci-
sion "met with critical and even derisive scholarly commentary").
69. The Shutts Court expressly reserved opinion on jurisdiction in other types of class
actions, including suits seeking equitable relief and suits against a defendant class. 472 U.S.
at 811 n.3; see Linda Mullenix, Getting to Shutts, 46 KAN. L. REV. 727, 727 (1998) (noting
that Shutts "subsequently took on a life of its own because of Footnote Three"); see also
Arthur R. Miller & David Crump, Jurisdiction and Choice of Law in Multistate Class Ac-
tions After Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 96 YALE L.J. 1, 38-57, 80 (1986) (discussing
argument that "Shutts prohibits mandatory classes" and concluding that although Shutts
"made the class action format economically attractive .... it is not clear whether Shutts will
expand the real availability of class actions, because the opt-out right may undermine class
inclusion or even destroy the mandatory class, at least in damage cases").
70. In order to certify a class under Rule 23(b)(3), a court must find that the "ques-
tions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions
affecting only individual members," and a pertinent factor includes "the difficulties likely
to be encountered in the management of a class action." FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
71. Even mandatory class actions continued. See Linda Mullenix, Class Actions, Per-
sonal Jurisdiction, and Plaintiffs' Due Process: Implications for Mass Tort Litigation, 28
U.C. DAvis L. REV. 871 (1995) (surveying class action cases in ten years following Shutts
and reporting that many courts upheld 23(b)(1) and (b)(2) mandatory class actions against
due process challenges).
72. See supra note 58. Indeed, the Allstate test for constitutionally permissible choice
of law, which the Court applied in Shutts, has been criticized as too permissive. Shutts, 472
U.S. at 818; see DAVID P. CURRIE ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS 339 (6th ed. 2001) (citing
commentary and stating that "conflicts scholars have made a cottage industry of criticizing




Moreover, in Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman,74 a follow-up case to Shutts in
1988, the Court illustrated that state courts still offer significant forum
shopping advantages for plaintiffs in nationwide class actions. 75 Wortman
involved a class action virtually identical to that in Shutts. 76 The Kansas
trial court applied the Kansas five-year statute of limitation to all claims 77
and purported to apply Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas substantive law
but held that the law of these states was essentially the same as Kansas
law.78 Defendant Sun Oil challenged the judgment, claiming that applica-
tion of the Kansas limitation statute violated the principles announced in
Shutts and that the trial court unconstitutionally distorted the substantive
law.79 The United States Supreme Court rejected the challenges and up-
held the judgment.80 A majority of the Court agreed that Kansas could
properly apply its statute of limitation,81 and a different majority held
that the Kansas court's errors, if any, in applying the law of Louisiana,
Oklahoma and Texas did not rise to the level of constitutional depriva-
tion.82 Thus, under Wortman, states may apply their own procedural
law-and thereby provide forum shopping incentives to class counsel 3-
even in cases "where its contacts with the dispute stem only from its sta-
tus as the forum. '8 4 Moreover, Wortman reassured litigants and state
73. Shutts, 472 U.S. at 823. This is not to say that choice of law in complex litigation is
easy or without controversy. See generally Larry Kramer, Choice of Law in Complex Liti-
gation, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 547 (1996) (discussing and criticizing ways in which courts in
class and other complex litigation manipulate choice of law rules to result in choice of a
single law).
74. 486 U.S. 717 (1988).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 721.
78. Id. at 722. The trial court originally applied Kansas law to resolve all claims, and
the Court vacated and remanded in light of Shutts. Id. at 721. On remand, the trial court
reached the same outcome. Id.
79. Id. at 719.
80. Id. at 722.
81. The Justices disagreed as to the proper mode of analysis, but they agreed that a
forum state may properly apply procedural law, including statutes of limitation, to all
claims, regardless of other state interests. Justice Scalia relied primarily on the long-stand-
ing practice in the field of choice of law to characterize statutes of limitation as procedural
and within a forum state's permissible realm of regulation. Id. at 722-29. Justice Brennan
argued for interest analysis and found that the forum had sufficient interest to apply its
own statute of limitation. Id. at 734-43.
82. Id. at 732-34. All Justices agreed that the test for constitutional error in the appli-
cation of another state's law is whether the court contradicts "law of the other State that is
clearly established and that has been brought to the court's attention." Id. at 730-31. Jus-
tice O'Connor argued that the Kansas court's application of the other law "was not sup-
ported with so much as a single colorable argument" and constituted a "failure to give full
effect-or any effect-to the laws of its sister States." Id. at 743-49 (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part).
83. See generally Sam Walker, Forum Shopping for Stale Claims: Statutes of Limita-
tions and Conflict of Laws, 23 AKRON L. REV. 19 (1989) (surveying forum shopping advan-
tages resulting from a forum applying its own statute of limitation and noting that certain
states, including New Hampshire, had become well-known "havens" for forum-shopping
plaintiffs).
84. Wortman, 486 U.S. at 736 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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courts that federal courts will defer to a state court's application of sister
states' laws in complex suits. In sum, the combined effect of Shutts and
Wortman was to clarify some of the uncertainty surrounding state court
nationwide class actions, which in turn let the suits prosper.
D. A SECOND WAVE OF NATIONWIDE CLASS ACTIONS IN
STATE COURT
In the meantime, federal courts in the 1980s saw a new type of large,
nationwide class action. These new suits were damages class actions, filed
under Rule 23(b)(3) and based on state law, but unlike the consumer
class actions of the 1970s, the new class actions arose from mass torts and
sought large dollar damages, sufficient to satisfy federal subject-matter
jurisdiction standards. The new suits were not the product of a rule
amendment but instead changes in judicial attitude and litigation strat-
egy. In the years immediately following the 1966 amendment to Rule 23,
courts refused to certify large tort classes under Rule 23(b)(3), based
largely on a comment by the drafters of the 1966 rule that mass accident
cases "ordinarily are not appropriate" for class action treatment. 85 In the
mid-1980s, courts, particularly federal courts facing an onslaught of asbes-
tos cases, 86 began to look beyond this comment and recognize the effi-
ciencies of collecting cases into a class action format. Defendants also
saw advantages in global settlement.87 Courts initially certified such clas-
ses under Rule 23(b)(3), but the ability of class members to opt-out of
Rule 23(b)(3) actions undermined efficiency and deterred global settle-
ments.8 8 Accordingly, litigants and courts began to experiment with cer-
tifying mass tort classes under one of the mandatory class options of Rule
23-often using a limited fund theory under Rule 23(b)(1)(B) 89-thereby
85. The committee stated:
A "mass accident" resulting in injuries to numerous persons is ordinarily not
appropriate for a class action because of the likelihood that significant ques-
tions, not only of damages but of liability and defenses to liability, would be
present, affecting the individual in different ways. In these circumstances...
a class action would degenerate in practice into multiple lawsuits separately
tried.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee's note; Amends. to R. of Civ. P., 39 F.R.D. 69, 103
(1966); see Michael A. Perino, Class Action Chaos? The Theory of the Core and an Analy-
sis of Opt-out Rights in Mass Tort Class Actions, 46 EMORY L.J. 85, 92 (1997) (collecting
cases and describing four phases of mass tort class actions, beginning with the first stage in
which "most courts followed the Advisory Committee's views and largely denied class ac-
tion treatment in any kind of mass tort case").
86. See Amchem Prods. Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 598-99 (1997) (noting turbulent
history of asbestos litigation and noting unanswered pleas for Congressional action to regu-
late asbestos recovery).
87. See Pamela Coyle, When Bigger Isn't Better, ABA J., 66-72 (Mar. 1995) (reporting
on the phenomenon of large class actions in personal injury and other large dollar cases
and the changing perspective of defendants).
88. Perino, supra note 85, at 97 (collecting cases and describing the second phase of
mass tort class actions which "corresponded closely with the burgeoning of asbestos and
other mass tort litigation" and which saw increasing numbers of mass tort suits certified as
class actions under Rule 23(b)(3)).
89. See supra note 12 (reprinting Rule 23(b)(1)(B)).
13252005]
SMU LAW REVIEW
making opt-out unavailable. 90 Such treatment, however, received a chilly
reception in the federal appellate courts.91
In the 1990s, federal appellate courts, including the Supreme Court,
repeatedly rejected attempts to certify large dollar mass tort claims as
class actions.92 In Amchem Products Inc. v. Windsor, the Court reversed
an asbestos class action settlement for failure to comply with Rule 23.93
In Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., the Court struck down use of the limited
fund class in another mass asbestos class action.94 Likewise, the federal
courts of appeals decertified class actions in a number of prominent, na-
tionwide mass tort suits. 95 Many of these rulings were grounded on Rule
23, as opposed to constitutional grounds, which meant that state courts
were not bound by the federal decisions. Accordingly, as in the late
1970s, class counsel again looked to state courts, creating a second wave
of nationwide class actions in state courts.96
E. THE DEBATE CONCERNING MULTI-STATE CLASS ACTIONS IN
STATE COURT AND THE CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT
The increasing number of multi-state class actions filed in state court
began to garner considerable criticism and debate by the early 1990s. 97
Observers raised concerns that isolated state courts were overreaching
and repeatedly deciding cases of national importance. 98 Critics charged
90. Perino, supra note 85, at 97 (collecting cases and describing the third phase of mass
tort class actions in which courts turned to mandatory Rule 23(b)(1) class certification for
mass tort cases).
91. Id. at 101 (collecting cases and describing the fourth phase of mass tort class ac-
tions in which "many appellate courts" not only have criticized use of Rule 23(b)(1) class
certification for mass tort cases but also "have reasserted much of their original skepticism
about the utility of mass tort class actions").
92. See generally Joel S. Feldman, Class Certification Issues for Non-Federal Question
Class Actions-Defense Perspective, 710 PLI LITIG. 259, 302-32 (2004).
93. 521 U.S. 591, 629 (1997). The proposed settlement in Amchem prompted com-
plaints of collusion and unethical behavior, even before the case reached the Supreme
Court. See Susan P. Koniak, Feasting While the Widow Weeps: Georgine v. Amchem Prod-
ucts, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1045 (1995). The Court did not address these questions, holding
instead that the class did not meet the Rule 23(a) adequate representation and Rule
23(b)(3) predominance standards. See 521 U.S. at 626 n.20 (noting argument and reserving
question).
94. 527 U.S. 815, 864-65 (1999).
95. See In re Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996) (ordering decer-
tification of "the largest class action ever attempted in federal court," which consisted of
all persons, and their heirs, who were injured by defendants' cigarettes after 1943); In re
Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995) (ordering decertification of na-
tionwide class of hemophiliacs exposed to AIDS-infected blood products).
96. See Jesse Tiko Smallwood, Note, Nationwide, State Law Class Actions and the
Beauty of Federalism, 53 DUKE L.J. 1137, 1137-38 (2003) (reporting migration of class ac-
tions to state court following "chilly reception in federal court").
97. See 151 CONG. REC. H723-01, H726 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 2005) (statement of Rep.
Sensenbrenner) (stating that state court class action filings increased 1,315 percent over
last ten years).
98. A House Report in support of the Interstate Class Action Jurisdiction Act of 1999
stated:
Because of the way in which they have overreached in the use of the class
device, some State courts have effectively made themselves the arbiters of
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that some state courts had become forum shopping havens for class coun-
sel by applying loose standards of class management. 99 A particular con-
cern was settlements under which class counsel received large fees and
class members received minimal or illusory relief, such as coupons for
future purchases. 100 Critics charged that some state courts did not ade-
quately monitor settlements and fee agreements, resulting in tremendous
fees for class counsel and, according to some critics, collusion between
class counsel and defendants. 10 1 Moreover, as nationwide class suits
gained popularity in state court, a new problem arose-overlapping class
actions, in which more than one state court purported to hear the claims
of the same national class. 102 Unlike the federal system, which can con-
solidate suits pending in different federal courts, state court systems are
independent of each other and typically cannot force coordination before
the laws of other States, raising serious federalism concerns . . . [A] single
State court decides the law of many other jurisdictions, effectively telling
other States what their laws are with no input from the judiciaries of those
other jurisdictions. Again, this practice means that a State court, which has
no accountability to the residents of any other State, is dictating applicable
laws to out-of-State residents.
H.R. REP. No. 106-320, at 8-9 (1999).
99. See generally John H. Beisner & Jessica Davidson Miller, They're Making A Fed-
eral Case Out of It... In State Court, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 143, 205 (2001) (report-
ing that many interstate class actions in state court were "being heard by locally elected
county judges, who typically have only scant resources to devote to such complex cases,
who are often viewed by plaintiff's lawyers as willing to 'rubber stamp' class certification
orders and 'coupon' settlements, and who are periodically forced to turn to the local bar to
fund their efforts at re-election"). The House Report described the phenomenon as a
"race to the bottom."
Although class certification standards do not differ radically among Federal
and State court, some State courts have shown very lax attitudes toward class
certification .... Essentially, there is a race to the bottom-class action law-
yers find the State courts with the most lax attitude toward class actions and
file their cases there. As a result, certain State courts hear a highly dispro-
portionate amount of nationwide or multi-State class actions and thereby ef-
fectively dictate Federal class action policy (even though they have no
charter to do so).
H.R. REP. No. 106-320, at 8. The state court in Madison County, Illinois became so notori-
ous that President Bush chose Madison County as the location to kick-off his early 2005
campaign support for federal class action reform. See David Rogers & Monica Langley,
Bush Set to Sign Landmark Bill on Class Actions, WALL ST. J., Feb. 18, 2005, at Al, A7
(reporting passage of legislation and President's January 2005 campaign launch in Illinois).
100. See generally In re Gen. Motors Corp., 55 F.3d 768 (3d Cir. 1995) (discussing issues
arising in coupon settlements and reversing approval of class settlement centered on cou-
pon payments to the class); Note, In-Kind Class Action Settlements, 109 HARV. L. REV. 810
(1996).
101. See H.R. Rep. No. 106-320, at 7-8 (charging that some state courts are not properly
monitoring class counsel fee, such that "class counsel become the primary beneficiaries of
[class] settlements" and that class members "get little or nothing-or worse"). See also
supra note 93 (discussing settlement proposal in Amchem asbestos case and charges of
collusion).
102. See Geoffrey P. Miller, Overlapping Class Actions, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 514 (1996)
(describing problem of overlapping class actions); Underwood, supra note 14, at 408-411
(same); Thomas Woods, Note, Wielding the Sledgehammer: Legislative Solutions for Class




Citing these concerns, critics moved for reform on several fronts. One
was to change the procedure governing class actions. 10 4 In the early
1990s, federal rule-makers began considering amendments to Rule 23.105
One relatively non-controversial proposal-to expand the jurisdiction of
federal appellate courts to review class certification orders-was adopted
early in 199 8.106 Other reforms were more controversial. 10 7 Several dif-
ferent amendments to Rule 23 were debated for almost a decade. 10 8 Fi-
nally, in December 2003, rule changes made "modest" adjustments to the
formal class action procedure in federal court.'0 9 For the most part, the
rule changes either clarified ambiguities in the 1966 rule 10 or codified
practices already used by federal courts, such as scrutiny of the adequacy
of proposed class counsel."1 The amendments did not change the stan-
dards for certifying the class.112
103. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (THIRD) §§ 31.1-31.3 (1995) (describing
federal court coordination mechanisms and limitations); Miller, supra note 102 (noting lim-
ited coordination options of state courts before a class action is reduced to judgment).
104. Some observers reported that a few state court systems so changed their procedure
in response to criticism that they became hostile to class actions. See Stephen D. Sussman,
Class Actions: Consumer Sword Turned Corporate Shield, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1, 5
(2003) (arguing that although state courts once might have been receptive to class actions,
solicitude had disappeared in Texas, where the state supreme court had become actively
critical of class actions); Terry Carter, Class Action Climax, 4 A.B.A. J. E-REPORT 7 (2005)
(noting recent procedural changes in Texas that made "class actions virtually nil").
105. See Advisory Comm. Recommendation, 215 F.R.D. 158, 238-39 (2003) (summariz-
ing decade-long work in studying and revising Rule 23).
106. See Amends. to Fed. R. of Civ. P., Evid., & App. P., 177 F.R.D. 530, 531 (1998)
(order approving rule amendment to add Rule 23(f), providing for discretionary appeals of
class certification order).
107. While federal rule-makers considered changes in Rule 23, Congress in 1995 acted
on its own to restrict class actions in federal securities litigation. The Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act ("PSLRA") added new restrictions on federal securities class action
procedure, including specific standards for lead plaintiffs, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(2), (3)
(1998); limits on attorney's fees, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(6) (1998); and posting of security, 15
U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(8) (1998). Lawyers attempted to avoid the new PSLRA limits by draft-
ing class actions as state law suits, but in 1998, Congress made federal courts the exclusive
forum for most class actions alleging fraud in connection with securities. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 78bb(f) (2005).
108. The rules committee considered a variety of proposals, including a "top-to-bottom
revision of all of Rule 23" and special rules governing settlement classes and mass tort
litigation. See 215 F.R.D. at 238-39.
109. Id. at 204-16 (red-lined version of proposed Rule 23); see also id. at 239 (advisory
committee recommendation, characterizing rule changes as "modest" compared to previ-
ous proposals).
110. The amendment, for example, struck the 1966 rule's reference to "conditional"
certification in order to stop the practice of some courts under which they immediately
certified classes, subject to later consideration of the requirements of Rule 23(a) and (b).
See id. at 205 (new Rule 23(c)(1)(C)); see also id. at 217-18 (advisory committee notes).
111. See id. at 205 (proposed new FED. R. Civ. P. 23(g)); see also id. at 225-30 (advisory
committee notes explaining that Rule 23(g) "responds to the reality that selection and
activity of class counsel are often critically important" and that "[u]ntil now, courts have
scrutinized proposed class counsel as well as the class representative under Rule
23(a)(4)").
112. Rules 23 (a) and (b) were unchanged. See id. at 239 ("There is no attempt to
change the criteria for class certification"). The most substantive amendment was to Rule
23(e), which allows the court to deny settlement unless class members are given another
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Reformers also proposed changing federal subject-matter jurisdiction
standards to permit more class actions in federal court. The proposals
centered on a new federal statute that would override Zahn's restrictive
reading of the diversity statute and set a new jurisdictional amount for
class actions.1 13 This legislative proposal eventually became known as the
Class Action Fairness Act.114 The proposal drew both academic1 15 and
political opposition,116 and it stalled for years in Congress. Finally, in
early 2005, CAFA became law.1 1
7
CAFA primarily addresses federal subject-matter jurisdiction. Under
CAFA, a class action may be filed in, or removed to,118 federal court if its
claims in the aggregate exceed $5 million (without regard to the amount
of the individual claims)119 and at least one member of the plaintiff class
is diverse from one of the defendants. 120 CAFA excludes a number of
class actions from federal jurisdiction, including those that are primarily
local to a particular state. a21 In addition, CAFA adds a few new general
procedures, apparently applicable to all class actions in federal court.1
22
chance to opt out. See id. at 211 (new FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(3)); see also id. at 222-24
(advisory committee notes).
113. See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text (discussing Zahn v. Int'l Paper Co.,
414 U.S. 291 (1973)); see H.R. REP. No. 106-320, at 8-9 (1999) (proposing to "correct a
technical flaw" in the diversity statute and arguing that multi-state class actions "deserve
Federal court access because they typically affect more citizens, involve more money, and
implicate more interstate commerce issues that any other type of lawsuit").
114. The first legislative proposal was made in 1998. A bill passed the House in 1999,
but the Senate did not consider it. See John Conyers, Jr., Class Action "Fairness"-A Bad
Deal for the States and Consumers, 40 HARV. J. ON LEGis. 493, 493-94 nn.2 & 4 (2003)
(summarizing history of CAFA).
115. See Woods, supra note 102, at 522-532 (criticizing proposed reforms).
116. A persistent opponent in the House was Representative John Conyers. See gener-
ally Conyers, supra note 114 (arguing against 2002 version of CAFA). He spoke on the
House floor against the final version of the bill. See 151 CONG. REc. H723-01, H726-27
(daily ed. Feb. 17, 2005) (statement of Rep. Conyers) (describing CAFA as an "assault on
our Nation's civil justice system" and as "one-sided, anti-consumer and anti-civil rights
legislation").
117. Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005).
118. CAFA also lessens statutory limits on removal. Previously, a defendant who was a
resident of the state in which a suit was pending could not remove based on diversity, even
if the action was otherwise subject to removal. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (2005). CAFA
exempts class actions from this and other restrictions on removal. Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119
Stat. 4, § 4 (new removal statute applicable to class actions, 28 U.S.C. § 1453).
119. Id. § 4 (28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2) and (d)(6)).
120. Id. (28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)(A)).
121. There are several levels to this exception. The federal court has discretion to de-
cline jurisdiction if, among other things, one-third to two-thirds of the plaintiff class mem-
bers and the "primary defendants" are residents of the state in which the action is
originally filed. Id. (28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(3)). The federal court must decline jurisdiction if,
among other things, more than two-thirds of the plaintiff class are local residents. Id. (28
U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)). CAFA also exempts suits in which there are fewer than 100 class
members or in which state officials are parties. Id. (28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(5)); see also id. (28
U.S.C. § 1332(d)(9)) (exempting securities actions and suits relating to corporate
governance).
122. CAFA adds a new section to the judicial code that addresses class actions gener-
ally: Chapter 114, which was previously a vacant block in Title 28. Id. § 3. Among other
things, this new section requires the defendant to notify specified state officials of pending
settlements. Id. (new provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1715).
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For example, federal courts must scrutinize class action settlements in-
volving coupons or monetary detriment to the class123 and may not ap-
prove a settlement in which class members get greater recovery based on
their close geographic proximity to the court. 124 The procedural changes
are modest: once a class action is in federal court, CAFA does not signifi-
cantly modify the procedure for or law governing class actions.125
The passage of CAFA did not calm the controversy. Critics charged
that CAFA would mean the death knell to class litigation.12 6 Class coun-
sel claimed that they would avoid its effect by crafting class actions to
evade CAFA's expanded subject-matter jurisdiction, and others predicted
wasteful satellite litigation over the meaning and application of CAFA. 127
The extent of federal subject-matter jurisdiction over class actions was
further confused by the Supreme Court's decision in June 2005 in Exxon
Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services Inc., which broadly interpreted the
federal supplemental jurisdiction statute to effectively overrule Zahn and
permit jurisdiction over class actions in which only the named plaintiff
meets the jurisdictional amount. 128 Regardless of the impact of CAFA
and Allapattah, one problem of class action fairness and jurisdiction re-
mains unaddressed: personal jurisdiction over the defendant.
123. Id. (new provisions, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1712, 1713).
124. Id. (new provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1714).
125. See Rogers & Langley, supra note 99, at A7 (stating that plaintiffs' lawyers "took
some comfort" in that CAFA does not contain provisions that they had feared, such as
caps on damages, caps on legal fees, or substantive changes in tort law) (quoting Todd
Smith, president of American Trial Lawyers Association); Carter, supra note 104, at 7
(quoting Yale Law Professor George Priest: "This legislation is not the end of class actions
by any means;" "I think this is reasonable reform, but it's modest.").
126. See Skewering the Lawyers, ECONOMIST (Feb. 19, 2005), at 29 (arguing that "it will
be virtually impossible now to get a nationwide class-action suit off the ground" due to "all
sorts of constraints" that federal judges face in certifying classes and the "huge backlog in
federal cases").
127. Garth Yearick, New Class Action Fairness Act Makes Sweeping Changes, 30 LIT.
NEWS (A.B.A.) (May 2005), at 1, 3 (quoting Gregory P. Joseph, past chair of ABA Section
on Litigation: CAFA "is going to result in a lot of very carefully crafted state court class
actions and a great deal of litigation about who is a 'primary' defendant, what are 'principal
injuries,' and what is 'significant relief" and "the plaintiffs will plead around the Act by
filing separate non-removable actions in different states"); see also Carter, supra note 104,
at 7 (quoting Harvard Law Professor Arthur Miller: CAFA "creates skirmish points where
everyone can now fight in court about everything, including the terms of the legislation,"
which "plays into the hands of the defense interests and the defense lawyers being paid by
the hour").
128. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2611 (2005). The Court
interpreted the supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367, to permit subject-mat-
ter jurisdiction over class actions so long as the named plaintiff meets jurisdictional stan-
dards, irrespective of the remaining class claims, thus changing the doctrine of Zahn. Id. at
2625-27. See supra notes 21-23 (discussing Zahn). The exact jurisdictional impact of Al-
lapatah and CAFA remains to be seen, but the two will have different impact. The Al-
lapatah expansion of jurisdiction applies only where at least one claimant meets
jurisdictional standards, and CAFA allows aggregation of claims and does not require that
any one meet the jurisdictional amount. Moreover, the exceptions to jurisdiction under
section 1367 differ from those under CAFA. Indeed, the Allapatah Court noted that
CAFA did not "moot the significance of our interpretation of § 1367, as many proposed
exercises of supplemental jurisdiction, even in the class-action context, might not fall
within the CAFA's ambit." 125 S. Ct. at 2628.
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F. THE OVERLOOKED QUESTION OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER
THE DEFENDANT IN NATIONWIDE CLASS ACTIONS
CAFA, and the debate leading to its passage, largely ignored one key
fairness question-whether a single court, state or federal, can determine
the claims of persons throughout the United States, when only a few of
the claims arise out of the defendant's activities in the forum state. This is
a question of personal jurisdiction. In state court, the question closely
resembles the issues addressed by the Court in Shutts-whether it is fair
under due process for one state court, which has only marginal connec-
tion to the class as a whole, to decide the claims of a nationwide class.
Shutts addressed personal jurisdiction in this context, but only from the
perspective of the plaintiff class. 129 Shutts also addressed due process
from the perspective of the defendant, but the issue was application of
forum state law, not personal jurisdiction. 130
In Shutts itself, neither the Court nor the parties mentioned personal
jurisdiction from the defendant's perspective. In an earlier, related class
action, the Kansas Supreme Court suggested that jurisdiction was proper
over defendant Phillips because it did business in the state and was served
in Kansas.131 Phillips likely was registered to do business in Kansas, but
under Kansas law, jurisdiction apparently did not depend on whether
Phillips was registered as an out-of-state corporation. In June 1977, a
Kansas appellate court interpreted the Kansas foreign corporation statute
as conferring general personal jurisdiction over non-registered, out-of-
state corporations on claims unrelated to Kansas if the claims arose dur-
ing the time period in which the corporation was doing business in Kan-
sas.132 Thus, regardless of whether Phillips was formally registered to do
business in Kansas, the parties in Shutts probably assumed general per-
sonal jurisdiction over Phillips on all claims, even claims unrelated to
Kansas, because Phillips had been doing business in Kansas.
Shutts drew considerable academic scrutiny and criticism, but few com-
mentators questioned jurisdiction from the defendant's perspective. In
1987, Judge (then Professor) Diane Wood offered the most extensive dis-
cussion of jurisdiction over class action defendants, but even this discus-
sion was limited and part of a longer article concerning a variety of
129. See supra notes 56-60 and accompanying text (discussing Shutts, personal jurisdic-
tion ruling).
130. See supra notes 61-67 and accompanying text (discussing Shutts, choice of law
ruling).
131. Ex rel Shutts v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 567 P.2d 1292, 1304 (Kan. 1977) ("The
named defendant does business in Kansas, and has been duly served with process in Kan-
sas. No question is asserted on this appeal as to the jurisdiction of the trial court over the
defendant or the trial court's power to enforce a judgment against the defendant.").
132. Scrivner v. Twin Am. Agric. & Indus. Developers, Inc., 573 P.2d 404, 408 (Kan. Ct.
App. 1977) (noting dual bases for jurisdiction-actions that "arise out of" Kansas business
or "while" defendant was doing business in Kansas-applicable to corporations which do
business in Kansas, regardless of whether they have formally registered and qualified to do
business); id. at 414 (explaining theory of jurisdiction: the defendant is "present" in Kansas
when he is doing business "so as to be amenable to service of process on any cause of
action arising 'while' it was here").
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jurisdictional issues in class actions. 133 Judge Wood argued that it is diffi-
cult to justify jurisdiction over class action defendants, such as Phillips in
Shutts, where the claims of the unnamed class members do not arise in
the forum. 134 Judge Wood said that most observers of the Shutts case
assumed that the Kansas court had general jurisdiction over Phillips
based on its contacts with Kansas, but she argued that this was a faulty
assumption. 135 Judge Wood proposed a new theory of jurisdiction for
certain types of class actions, under which jurisdiction would be justified
if the class action were of a "purely representational variety," typically
class actions under Rule 23(b)(1) and 23(b)(2).136 By contrast, she ar-
gued that jurisdiction in "joinder" class actions, typically those under
Rule 23(b)(3), must be founded on the defendant's contacts with the fo-
rum, either extensive contacts or local conduct addressed to the class as a
whole, both of which she found missing in Shutts.137 Thus, in at least one
scholar's view, jurisdiction was far from certain as to defendants in na-
tionwide class actions.
Yet, critics of class actions did not press the issue when they com-
plained of state court abuses in nationwide class actions. This is an odd
oversight, given that a jurisdictional challenge is of constitutional propor-
tions and is a means by which a defendant in a nationwide class action
can attempt to move the suit out of an undesirable forum. The oversight
also is surprising because the critics' arguments-abusive forum shopping
and state courts exceeding sovereign limits13 8-parallel some of the fair-
ness concerns of jurisdictional analysis. I do not mean to say that every-
one overlooked these issues. Surely some litigants, courts, and other
commentators 139 considered the issues. Yet, the fairness of personal ju-
risdiction over the defendant obviously has not been a significant part of
the recent national debate concerning "class action fairness." It is an is-
sue that merits more careful consideration.
133. Diane P. Wood, Adjudicatory Jurisdiction and Class Actions, 62 IND. L.J. 597
(1987).
134. Id. at 613 ("Because no one had raised the point, the Supreme Court's decision inShutts paid no attention to the question why Phillips had to answer in Kansas for its policy
about interest on suspense royalties. The answer to that question is important, however,
because it reveals that some states will be proper fora in multistate class actions of this kind
and others will not-a subtlety that the Court's analysis did not capture.").
135. Id. at 614-15.
136. Id. at 616-18.
137. Id.
138. For example, CAFA lists Congressional "findings" of "abuses" by state courts that
include "keeping cases of national importance out of Federal court," "sometimes acting in
ways that demonstrate bias against out-of-State defendants," and "making judgments that
impose their views of the law on other States and bind the rights of the residents of those
States." Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4, § 2 (2005); see also notes supra 97-103 (reporting
criticisms of state court class actions).
139. Professor John E. Kennedy, in his 1985 general critique of Shutts, briefly ques-
tioned personal jurisdiction over Phillips. He believed that the Court either assumed juris-diction based on consent or based jurisdiction over Phillips on a theory of necessity, whathe called "exaggerated necessity." John E. Kennedy, The Supreme Court Meets the Bride
of Frankenstein: Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts and the State Multistate Class Action, 34
KAN. L. REV. 255, 281-82 n.140, 285-86, 306 (1985).
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II. THE PERSONAL JURISDICTION PROBLEM IN
NATIONWIDE CLASS ACTIONS FILED
IN STATE COURT
The principal problem with a state court asserting personal jurisdiction
over a defendant in a nationwide class action occurs when the bulk of the
class claims do not arise out of the defendant's forum contacts. To be
sure, the named class representative often has a local claim, but the class
consists of residents of many states and their claims usually arise in their
home states. This problem is fundamental because the relationship of the
claim to the forum is a crucial factor in determining the due process fair-
ness of state court jurisdiction. Not all assertions of jurisdiction require
that the claims arise out of forum activities, but the lack of such relation-
ship makes jurisdiction more difficult to justify. In this section, I start in
Part II(A)(1) by examining the Supreme Court's cases regarding state
court personal jurisdiction with a particular emphasis on the criterion that
claims relate to the defendant's forum contacts. In Part II(A)(2), I look
at the policies underlying the relationship standard. I conclude in Part
II(B) with an in-depth examination of four possible arguments that might
justify state court personal jurisdiction over the defendant in nationwide
class actions.
A. THE FUNCTION OF RELATEDNESS IN ASSESSING PERSONAL
JURISDICTION IN STATE COURTS
The Supreme Court has long imposed limits on a state court's personal
jurisdiction, primarily under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. In Pennoyer v. Neff, the Court established a physical power
theory of state court jurisdiction, based on "principles of public law" that
the Court equated with notions of due process. 140 In the early twentieth
century, the Court invalidated some state court assertions of jurisdiction
under the dormant commerce clause.141 In 1945, the Court in Interna-
tional Shoe Co. v. Washington142 introduced the "minimum contacts" test
for judging the due process fairness of state court personal jurisdiction.143
The minimum contacts due process test is now the primary basis for as-
sessing state court jurisdiction, but the Court has struggled to define the
minimum contacts test and its relationship, if any, with other tests of ju-
risdiction. Throughout this struggle, the Court has repeatedly recognized
a distinction between jurisdiction over claims that arise out of a defen-
dant's activities in the forum state and jurisdiction over claims that do not
concern the defendant's forum activities.
140. 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877). The Court based its holding on general principles of law
because the judgment preceded enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment, but the Court
also stated that jurisdiction from thereafter should be tested under due process standards.
Id. at 733-34.
141. Davis v. Farmer's Co-op Equity Co., 262 U.S. 312 (1923).
142. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
143. Id. at 316-19.
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1. The Supreme Court Cases Governing State Court Personal
Jurisdiction and the Relatedness Factor
Under Pennoyer, a state court could assert jurisdiction over a defen-
dant if, at the beginning of the suit, the defendant was found and served
in the forum state (in personam jurisdiction) or his property in the state
was properly attached (in rem and quasi in rem jurisdiction). 144 The rule
had two exceptions-suits determining the marital status of forum citi-
zens and suits in which the defendant consented to jurisdiction-but in all
other cases, a state court's jurisdiction required in-state service on the
defendant or attachment of the defendant's in-state property. 145 The
physical presence of the person of the defendant or his property was the
key under Pennoyer. Without physical power over the defendant or his
property, the assertion of jurisdiction violated the defendant's right to
due process, and any resulting judgment was void and unenforceable. 146
In most cases, the relationship of the plaintiff's claim to the forum was
irrelevant. If a state had power over the person or his property, then the
state had power to adjudicate any claim, even a claim that arose outside
the forum. However, relationship played a role in a few forms of jurisdic-
tion under Pennoyer. In early automobile cases, for example, the Court
permitted state court jurisdiction through express or implied consent, but
such jurisdiction was limited to suits arising from the defendant's driving
in the forum state.1 47 Relationship also played a role in jurisdiction over
corporations, although that role was far from clear.
Corporations did not fit comfortably in the physical power theory ofjurisdiction because a corporation is a fictional entity that has no physical
presence, 148 and as a result, a variety of theories developed to justify ju-
144. 95 U.S. at 724.
145. "Except in cases affecting the personal status of the plaintiff, and cases in which
that mode of service may be considered to have been assented to in advance," a defendant
must be personally served in the state or his property must be brought under the control of
the court. Id. at 733.
146. Initially, courts tended to interpret Pennoyer as applying only to enforcement ofjudgments in subsequent proceedings, but by the early twentieth century, the Court inter-
preted Pennoyer as declaring that a judgment entered without jurisdiction was itself a vio-
lation of due process at the outset. Riverside & Dan River Cotton Mills v. Menefee, 237
U.S. 189, 196-97 (1915) ("[U]nobservedly or otherwise, judgments have been rendered in
violation of the due process clause, and their enforcement has been refused under the full
faith and credit clause, affords no ground for refusing to apply the due process clause and
preventing that from being done which is by it forbidden, and which, if done, would be
void and not entitled to enforcement under the full faith and credit clause.").
147. See generally Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1922) (implied appointment of agent
for service of process in suits arising out of driving in Massachusetts); Kane v. New Jersey,
242 U.S. 160 (1916) (actual appointment of in-state agent for service on suits arising out of
driving in New Jersey).
148. The prevailing law in the early nineteenth century held that a corporation could be
"found" only in its state of incorporation. See Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. 519, 588(1839) (stating that "a corporation can have no legal existence out of the boundaries of the
sovereignty by which it is created"); see also Philip B. Kurland, The Supreme Court, the
Due Process Clause and the In Personam Jurisdiction of State Courts, From Pennoyer to
Denckla: A Review, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 569, 578 (1958).
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risdiction over corporations. 149 The first theory was consent. Before
Pennoyer, an out-of-state corporation needed a state's permission before
it could do business in the state, and the Court allowed states to condition
that permission on the corporation consenting to jurisdiction through ap-
pointment of an in-state agent for service of process. 150 In addition, when
a corporation failed to register or appoint an agent, but nonetheless did
business in a state, the Court allowed the state to imply assent from the
act of doing business.151 In implied consent cases, the state statute usu-
ally provided for service on a state official, such as the Secretary of State.
Pennoyer did not change this scheme; it recognized express and implied
consent as permissible bases of jurisdiction over corporations.
152
In the decades following Pennoyer, many courts, including the Supreme
Court, suggested an alternative theory to implied consent, based on cor-
porate presence. Under the presence theory, a corporation that con-
ducted a certain level of in-state business was deemed to be present and
subject to jurisdiction in the state. 153 The theories co-existed, and courts
used the same term, "doing business," to describe the level of in-state
activity that would trigger jurisdiction in both presence and implied con-
sent cases. 154 Although courts rarely articulated a constitutional theory
in the corporate consent and presence cases, most cases can be fairly
characterized as deciding the due process limits of state court jurisdiction.
In the early twentieth century, however, the Court used the dormant
149. See generally GERALD HENDERSON, THE POSITION OF FOREIGN CORPORATIONS IN
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, ch. V (1918) (tracing early history and development of
jurisdictional principles as to corporations).
150. The seminal decision was Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, in which the Court in 1855
stated that a "corporation created by Indiana can transact business in Ohio only with the
consent, express or implied, of the latter State," and that "[t]his consent may be accompa-
nied by such conditions as Ohio may think fit to impose," including in-state service of
process. 59 U.S. 404, 407 (1855).
151. Id.; see also R.R. Co. v. Harris, 79 U.S. 65, 81 (1870) (stating that a corporation
"cannot migrate, but may exercise its authority in a foreign territory upon such conditions
as may be prescribed by the law of the place" and that "[i]f it do business there it will be
presumed to have assented and will be bound accordingly").
152. The court explained:
Neither do we mean to assert that a State may not require a non-resident
entering into a partnership or association within its limits, or making con-
tracts enforceable there, to appoint an agent ... in the state State to receive
service of process and notice in legal proceedings instituted with respect to
such partnership, association or contracts .... and provide, upon their failure,
to make such appointment ... that service may be made upon a public officer
designated for that purpose.
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 735 (1877).
153. See St. Louis S.W. Ry. Co. v. Alexander, 227 U.S. 218, 226-28 (1913) (survey-
ing "doing business" standards for determining "the presence of the corporation within
the jurisdiction of the court"); ROBERT C. CASAD, MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE
§ 108.2311][b][iii] (2005) (describing doing business-presence theory).
154. See Kurland, supra note 148, at 584 (noting that the application of either the con-
sent or the presence doctrine "created difficulties, for whichever was chosen it became
necessary to determine whether the foreign corporation was 'doing business' within the
state, either to decide whether its 'consent' could properly be 'implied,' or to discover




commerce clause to invalidate state court jurisdiction over corporations
engaged in interstate commerce in cases that the Court acknowledged
might survive a due process challenge. 155
The relationship of the claim to the corporation's forum activities was
relevant under some of these theories of corporate jurisdiction. Relation-
ship was an important factor in the dormant commerce clause cases. In-
deed, the only cases in which the Court invalidated state courtjurisdiction under the dormant commerce clause involved claims that
arose outside the forum state. 156 In the due process cases, the courts
seemed to make distinctions based on the theory of jurisdiction. The Su-
preme Court held that implied consent to appointment of a state officer
for service of process must be limited to claims arising from the corpora-
tion's in-state activity, 57 but that actual appointment of an agent for ser-
vice of process could authorize general jurisdiction over claims having no
relation to the forum state. 158 In the presence cases, the Court did not
directly address whether the claim must be related to the corporate de-
fendant's forum activities, but some contemporaneous scholars argued
that lack of relationship was an unstated but critical factor in many of the
cases in which the Court invalidated jurisdiction.159 Nevertheless, a few
155. See Davis v. Farmer's Co-op Equity Co., 262 U.S. 312, 317-18 (1923) (holding that
dormant commerce clause forbid Minnesota from asserting jurisdiction over a Kansas rail-
road on a claim by a Kansas resident that arose in Kansas and noting that the case resem-bled two cases in which the Court previously had upheld jurisdiction but stating that "in
both cases, the only constitutional objection asserted was violation of the due process
clause").
156. See id. at 316-17 (noting that the statutory authorization of jurisdiction might with-
stand commerce class scrutiny if, among other things, "the transaction out of which it arosehad been entered upon within the state"); see also Missouri v. Taylor, 266 U.S. 200, 207(1924) (upholding jurisdiction against commerce clause challenge and distinguishing Davis,in part based on possibility that suit at issue in Taylor concerned negligence in the forum
state). That a cause of action arose outside the state, however, did not necessarily mean
that the Court would invalidate the assertion of jurisdiction as unreasonably burdeninginterstate commerce. The Court also looked at other factors, including party residence.
See Hoffman v. Missouri, 274 U.S. 21, 21-23 (1927) (upholding Missouri state court juris-diction over claim that arose in Kansas where the defendant was incorporated in Missouri).
157. Old Wayne Mut. Life Ass'n v. McDonough, 204 U.S. 8, 21 (1907) (rejecting juris-
diction over Indiana insurance company that did business in Pennsylvania: "it cannot beheld that the company agreed that the service of process upon the Insurance Commis-
sioner of that commonwealth would alone be sufficient to bring it into court with respect to
all business transacted by it, no matter where, with, or for the benefit of, citizens of Penn-
sylvania") (emphasis added); Simon v. S. Ry., 236 U.S. 115, 130 (1915) (stating that the
"power to designate by statute the officer upon whom service in suits against foreign cor-
porations may be made relates to business and transactions within the jurisdiction of the
state enacting the law" and that "the statutory consent of a foreign corporation to be sued
does not extend to causes of action arising in other States").
158. Pa. Fire Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co., 243 U.S. 93, 96 (1917) (distin-
guishing Old Wayne and Simon, supra note 157, as involving fictional consent: "when apower actually is conferred by a document, the party executing it takes the risk of theinterpretation that may be put upon it by the courts").
159. Note, What Constitutes Doing Business By a Foreign Corporation for Purposes of
Jurisdiction, 29 COLIuM. L. REV. 187, 190-91 (1929) (reviewing cases, noting that "[f]ew
courts consider directly where the cause arose" and concluding that "while courts continue
to talk in the traditional jargon ... whether the cause of action arose in the forum is more
often than not the determinative factor").
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lower courts suggested that a corporation's presence through doing busi-
ness was analogous to the physical presence of a natural person, thereby
extending general jurisdiction over corporations on unrelated claims. 160
These distinctions were by no means settled, and they created anoma-
lies. 161 In some courts, the same level of activities-"doing business"-
conferred different levels of jurisdiction, depending on whether the the-
ory was implied consent or presence, and under consent theory, a corpo-
ration who defied registration statutes might face lesser jurisdictional
consequences than a corporation who complied and registered.'
62
In 1945, the Court in International Shoe tried to end the confusion by
developing a new minimum contacts test for corporate jurisdiction, and in
doing so, it clarified the importance of the relationship of the claim to the
defendant's forum state activities. 163 The minimum contacts test asks
whether the defendant had sufficient minimum contacts with the state so
that the assertion of personal jurisdiction would not offend "traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice."'1 64 The aim of the minimum
contacts test, according to the Court, is to more directly ask the question
at the heart of both the presence and implied consent cases: whether it is
fair to subject the corporation to jurisdiction. 165
To illustrate and give meaning to the new test, the Court in Interna-
tional Shoe collected many of its prior decisions and grouped them into
four categories. 166 The first and easiest case for finding jurisdiction is one
160. Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 115 N.E. 915, 918 (N.Y. 1917) (Cardozo, J., stat-
ing that "the jurisdiction does not fail because the cause of action sued upon has no rela-
tion in its origin to the business here transacted;" and "the essential thing is that the
corporation shall have come into the state"); see also Kurland, supra note 148, at 583.
161. See generally Kurland, supra note 148, at 579-80; HENDERSON, supra note 149, at
96-100 (discussing issues regarding the relationship of the claim to the forum under early
twentieth century jurisdictional principles).
162. HENDERSON, supra note 149, at 96-100; see also Smolik v. Philadelphia & Reading
Coal & Iron Co., 222 F. 148, 150-51 (S.D.N.Y. 1915) (Learned Hand, J., stating that the
argument that "an outlaw who refused to obey the laws of the state would be in a better
position that a corporation which chooses to conform," confuses "a legal fiction with a
statement of fact" and holding that implied consent is a fiction that, as "a mere creature of
justice" should be limited, but that actual consent "must be measured by the proper mean-
ing to be attributed to the words used, and, where that meaning calls for wide application,
such must be given").
163. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316-17 (1945).
164. "[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in
personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum
contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice."' Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463
(1941)).
165. Id. at 316-17 (stating that "presence" in its prior decisions was "used merely to
symbolize those activities of the corporation's agent within the state which courts will
deem to be sufficient to satisfy the demands of due process"); id. at 318 (stating that some
of its earlier jurisdiction decisions were "supported by resort to the legal fiction that [the
corporation] has given its consent to service and suit, consent being implied from its pres-
ence in the state through the acts of its authorized agents" and that "more realistically it
may be said that those authorized acts were of such a nature as to justify the fiction").
166. In the following discussion, infra notes 167-70, I have included the Court's full
quotation and citation to its previous cases, and I have added bracketed explanations of
the essential holding of each case cited by the Court.
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"when the activities of the corporation [in the forum] have not only been
continuous and systematic, but also give rise to the liabilities sued
upon.1 67 The easiest case against jurisdiction is one where the corpora-
tion has "isolated" forum activities "unconnected" to the claim. 168 The
more difficult cases for deciding jurisdiction, according to the Court, are
those in which the two factors are mixed-extensive but unrelated con-
167. "Presence" in the state ... has never been doubted when the activities of
the corporation there have not only been continuous and systematic, but also
give rise to the liability sued on, even though no consent to be sued or au-
thorization to an agent to accept service of process has been given. St. Clair
v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350, 355 [rejecting jurisdiction over an unrelated claim but
stating that it is "only right" to hold corporations "responsible in those courts
to obligations and liabilities there incurred"]; Connecticut Mutual Life Insur-
ance Co. v. Spratley, 172 U.S. 602,610, 611 [finding personal jurisdiction over
an in-state insurance claim where the defendant had many insurance policies
in the forum state]; Pennsylvania Lumbermen's Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Meyer,
197 U.S. 407, 414, 415 [same]; Commercial Mutual Accident Co. v. Davis, 213
U.S. 245, 255, 256 [same]; International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, [234 U.S.
579 (1909) [finding jurisdiction on a criminal restraint of trade claim, even if
defendant's contacts were exclusively interstate commerce, where they con-
stituted a continued course of dealings with forum]; cf. St. Louis S.W. R. Co.,
227 U.S. 218 [finding jurisdiction over claim arising from failed railroad de-
livery to the forum where defendant was "present" in forum, due to agent,
office and other business]."
Int'l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 317 (bracketed case explanations added) (parallel cites omitted).
168. Conversely it has been generally recognized that the casual presence of the
corporate agent or even his conduct of single or isolated items of activities in
a state in the corporation's behalf are not enough to subject it to suit on
causes of action unconnected with the activities there. St. Clair v. Cox .. ,
106 U.S. 359, 360 [rejecting jurisdiction where there was there was no evi-
dence that defendant engaged in business in forum at time agent served]; Old
Wayne Mut. Life Ass'n v. McDonough 204 U.S. 8, 21 [rejecting jurisdiction
over an insurance claim on a policy executed outside the forum, even if de-
fendant insurer did other business in forum]; Frene v. Louisville Cement
Co .... 134 F.2d 511, 515 and cases cited [surveying expansion of jurisdic-
tional law and finding jurisdiction in forum over foreign manufacturer, based
on its forum solicitation of sales and other activities]. To require the corpora-
tion in such circumstances to defend the suit away from its home or otherjurisdiction where it carries on more substantial activities has been thought
to lay too great and unreasonable a burden on the corporation to comport
with due process.
Id. (bracketed case explanations added) (parallel citations omitted).
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tacts169 or isolated but related contacts.170 Jurisdiction in either case
could fail or satisfy the demands of due process, depending on the facts of
each case.
In all four examples, the Court manipulated two factors: first, the ex-
tent of the defendant's forum contacts (whether continuous and system-
atic or merely isolated), and second, the relationship of the claim to the
defendant's forum contacts (whether the forum activities gave rise to the
suit or were unconnected to the forum activities). Substantial contacts by
themselves could be enough in some cases even without relatedness, but
relatedness moved the substantial contacts case to the "easy yes" cate-
gory. On the other extreme, where the defendant had only isolated con-
tacts with the forum, the relationship of the contacts to the claim might be
169. While it has been held in cases on which appellant relies that continuous
activity of some sorts within a state is not enough to support the demand that
the corporation be amenable to suits unrelated to that activity, Old Wayne
Mut. Life Ass'n v. McDonough ..., 204 U.S. at 22 [rejecting jurisdiction on
unrelated claim where consent was merely implied and there was a factual
question as to degree of other business in the forum], Green v. Chicago, Bur-
lington & Quincy R. Co .... [rejecting jurisdiction over railroad based on
passenger agent's "mere solicitation" of ticket sales in forum where claim
arose outside forum], Simon v. Southern R. Co., 236 U.S. 115 [rejecting ju-
risdiction over railroad in Louisiana on a personal injury claim arising in Ala-
bama where there was a factual question as to whether the defendant
conducted any business in forum]; People's Tobacco Co. v. American To-
bacco Co. 246 U.S. 79, 87 (1918) [rejecting jurisdiction in Louisiana on anti-
trust claim by competitor based on defendant's mere stock ownership in
subsidiary corporation and advertisements of product in forum]; cf. Davis v.
Farmers' Co-operative Equity Co., 262 U.S. 312, 317 [invalidating Minnesota
state court jurisdiction on commerce clause grounds over claim against Kan-
sas railroad that arose in Kansas, where defendant's only contacts with Min-
nesota was a freight agent soliciting business there], there have been
instances in which the continuous corporate operations within a state were
thought so substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit against it on
causes of action arising from dealings entirely distinct from those activities.
See Missouri, K. & T.R. Co. v. Reynolds, 255 U.S. 565 (1921) [affirming with-
out opinion Massachusetts case that found jurisdiction over defendant rail-
road, based on solicitation-plus in forum], Tauza v. Susquhanna Coal Co.,
115 N.E. 915 [finding personal jurisdiction over unrelated claim based on
steady sales and shipments to New York); cf. St. Louis S.W. Ry. v. Alexander
.... [finding jurisdiction on related claim based on solicitation-plus in the
forum].
Id. at 318. (bracketed case explanations added) (parallel citations omitted).
170. [A]lthough the commission of some single or occasional acts of the corpo-
rate agent in a state sufficient to impose an obligation or liability on the cor-
poration has not been thought to confer upon the state authority to enforce
it, Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Curtis Brown Co., 260 U.S. 516, 518 (1923)
[rejecting jurisdiction in New York based solely on defendant corporation's
New York purchases through mail and regular visits], other such acts, be-
cause of their nature and quality and the circumstances of their commission,
may be deemed sufficient to render the corporation liable to suit. Cf. Kane
v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160 [finding jurisdiction over non-resident motorist
based on express consent to jurisdiction over claims arising out of driving in
forum]; Hess v. Pawloski . . . , 274 U.S. 352 [allowing jurisdiction over non-
resident motorist based on implied consent to jurisdiction over claims arising
out of driving in forum]; Young v. Masci..., [allowing application of New
York law to insurer that issued policies on New York property]."
Id. (bracketed case explanations added) (parallel citations omitted).
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enough to justify jurisdiction, but lack of relationship was fatal to jurisdic-
tion. Thus, relationship of the claim to the forum contacts played a piv-
otal role under the Court's new minimum contacts test.
Most of the Court's personal jurisdiction cases since International Shoe
have concerned the propriety of jurisdiction in the second mixed factor
case isolated and related contacts with the forum, what the Court now
calls "specific" personal jurisdiction. 171 The most important development
in this line of cases was the "purposeful availment" factor. In Hanson v.
Denckla, the Court held that a Florida court could not assert jurisdiction
over a Delaware trust company even though the suit concerned its busi-
ness dealings with a Florida resident.172 The defendant trust company
originally formed its relationship with the trust settlor while she was a
resident of Pennsylvania, and it continued to do business with her after
she moved to Florida. 173 The "unilateral activity" of the settlor was not
enough to establish the defendant's minimum contacts with the state of
Florida: "[i]t is essential in each case that there be some act by which the
defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activi-
ties within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of
its laws."'1 7 4
The purposeful availment standard did not replace the two Interna-
tional Shoe factors of extent of contacts and degree of relationship. In-
stead, the Court added the purposeful availment as a third factor to
determine jurisdiction in cases of related but isolated contacts. In order
to justify specific jurisdiction, the defendant's isolated contact with the
forum not only must be related to the suit, but the forum contacts also
must be purposely initiated by the defendant.
In 1980, the Court in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson 175 sep-
arated the minimum contacts test for specific personal jurisdiction into
two parts, each correlating to a separate function of the minimum con-
tacts test. According to the Court, the minimum contacts test serves two
functions: first, "to ensure that the States through their courts, do not
reach out beyond the limits imposed on them by their status as coequal
sovereigns in a federal system," and second, to protect "the defendant
against the burdens of litigating in a distant or inconvenient forum."'1 76
The sovereignty function is served by the first prong of the test, which
looks to three factors: the extent of contacts, the relationship of contacts,
171. The Court adopted the terminology in Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A.
v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 415 n.9 (1984), based on an influential article by Professors Arthur T.
von Mehren and Donald T. Trautman: Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79
HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1136-44 (1966).
172. 357 U.S. 235, 254 (1958).
173. Id. at 252-53.
174. Id. at 253.
175. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
176. Id. at 292. I have reversed the order of the two functions, as originally stated by
the Court. The Court's later discussion and application demonstrate that the Court consid-
ered the sovereignty function to be the crucial first inquiry. See infra notes 177-79.
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and purposeful availment. 177 The second prong protects the defendant
from an unreasonable assertion of jurisdiction.1 78 Although the burden
on the defendant is a primary concern under this "reasonableness" prong,
the defendant's burden must be balanced against other relevant factors,
including the "forum State's interest in adjudicating the dispute," the
plaintiff's interest in suit in the forum, interstate judicial efficiency, "and
the shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental social
policies. 17
9
The assertion of jurisdiction must pass both prongs of the test. If there
is an insufficient connection between the defendant, the suit, and the fo-
rum under the first prong, it does not matter how reasonable the asser-
tion of jurisdiction otherwise would be.18 0 Indeed, the Court in Burger
King Corp. v. Rudzewicz described the first "contacts" prong as the "con-
stitutional touchstone."1 81 Once the first prong is met, the jurisdiction is
presumed reasonable, and the defendant must show a "compelling case"
of unreasonableness before the jurisdiction will be deemed
unconstitutional. 1 82
The Court rarely has addressed jurisdiction in the other International
Shoe mixed factor case substantial but unrelated contacts, what the Court
now calls "general" personal jurisdiction. 183 In general jurisdiction cases,
the court must consider two key issues: whether the claim is "unrelated,"
and if so, whether the defendant has sufficient contacts to justify general
jurisdiction.' 84 The Supreme Court has addressed only the second ques-
tion-the extent of contacts necessary to justify jurisdiction on unrelated
claims.
In 1952, the Court in Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co. held
that an Ohio state court could properly assert jurisdiction over a share-
holder claim against a Philippine mining company that had halted opera-
177. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 295-98. See infra notes 214-20 (discuss-
ing holding in World-Wide Volkswagen).
178. Id. at 292.
179. Id.
180. The Court stated:
Even if the defendant would suffer minimal or no inconvenience from being
forced to litigate before the tribunals of another State; even if the forum
State has a strong interest in applying its law to the controversy; even if the
forum State is the most convenient location for the litigation, the Due Pro-
cess Clause, acting as an instrument of interstate federalism, may sometimes
act to divest the State of its power to render a valid judgment.
Id. at 294 (citing Hanson v. Denckla, 357 N.S. 235, 254). In World-Wide Volkswagen itself,
the Court did not consider the reasonableness factors because the case did not satisfy the
first prong. Id. at 299.
181. 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985).
182. Id. at 477. The Burger King Court acknowledged that the second prong's factors
sometimes could "establish the reasonableness of jurisdiction upon a lesser showing of
minimum contacts" under the first prong. Id.
183. See supra note 169 (discussing International Shoe mixed factor cases).
184. But see Mary Twitchell, The Myth of General Jurisdiction, 101 HARV. L. REV. 610,




tions during World War II and moved its scaled-back office to Ohio.185
The defendant's president "carried on in Ohio a continuous and system-
atic supervision of the necessarily limited wartime activities of the com-
pany," which was sufficient to justify suit on claims that the Court said
did not arise in the forum. 186 In Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia,
S.A. v. Hall,187 the defendant operated a helicopter charter service in
South America, and one of its helicopters crashed in Peru, killing Ameri-
can oil pipeline workers. 188 Their widows sued in state court in Texas.
The defendant had purchased helicopters in Texas, sent some of its staff
for training in Texas, negotiated the particular charter service with the
decedent's employer in Texas, and taken payment from checks drawn on
Texas banks.189 The Court assumed an unrelated cause of action19° and
held that the Texas contacts were not enough to support general jurisdic-
tion because Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia's activities did not
constitute a continuous and systematic business presence in Texas. 191
Relationship-or more accurately, lack of relationship-played a piv-
otal role in Perkins and Helicopteros. The Court in both cases acknowl-
edged that jurisdiction based on unrelated contacts requires a different
analysis than jurisdiction based on related contacts, but it did not address
how to determine whether a particular contact is related to the plaintiff's
claim. Instead, the Court summarily stated or assumed that the claims
were unrelated to the defendants' forum contacts.
Relationship undoubtedly is a critical element under minimum contacts
analysis, but minimum contacts analysis does not necessarily apply to test
all assertions of jurisdiction. Many theories of jurisdiction existed before
International Shoe, and the Court did not necessarily replace all of these
theories with minimum contacts analysis. The Court in International Shoe
strongly suggested that the new minimum contacts test replaced the pres-
ence and implied consent tests for corporate jurisdiction, but it did not
speak directly to other theories or bases of jurisdiction. 192 It did not ad-
dress two other issues of corporate jurisdiction-express consent and dor-
mant commerce clause.193 Moreover, because International Shoe was a
185. 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
186. Id. at 448.
187. Helicopteros Nacionaloes de Columbia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
188. Id. at 410.
189. Id. at 410-12 & 416-17.
190. The Court stated that the plaintiffs conceded that the claim was unrelated to
Helicopteros's Texas contacts. Id. at 415 & n.10. See also infra notes 239-43 (discussing
relatedness issues in Helicopteros).
191. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 416.
192. See supra notes 164-70 (discussing International Shoe).
193. However, in listing the four cases of jurisdiction, the International Shoe Court ob-
liquely referred to both consent and commerce clause jurisdictional principles or cases. See
supra notes 167-70 (quoting International Shoe Court's discussion of four cases of jurisdic-
tion). In noting the first easy case of jurisdiction-related and substantial contacts-the
Court stated that jurisdiction had never been doubted "even though no consent to be sued
or authorization to an agent to accept service of process had been given." Int'l Shoe Co.,
326 U.S. at 317. In noting that general jurisdiction over unrelated claims could be denied
in some cases, the Court included a "cf" citation to Davis, the leading case in which the
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corporate jurisdiction case, the Court did not consider the due process
limits on personal jurisdiction over property or natural persons. Since
International Shoe, the Court has not directly tested personal jurisdiction
under the dormant commerce clause, and it has struggled, with mixed
success, to determine whether minimum contacts analysis supplants or
merely supplements the Pennoyer due process tests. The lingering doubt
about these other tests of jurisdiction in turn creates uncertainty as to the
proper role of relationship of the claim to the forum in these cases.
First, in 1977, in Shaffer v. Heitner,194 the Court held that Pennoyer's
property bases for personal jurisdiction (in-rem and quasi-in-rem jurisdic-
tion) were no longer valid and that "all assertions of state-court jurisdic-
tion must be evaluated according to the standards set forth in
International Shoe and its progeny. ' '195 Under minimum contacts analy-
sis, the property is merely one forum contact that must be evaluated
under the minimum contacts test to determine if the exercise of jurisdic-
tion is fair.196 The essential difference was the relationship factor of the
minimum contacts test: "the central concern of the inquiry into personal
jurisdiction" involves "the relationship among the defendant, the forum,
and the litigation. 1 97 Thus, as the Court explained, minimum contacts
analysis would result in "significant change" in many cases formerly
based on quasi-in-rem jurisdiction where, by definition, the defendant's
contact with the forum state-the property-is not related to the suit. 198
Despite Shaffer, the Court has since endorsed both consent and in-state
service as grounds for jurisdiction, independent of minimum contacts
analysis. In Shaffer itself, the Court in a dictum seemingly approved of a
statute whereby directors consented to jurisdiction through acceptance of
directorship in corporations incorporated in the forum state. 199 In 1982,
the Court in Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Campagne des Bauxites de
Guinee200 held that a court, consistent with due process, may sanction a
defendant for misconduct by holding that the defendant waived its chal-
lenge to personal jurisdiction.20 1 The Court explained that the require-
Court invalidated jurisdiction under the dormant commerce clause. Id. at 318; see supra
notes 155-56 (discussing Davis and related cases).
194. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
195. Id. at 212.
196. Id. at 207-08.
197. Id. at 204.
198. Id. at 208. Under Pennoyer, the property in quasi in rem cases was used to acquire
jurisdiction and was "completely unrelated to the plaintiff's cause of action." Id. at 209.
See supra notes 144-46 and accompanying text (discussing Pennoyer quasi in rem
jurisdiction).
199. 433 U.S. at 216 n.47 (noting that "Delaware unlike some States, has not enacted a
statute that treats acceptance of a directorship as consent to jurisdiction in the state").
200. 456 U.S. 694 (1982).
201. The defendant in Bauxites challenged personal jurisdiction, and the trial court or-
dered discovery on jurisdictional facts. Id. at 698-99. When the defendant failed to comply
with the discovery orders, the trial court sanctioned it under Rule 37 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and ordered that personal jurisdiction over the defendant was estab-
lished. Id. at 699; see FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A) (providing that for failure to comply with
a discovery order, the court may order "that the matters regarding which the order was
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ment that a court have personal jurisdiction does not flow from Article
III, but instead the Due Process Clause, which protects an individual's
liberty interest, and as an individual liberty interest, the defendant may
consent to or waive this protection.20 2 Likewise, in Shutts, the Court in
1985 relied in part on a consent theory to uphold jurisdiction over the
plaintiff class, independent of minimum contacts analysis. 2
0 3
In 1990, the Court in Burnham v. Superior Court of California held that
personal service in the forum-commonly called transient or tag jurisdic-
tion, and the primary basis for jurisdiction under Pennoyer-continued as
a basis for jurisdiction, at least as to natural persons. 20 4 The Burnham
Court split as to the proper mode of analysis, but all nine Justices upheld
in-state service as a means of securing jurisdiction over individual defend-
ants.20 5 Justice Scalia relied on historical precedent for determining due
process standards and distinguished Shaffer as demanding minimum con-
tacts analysis only in cases involving persons not present in the forum
state at time of service.20 6 Justice Brennan held that tag jurisdiction must
be assessed under the minimum contacts test, but he suggested that most
cases of tag jurisdiction would easily satisfy minimum contacts analysis.20 7
The Court did not conclusively state in these cases whether jurisdiction
based on consent or in-state service requires any relationship between the
claim and the forum. In the consent cases, the consent to or waiver of
jurisdiction was limited to particular claims, and the Court had no occa-
sion to consider broader consent to unlimited jurisdiction. By contrast, in
Burnham, the entire Court seemed to assume that the defendant's pres-
ence in the forum at the time of service need not be related to the suit.20 8
made or any other designated facts shall be taken to be established for purposes of the
action").
202. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. at 702. The Court clarified that
World-Wide Volkswagen did not hold otherwise. Id. at 702 n.10 ("The restriction on state
sovereign power described in World-Wide Volkwagen Corp., however, must be seen as ulti-
mately a function of the individual liberty interest preserved by the Due Process Clause.").
See supra notes 175-77 and accompanying text (discussing World-Wide Volkswagen discus-
sion of sovereignty function).
203. "Any plaintiff may consent to jurisdiction. The essential question, then, is how
stringent the requirement for a showing of consent will be." Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985).
204. Burnham v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 495 U.S. 604 (1990).
205. Id.
206. Id. at 607-28.
207. Id. at 628-40. See infra note 208 (discussing Justice Brennan's "rule" as to tag
jurisdiction cases).
208. According to Justice Scalia, International Shoe permitted jurisdiction based on the
contacts of an absent defendant "only with respect to suits arising out of the absent defen-
dant's contacts with the State," which made the question before the Burnham Court
"whether due process requires a similar connection between the litigation and the defen-
dant's contacts with the State in cases where the defendant is physically present in the State
at the time process is served upon him." Id. at 610. He answered no. Justice Brennan in
Burnham concluded that "as a rule the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a defendant
based on his voluntary presence in the forum will satisfy the requirements of due process."
Id. at 629 (Brennan, J., concurring) (emphasis added). Under this "rule," the relationship
of the claim to the defendant's forum contacts is immaterial.
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Thus, although relationship is a key element in minimum contacts analy-
sis, it may not be in all cases.
2. The Policy Reasons In Support of the Relatedness Requirement
Despite the uncertainty as to some bases of jurisdiction, relationship
unquestionably is a key factor in most assertions of jurisdiction. The
Court has not articulated precisely why relationship plays an important
role in determining jurisdiction, but the Court has explained the policies
underlying the minimum contacts test as a whole, which in turn help ex-
plain the importance of relationship. The foremost policy reason under-
lying personal jurisdiction analysis is fairness-jurisdiction must comport
with "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice" 2 9-and this
general fairness policy has four components-reciprocity, predictability,
state sovereignty, and inconvenience. Academic commentators have
struggled to use these individual components to explain the role of the
relatedness factor, particularly as applied to the policy justification for
general jurisdiction over unrelated claims. 210 I contend that all of the
component elements of jurisdictional fairness are important in under-
standing the role of relatedness and defining the proper parameters of
general and specific jurisdiction.
First, in International Shoe, the Court stated that when a corporation
"exercises the privilege of conducting activities within a state, it enjoys
the benefits and protection of the laws of that state" and that the "exer-
cise of that privilege may give rise to obligations. '211 The Court next
stated that "so far as those obligations arise out of or are connected with
the activities within the state, a procedure which requires the corporation
to respond to a suit brought to enforce them can, in most instances,
hardly be said to be undue. ' 212 This suggests a quid pro quo or exchange
theory of fairness. Because the corporation received benefits from the
state, it is fair for the corporation to bear similar burdens.
Relationship helps test whether the benefits and burdens are similar.
When a suit concerns the activities from which the corporation received
209. See supra note 164 (quoting Int'l Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).
210. Of particular note was a 1988 debate between Professors Lea Brilmayer and Mary
Twitchell concerning the role of relationship and the scope of general jurisdiction. See Lea
Brilmayer et al., A General Look at General Jurisdiction, 66 TEX. L. REV 721 (1988) [here-
inafter Brilmayer, General Look]; Lea Brilmayer, Related Contacts and Personal Jurisdic-
tion, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1444 (1988); Twitchell, Myth of General Jurisdiction, supra note
184; Mary Twitchell, A Rejoinder to Professor Brilmayer, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1465 (1988).
Other scholars have entered the debate. See Charles W. Rhodes, Clarifying General Juris-
diction, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 807 (2004); Linda Sandstrom Simard, Hybrid Personal
Jurisdiction: It's Not General Jurisdiction, or Specific Jurisdiction, But is it Constitutional?,
48 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 559 (1998); Allan R. Stein, Styles of Argument and Interstate
Federalism in the Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 65 TEX. L. REV. 689 (1987); see generally
Mary Twitchell, Why We Keep Doing Business With Doing-Business Jurisdiction, 2001 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 171, 172-79 (2001) (surveying the academic commentary as to the "baffling
rationale" for general jurisdiction) [hereinafter Twitchell, Doing Business].
211. Int'l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 319.
212. Id. at 318.
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in-state benefits, there is some similarity in the burden imposed by the
assertion of jurisdiction. By the same logic, the burdens imposed by juris-
diction over unrelated claims are excessive unless the benefits of in-state
corporate activity themselves are substantial. The corporation must re-
ceive so many benefits from the forum state that the burden imposed by
defending unrelated suits in the state is sufficiently reciprocal to the bene-
fits. Relatedness may be a rough measure, but it placed a logical limit on
the burdens arising from in-state activities.
Another fairness concern is the "orderly administration of laws. '213
This concern has two aspects. One is predictability. The Court in World-
Wide Volkswagen214 stated that the "Due Process Clause, by ensuring the
"orderly administration of the laws," gives a degree of predictability to
the legal system that allows potential defendants to structure their pri-
mary conduct with some minimum assurance as to where that conduct
will and will not render them liable to suit. .... "215 The predictability
must be such that the defendant can make meaningful choices with re-
gard to activity in the forum state. "When a corporation 'purposefully
avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum
State,' it has clear notice that it is subject to suit there, and can act to
alleviate the risk of burdensome litigation by procuring insurance, passing
the expected costs on to consumers, or, if the risks are too great, severing
its connection with the State. '216
Although the Court advanced the predictability rationale to support
the purposeful availment standard, predictability also helps explain the
relationship standard. 217 In order for a business to properly structure its
behavior-set consumer costs, procure insurance, or sever its relationship
with a particular state-it must not only know that a contact has been
made in a particular state (an aim protected through the purposeful avail-
ment standard), but it also must have some minimal appreciation of the
effect of that contact. The relationship standard helps give this knowl-
edge. If a business entity chooses to enter a state on a minimal level, it
knows that under the relationship standard, its potential for suit will be
limited to suits concerning the activities that it initiates in the state. Like-
wise, it knows that if it instead chooses to engage in substantial activities,
213. The Court in International Shoe stated that "[w]hether due process is satisfied
must depend rather upon the quality and nature of the activity in relation to the fair and
orderly administration of the laws which it was the purpose of the due process clause to
insure." Id. at 319.
214. See supra notes 175-82 (discussing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444
U.S. 286 (1980) policy discussion) and infra notes 232-37 (discussing World-Wide
Volkswagen).
215. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 297 (citing Int'l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at
319).
216. Id. (citing Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958)).
217. Indeed, in Burger King, the Court noted that the "'fair warning' requirement is
satisfied if the defendant has 'purposefully directed' his activities at residents of the forum,
and the litigation results from alleged injuries that 'arise out of or relate to' those activi-
ties." Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985) (emphasis added).
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such as centering its corporate operations in a state, the potential for suit
there will be substantial, extending to any claim.
The Court in World-Wide Volkswagen articulated a second aspect of
the orderly administration of laws-a state must not exceed its sover-
eignty. 218 Although the Court in Bauxites clarified that this aim is a func-
tion of due process rather than an aspect of federalism, the Court did not
remove the sovereignty component from jurisdictional analysis.2 19 The
defendant has a due process right to have states act only within the limits
of their sovereignty.
220
The relationship element is fundamental to the sovereignty limitation.
A state has sovereignty with regard to activity conducted within its bor-
ders, and it thus has power over claims arising from that activity. Simi-
larly, a state has sovereignty over its citizens, no matter where they act.
This would justify general jurisdiction over unrelated claims against fo-
rum state citizens and perhaps even non-citizens who have equivalent
contacts with the state. A state seemingly has no sovereignty over activ-
ity that neither involves its citizens nor occurs within its borders.
The first three policies-reciprocity, predictability, and sovereignty-
are reflected primarily by the first prong of the World-Wide Volkswagen
test. The fourth policy concern-inconvenience-is served by the second
prong of the test. This prong balances the relative burden of the defen-
dant arising from litigation in a distant forum against other factors, such
as the plaintiff's interest in that forum. Relatedness can affect most of the
reasonableness factors. A claim that has a weak relationship to a forum
state heightens the defendant's burden and lessens judicial efficiency be-
cause witnesses and other evidence are not readily available in the forum
state. A weak relationship also lessens both the plaintiff's interest in the
forum and the forum state's interest in litigating the claim. The mix of
factors changes when the defendant has substantial and continuous con-
tacts with the forum. Even though witnesses and other evidence may be
located elsewhere, the burden on the defendant to litigate in its home
state is significantly less and the state's interest in providing a forum is
higher.
Thus, relatedness is an essential element in protecting all of the fairness
policies underlying modern personal jurisdiction analysis. Relatedness
helps assure reciprocity between the benefits and burdens of an outsider
218. See supra notes 176-77 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444
U.S. 286 (1980)).
219. Ins. Corp. of Ir., Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702
(1982); see supra notes 200-02 and accompanying text; infra notes 314 & 317-18 (discussing
case).
220. That a state may act only within its sovereign limits is not only a due process con-
cern of the defendant but also a potential issue under the dormant commerce clause. A
state that exceeds its sovereignty and asserts jurisdiction over out-of-state activity of corpo-
rations may impermissibly burden interstate commerce. See generally supra notes 155-56
and accompanying text (discussing Davis v. Farmer's Co-op Equity Co., 262 U.S. 312
(1923)); infra notes 323-52 and accompanying text (discussing commerce clause concerns
arising out of conferring jurisdiction from corporate registration statutes).
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acting in a state. A requirement that the suit be related to the defen-
dant's forum activities gives the predictability necessary for orderly ad-
ministration of laws. It also helps limit the reach of states so that they do
not exceed legitimate state interests. Finally, relatedness assists courts in
their assessment of the relative burdens and interests in litigation in the
forum. Together, these policies and explanations give guidance in analyz-
ing the propriety of personal jurisdiction in any given case, including the
nationwide class action.
B. AN ANALYSIS OF STATE COURT JURISDICTION OVER DEFENDANTS
IN NATIONWIDE CLASS ACTIONS
Personal jurisdiction analysis depends on the facts of each case. A
global answer cannot be given for any particular category of cases. Even
the category of nationwide class actions has endless variations in legal
and factual issues. Accordingly, to illustrate and analyze the problems ofjurisdiction in nationwide class actions, I select one common fact pattern
as the "problem" class action. In this assumed class action, a class of
consumers alleges product defects or pricing irregularities in a product
that the defendant corporation sells in every state. The consumer class
members are residents of all fifty states, and they bought the product in
their home states. The named plaintiff sues on behalf of all consumers
nationwide, and she files the class action in her home state court. The
defendant is incorporated and based (including manufacture and primary
distribution) in a state other than the forum.
Four possible arguments might support personal jurisdiction over the
absent class members' claims in the problem case. One is that the claims
of the absent class members are sufficiently related to the defendant's
forum sales, even though they do not arise out of those sales. This argu-
ment centers on the degree of relationship needed to support specific per-
sonal jurisdiction. The second argument asserts that relationship is
unnecessary because the defendant conducts enough business in the fo-
rum to support general jurisdiction over any claims. This argument turns
on the extent of contacts required to justify unlimited jurisdiction over
unrelated claims. The third argument is that the defendant consented to
general jurisdiction in the forum by registering to do business and sell
products there. This argument turns on the reasonableness and effect of
corporate consent statutes. The final argument relies upon the class ac-
tion device itself. Unlike the first three arguments, which examine
whether the state court would have jurisdiction over the defendant if the
absent class claims were separate suits, the fourth argument looks to the
class as a whole and examines whether jurisdiction is justified by the join-
der device alone.
Each argument raises difficult questions that courts and scholars have
struggled to answer in other contexts. I focus on class actions, but similar
personal jurisdiction problems arise in any multiple-plaintiff suit in which
the claims do not all arise out of the defendant's forum contacts. I do not
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purport to conclusively settle these issues for class actions, let alone other
suits. Instead, I use the problem class action to illustrate that there are at
least significant uncertainties and often constitutional problems in a state
court asserting personal jurisdiction over the defendant in a nationwide
class action.
1. Specific Jurisdiction Based on the Relationship of the Absent Class
Claims to the Defendant's Forum Contacts
The first argument focuses on the degree of relationship needed to sup-
port specific personal jurisdiction. Specific jurisdiction can be based on a
single contact if the defendant purposefully directs the contact to the fo-
rum and if it is sufficiently related to the claim.221 The problem class
action easily meets the purposeful availment standard. The defendant de-
liberately directed its products to the forum state. The pivotal question is
whether the defendant's forum sales are sufficiently related to the claims
of the absent class members who both bought their product and were
injured outside the forum. Relationship is characterized in different
ways, but three prevailing standards have emerged from cases and com-
mentary: the "proximate cause," "but for," and similarity tests. The dif-
ference in these tests is more than semantic. The three tests require
decreasing degrees of relationship, and the selection of one test over an-
other often will change the result in the minimum contacts analysis. In-
deed, in the problem class action, the absent class members' claims fail all
but the most liberal test, based on mere similarity.
In International Shoe, the Court used several different terms to de-
scribe relationship and lack of relationship: activities that "give rise to"
liabilities versus "unconnected," "unrelated," or "entirely distinct" activi-
ties.222 Since then, the Court has continued to vary its terminology, and
the Court has not conclusively defined the necessary degree of relation-
ship. However, the Court has pointed to a somewhat strict standard for
relationship, requiring more than mere subject matter similarity between
the plaintiff's claim and the defendant's forum activities.
In Perkins, for example, the plaintiff's claim sought dividends and dam-
ages due to the defendant's failure to issue certificates for her stock.
223
These corporate governance failures had a subject-matter similarity to the
defendant corporation's Ohio activities. At the time of the suit, Ohio was
the center of corporate operations, including meetings of the board,
maintenance of bank accounts, and stock transfer decisions.224 Yet, the
221. See McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957) (finding jurisdiction over a
Texas insurance company based on a single insurance policy with a forum resident); see
also supra notes 172-74 and accompanying text (discussing Hanson purposeful availment
factor).
222. See supra notes 167-70 (quoting Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310
(1945)).
223. Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 439. See supra notes 185-86
(discussing Perkins).
224. 342 U.S. at 445-46.
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Court summarily concluded that the "cause of action sued upon did not
arise in Ohio and does not relate to the corporation's activities there. '225
Likewise, in Shaffer, where relationship was a decisive element, 226 the
Court suggested a strict test. Shaffer was a shareholder's derivative ac-
tion, filed in Delaware state court against Greyhound Corporation (a
Delaware corporation based in Arizona) and twenty-eight Greyhound of-
ficers and directors.2 27 The suit alleged corporate wrongdoing in Ore-
gon.2 28 The plaintiff secured jurisdiction over twenty-one of the twenty-
eight individual defendants by sequestering their Greyhound stock.229
There was a form of subject matter relationship between the defendants'
stock and the claim; both were tied to the Greyhound Corporation. The
defendants' stock holdings certainly were more related to the suit than
other property that the corporate executives might have owned in Dela-
ware, such as a vacation home. This minimal relationship was not enough
for the Court: the defendant's Greyhound stock "is not the subject matter
of this litigation, nor is the underlying cause of action related to the prop-
erty. '230 The Court further explained that the plaintiff's "failure to se-
cure jurisdiction over seven of the defendants named in his complaint
demonstrates ... [that] there is no necessary relationship between hold-
ing a position as a corporate fiduciary and owning stock or other interests
in the corporation."'2 3' The Court thus suggested a "but for" test: because
the fiduciary liability would have occurred regardless of share ownership,
the claim was not related to the stock ownership.
Some commentators and courts cite World-Wide Volkswagen as endors-
ing a similarity test, 232 but that conclusion is questionable. World-Wide
Volkswagen was a product liability action by New York residents who
bought their car in New York but were injured by the car during travel in
Oklahoma. 233 The only issue before the Court was whether an
Oklahoma state court could assert jurisdiction over the New York dealer-
ship and distributor.2 34 The Court held it could not assert jurisdiction due
to lack of purposeful availment.235 However, in dictum regarding Audi,
225. Id. at 438.
226. See supra notes 197-98 and accompanying text (discussing Shaffer).
227. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 189-90.
228. Id. The action charged that the defendants violated their duties to Greyhound by
causing the company to be held liable for civil damages in excess of $3 million and a large
criminal fine in antitrust suits. Id. at 190 n.2.
229. Id. at 191-92. Delaware law provided that Delaware was the physical location of
stock issued by Delaware corporations and that shares of stock could be sequestered as a
means of asserting jurisdiction over absent defendants. Id. at 193-94.
230. Id. at 213.
231. Id. at 214.
232. See Flavio Rose, Related Contacts and Personal Jurisdiction: The "But For" Test, 82
CAL. L. REV. 1545 (1994); Twitchell, Myth of General Jurisdiction, supra note 184, at 661-62(arguing that jurisdiction over Audi in World-Wide Volkswagen was justified on product
similarity, not extent of contacts).
233. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 288.
234. Id. at 287.
235. The unilateral act of the plaintiffs in taking the car to Oklahoma did not establish
purposeful availment by the New York defendants. Id. at 298.
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the car's manufacturer, the Court stated:
if the sale of a product of a manufacturer ... such as Audi... is not
simply an isolated occurrence, but arises from the efforts of the man-
ufacturer ... to serve directly or indirectly, the market for its product
in other States, it is not unreasonable to subject it to suit in one of
those States if its allegedly defective merchandise has there been the
source of injury to its owner or to others.2 36
The dictum is ambiguous. The central issue in the case was purposeful
availment, and the Court likely was making a point about purposeful
availment by distinguishing the actual case from this hypothetical case
involving deliberate efforts to reach the forum state. Yet, because rela-
tionship also is critical to specific jurisdiction, the hypothetical case neces-
sarily raises a question of relationship, albeit an uncertain one.
On the one hand, the Court may be explaining why the Oklahoma
court in the actual case would have jurisdiction over Audi, which did not
contest jurisdiction. 237 If so, it might suggest a liberal test of relationship,
under which similarity in product sales would be enough. In other words,
Audi's marketing and sales of similar cars in Oklahoma would be suffi-
ciently related to plaintiffs' claims to justify suit against Audi there, even
though the plaintiff bought the actual car without regard to Audi's
Oklahoma marketing. On the other hand, the dictum may suggest only
that Audi would be subject to jurisdiction if its marketing reached an
Oklahoma consumer and motivated the consumer to buy the car, regard-
less of the actual place of purchase. This interpretation suggests a stricter
"but for" test for relationship. Under this scenario, the sale and the later
injury would not have occurred but for Audi's marketing in the forum
state. Thus, the World-Wide Volkswagen dictum does not conclusively
endorse any view of relationship.
In Helicopteros, plaintiffs apparently conceded lack of relationship,
238
so the Court did not consider whether the claim was related to the forum
activities. Instead, it expressly reserved decision on three key relatedness
issues:
whether the terms "arising out of" and "related to" describe differ-
ent connections between a cause of action and a defendant's contacts
with the forum[;] ... what sort of tie between a cause of action and a
defendant's contacts with a forum is necessary to a determination
that either connection exists[;] . . [and] whether... a cause of action
[that] "relates to" but does not "arise out of" the defendant's con-
tacts with the forum should be analyzed as an assertion of specific
jurisdiction. 239
236. Id. at 297.
237. Id. at 288 n.3.
238. See supra note 190.
239. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 416 n.10 (1984).
See supra notes 187-91 (discussing Helicopteros).
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Justice Brennan, in dissent in Helicopteros, refused to concede lack of
relationship. He agreed that the claims did "not formally 'arise out of'
[Helicopteros's] specific activities" in Texas, 240 but he argued that the
claims were not "wholly unrelated '241 and were "significantly related" to
the defendant's Texas contacts.242 Indeed, the defendant negotiated in
Texas the very charter service that led to the deaths that were at issue in
the wrongful death suits.243 The plaintiffs could have argued that but for
the defendant's Texas activities, the plaintiffs' husbands would not have
died in the Peru helicopter crash.
In the twenty years since Helicopteros, the Court has not addressed the
three reserved relationship questions. In the absence of clear authority
from the Court, lower courts have developed differing tests for relation-
ship. The circuit split is most prominent in vacation travel cases, similar
to Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines,244 where the Ninth Circuit explored the
different tests.245 In vacation travel cases, an out-of-state corporation is
in the vacation business-cruise trips, bus tours, and hotels-and it ad-
vertises and sells tickets or enters into reservation contracts with forum
citizens. The plaintiff is injured during the vacation at the distant locale
and later brings a tort suit in his home state. The question is whether the
solicitation and formalization of the vacation, through ticket sales or res-
ervation contracts, in the plaintiff's home state, are sufficiently related to
the tortious acts in the vacation locale to support jurisdiction in the plain-
tiff's home state.
In Carnival Cruise, plaintiffs were injured on a cruise several hundred
miles from their Washington home, 246 and the Ninth Circuit analyzed at
length the proper test for determining whether the tort suit arising from
this injury was sufficiently related to the cruise ticket sale in Washington.
The court first observed that the First, Second, and Eighth Circuits use a
strict test and decline jurisdiction in vacation travel cases. 247 This strict
test has a variety of names-often called the "proximate cause" test but
also termed the "arise out of" or "substantive relevance" test 248-but its
application to the vacation cases is largely the same. The personal injury
tort claim is not sufficiently related to the defendant's forum activities
because the claim depends on defendant's wrongful conduct in the vaca-
tion locale, not the advertisements or ticket sales in the forum. Perhaps a
breach of contract or misrepresentation claim would be sufficiently re-
240. Id. at 425 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
241. Id. at 426 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
242. Id. at 425 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
243. Id. at 410-12.
244. 897 F.2d 377 (9th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 499 U.S. 585 (1991). I discuss the grounds for
the Supreme Court's reversal of the Ninth Circuit holding infra at notes 254-56 & 316 and
accompanying text.
245. Carnival Cruise Lines, 897 F.2d at 383-86.
246. Id. at 379.
247. Id. at 383-84.
248. The term "substantive relevance" was developed by Professor Brilmayer. See gen-
erally Lea Brilmayer, How Contacts Count: Due Process Limitations on State Court Juris-
diction, 1980 SuP. CT. REV. 77 [hereinafter Brilmayer, How Contacts Count].
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lated but not the personal injury claim. In other words, the personal in-
jury plaintiff would not need to rely on any of the defendant's forum
activities to establish her claim. The theory underlying this view is that
substantive relevance is essential to the foreseeability component of mini-
mum contacts analysis.
249
The Ninth Circuit in Carnival Cruise concluded that the proximate
cause test too narrowly confined jurisdiction in suits such as the vacation
travel cases where the defendant's forum contacts are causally related to
the cause of action.2 50 It instead adopted a more liberal causation test
used by the Fifth and Sixth Circuits, usually articulated as the "but for"
test.25 ' Under this test, the court found that Carnival Cruise's advertise-
ments and ticket sales in Washington were essential causative elements in
the tort and were sufficiently related to support specific jurisdiction over
the cruise line in Washington. 252 The Ninth Circuit did not consider a test
more liberal than "but for." To the contrary, the court acknowledged
that the "but for" test can be too liberal in some cases, but it instructed
lower courts to use second prong reasonableness analysis to limit jurisdic-
tion in such cases.25
3
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Carnival Cruise,2 54 and al-
though it heard argument on the relationship issue, 255 the Court avoided
the constitutional question of relatedness.2 56 The circuit split as to the
proper test of relationship remains unresolved.
The "proximate cause" and "but for" tests are the two prevailing tests,
249. See Nowak v. Tak How Invs., Ltd., 94 F.3d 708, 715 (1st Cir. 1996) ("we think the
proximate cause standard better comports with the relatedness inquiry because it so easily
correlates to foreseeability, a significant component of the jurisdictional inquiry").
250. 897 F.2d at 385. The court quoted "key analysis" on this issue from the Fifth
Circuit:
Logically, there is no reason why a tort cannot grow out of a contractual
contact. In a case like this, a contractual contact is a 'but for' causative factor
for the tort, since it brought the parties within tortious 'striking distance' of
one another. While the relationship between a tort suit and a contractual
contact is certainly more tenuous than when a tort suit arises from a tort
contact, that only goes to whether the contact is by itself sufficient for due
process, not whether the suit arises from the contact.
Id. (citing Prejean v. Sonatrach, Inc., 652 F.2d 1260, 1270 n.21 (5th Cir. 1981)).
251. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 897 F.2d at 382 (citing Lanier v. Am. Bd. of Endodon-
tics, 843 F.2d 901 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 962 (1988) and Prejean, 652 F.2d
1260); see also id. (surveying cases and concluding that the "'but for' test is consistent with
the basic function of the 'arising out of' requirement-it preserves the essential distinction
between general and specific jurisdiction").
252. Carnival Cruise Lines, 897 F.2d at 386.
253. Id. at 385. See also ScoLES & HAY, CoNvLIcr OF LAWS 346 (3d ed. 2000) (arguing
that the "'but for' test is so potentially broad as to collapse the distinction between specific
and general personal jurisdiction" and the "mere fact that the contact ultimately led to
other events that produced the dispute ... is not ... sufficient to qualify it as related").
254. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 589 (1991).
255. See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 1991 WL 636293 at *3-11, 22-36 (oral
argument concerning relationship issue).
256. The Court enforced a forum selection clause printed on the back of the cruise
ticket and held that the plaintiffs agreed to bring their claims only in Florida, not the Wash-
ington forum. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 499 U.S. at 589. See infra note 316 and accom-
panying text (discussing Carnival Cruise forum selection clause).
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and they apply in contexts other than vacation cases. 257 To be sure, lower
courts and commentators have advocated other tests, including a product
similarity test,258 and many courts find jurisdiction in cases of weak rela-
tionship without ever addressing the issue. However, courts that have
actually considered relationship tend to adopt one of the two stricter
tests,259 rather than a more liberal test.260 Moreover, the Supreme
Court's cases generally point to a test stricter than mere subject matter
similarity.
This state of the law argues against specific jurisdiction in the problem
class action. The absent class members' claims satisfy only a product sim-
ilarity test.261 All class claims concern the same general product, but the
absent class claims are not causally related to the defendant's forum sales.
In other words, an absent class member plaintiff could prove her claim
without relying on any of the defendant's forum contacts, thus failing the
strict proximate cause test. Likewise, her claim fails the intermediate
"but for" test because the product sale and subsequent injury in her home
state would have occurred "but for" the defendant's forum product sales.
A policy analysis argues against use of the liberal similarity test in the
problem class action. The benefits and burdens of entering a state for
product sales are not reciprocal when a nationwide class action puts all
product sales at issue in a single state, regardless of the extent of sales in
that state. The orderly administration of laws also is undermined. Under
a similarity test, the defendant has no basis on which to predict the extent
of suits based on isolated product sales. Any sales in the forum state,
even a single sale, could subject the defendant to a suit in which it must
defend all sales, nationwide. In addition, the forum state arguably ex-
257. In Carnival Cruise, for example, the Ninth Circuit noted a number of applications
of the "but for" test. 897 F.2d at 384-85. Indeed, the repercussions of applying the proxi-
mate cause test outside the vacation travel context was one reason that the court opted for
the "but for" test. Id. at 385 (noting that application of the proximate cause test would
mean that product defect claims arise only in the place of manufacture and not the place of
sale).
258. See Rose, supra note 232 (criticizing the "but for" test and arguing for a substan-
tive relevance test that would include an exception permitting jurisdiction based on sales of
similar products in the forum); Twitchell, Myth of General Jurisdiction, supra note 184, at659-62 (arguing that substantive relevance test is "under inclusive" because it eliminatesjurisdiction in cases, such as product similarity, where jurisdiction is fair).
259. See CASAD, supra note 153, § 108.42[b] (surveying federal circuits and concluding
that most use an "arise out of" or proximate cause test but that some apply the test in a
"roundabout" way so that it is essentially a "but for" test).
260. Courts rarely address product similarity as a test, but many decisions, such as the
vacation travel cases, implicitly reject it. See Seymour v. Parke, Davis & Co., 423 F.2d 584,
585 (1st Cir. 1970) (holding that a New Hampshire court could not assert jurisdiction over
a drug maker in a product liability claim brought by a Massachusetts consumer of drugs
purchased in Massachusetts, even though the defendant advertised and solicited orders for
the same drug in New Hampshire); see also infra note 280 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing Seymour).
261. The claims also would meet the "not wholly unrelated" test suggested by Justice
Brennan in his dissent in Helicopteros, but likely not his "significantly" related test, at least
as he applied it in Helicopteros. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S.
408, 425-26 (1984); see supra notes 240-42 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Bren-
nan's dissent in Helicopteros).
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ceeds its sovereignty when it asserts jurisdiction over claims that are
merely similar to activities within its borders, as opposed to causally con-
nected to the forum conduct. Finally, the balance of reasonableness fac-
tors shifts somewhat when jurisdiction is based on similarity, as opposed
to stricter causation. Evidentiary burdens and judicial inefficiencies are
greater where the only connection to the forum is similar sales, as op-
posed to design or manufacture. Moreover, the out-of-state plaintiffs
have less interest in the forum, and the forum state has less interest in
providing a forum to out-of-state claimants.
In sum, both case law and policy argue against finding specific jurisdic-
tion in the problem class action. Under most accepted views of specific
personal jurisdiction, the out-of-state class claims are not sufficiently re-
lated to the defendant's forum activities to justify jurisdiction over those
claims alone. Therefore, jurisdiction in the problem class action should
not be based merely on the relationship of the absent class members'
claims to the sales in the forum.
2. General Jurisdiction Based on the Defendant's Business Contacts
with the Forum
A second possible basis for personal jurisdiction in the problem class
action is general jurisdiction, where the relationship of the class claims to
the defendant's forum contacts is immaterial. To justify general jurisdic-
tion, the defendant's contacts with the forum must be substantial. The
defendant's home state would have sufficient contacts to justify jurisdic-
tion over unrelated claims, but the problem class action, like many class
actions, is not pending in the defendant's home state. Instead, class coun-
sel has chosen any one of the states in which the defendant has regular
sales but no significant corporate operations. As to the volume of sales in
the chosen forum, assume for the problem class action that the defen-
dant's sales are equally divided between all fifty states, resulting in two
percent of sales in each state, including the forum.
Perkins and Helicopteros reaffirm the International Shoe dictum that
personal jurisdiction may be asserted over claims unrelated to the defen-
dant's forum contacts, but they provide only marginal guidance in deter-
mining the point at which the defendant's contacts are substantial enough
to support general jurisdiction. In Perkins, Ohio had essentially become
the principal place of business of the defendant; no other state had more
contacts with the defendant. 262 In Helicopteros, the defendant's home
base remained in South America.263 Texas was far from being the defen-
dant's center of operations. 264 Thus, the two cases are relatively far apart
in terms of extent of contacts, and the point of general jurisdiction falls
262. Perkins v. Benquet Consol. Min. Co., 342 U.S. 437, 447-48 (1952). See supra notes
185-86 and 223-25 (discussing Perkins).
263. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A., 466 U.S. at 409. See supra notes 187-91
and 238-43 (discussing Helicopteros).
264. See id. at 409-12.
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somewhere between the level of forum activities in Perkins and
Helicopteros.265
In Rush v. Savchuck,266 the Court stated in dicta that "State Farm is
'found,' in the sense of doing business, in all fifty States" 267 and that State
Farm's "forum contacts would support in personam jurisdiction even for
an unrelated cause of action. '2 68 This might suggest that a corporation is
subject to general jurisdiction in every state in which it does business, but
this dicta is far from certain. First, State Farm was registered to do busi-
ness in the forum state,269 and as I discuss in the next section (Part
II(B)(3)), this registration suggests a consent theory rather than a con-
tacts-based theory of general jurisdiction. Moreover, the dicta, if aimed
at a contacts-based form of general jurisdiction, are arguably inconsistent
with other Court dicta regarding forum sales and general jurisdiction.
Four years after Rush, the Court in Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.,
stated that Hustler Magazine's regular sales of 10,000-15,000 magazines
per month in New Hampshire were not enough to support general juris-
diction there. 270 These New Hampshire sales were undoubtedly on the
low side of Hustler's magazine sales, in terms of percentage of national
sales, and likely constituted less than two percent of the defendant's total
sales. In Rush, however, State Farm necessarily had business levels of
two percent (or less) in some states, yet the Court suggested that State
Farm was subject to general jurisdiction in every state.2 71 If the Rush
dictum was directed to contacts-based general jurisdiction, it seemingly
should have justified general jurisdiction over Hustler in New Hamp-
shire.2 72 Thus, the Rush dictum may have no application at all to con-
tacts-based jurisdiction. At a minimum, the Court later clarified in
Keeton that some instances of low sales volume are not sufficient to estab-
lish general personal jurisdiction.2 73
Lower courts and scholars have not reached a consensus as to the num-
ber and type of contacts necessary to establish general jurisdiction over
265. See SCOLES & HAY, supra note 253, at 350 (stating that Perkins and Helicopteros
"provide some guidance at the margins" and that there are "literally infinite number[s] of
factual permutations falling in between the two cases").
266. 444 U.S. 320 (1980).
267. Id. at 330.
268. Id.
269. Savchuk v. Rush, 245 N.W.2d 624, 629 (Minn. 1976).
270. Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 779 (1984).
271. Rush, 444 U.S. at 333.
272. The dollar differences in volume of business may reconcile the dicta in the two
cases, but the parties in Rush did not brief the absolute level of State Farm's contacts with
the forum. Cf. Brilmayer, General Look, supra note 210, at 743 (arguing that "for pur-
poses of general jurisdiction, the relevant issue is the absolute amount of activity, not the
amount of activity relative to what the defendant does outside the state"). This attempted
reconciliation of the Rush and Keeton dicta is not satisfactory, for it argues for general
jurisdiction over companies that have low percentage, perhaps even isolated, sales of high
purchase price items (luxury cars) before it would support general jurisdiction over a cor-
poration that sells almost all its low price product (penny candy) in the forum.
273. Keeton, 465 U.S. at 775-76.
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unrelated claims.274 Academic commentators tend to narrowly view gen-
eral jurisdiction, typically arguing for general jurisdiction over corporate
defendants in only the few states in which the corporation has contacts
close to domicile status.275 Few would support general jurisdiction based
on sales alone.27
6
Lower courts are divided as to whether sales volume alone can support
personal jurisdiction.277 Many have refused to base general jurisdiction
on sales and related contacts. 278 In Carnival Cruise, the Ninth Circuit
rejected general jurisdiction based on forum cruise sales constituting only
1.29% of defendant's cruise business. 279 The First Circuit in Seymour v.
Parke, Davis & Co. rejected general jurisdiction where the defendant
only advertised and solicited orders in the forum state.280 In Bearry v.
Beach Aircraft Corp. ,281 the Fifth Circuit set a particularly high thresh-
old. It reversed a finding of general jurisdiction where the defendant sold
$250 million in airplane products in the forum.282 The court relied in part
on the fact that the defendant structured the sales to occur in its home
state of Kansas, in an attempt to shield itself from the general jurisdiction
of other states.283
274. General jurisdiction case law is difficult to study. As noted in Part I(F) with regard
to nationwide class actions, many litigants may simply assume general jurisdiction. In re-
sponse to isolated (as opposed to class) claims, the defendant may note the issue but decide
that it is not economically feasible to pursue objections to general jurisdiction. See Twitch-
ell, Doing Business, supra note 210, at 193-94 (stating that because defendants do not al-
ways pursue objections to general jurisdiction, "published case law does not reflect the
entire picture").
275. See Rhodes, supra note 210, at 886-90 (proposing a three-prong test for general
jurisdiction that would ask first whether the defendant's forum activities are analogous to
the in-state activities of a forum domiciliary); Stein, supra note 210, at 758 (arguing that the
test for general personal jurisdiction should be "whether the defendant has adopted the
forum as its sovereign" and that the court should not ask about convenience but instead
whether the defendant has "for most other purposes treated the forum as its home, not-
withstanding its domicile elsewhere"); Wood, supra note 133, at 614 (arguing that the
"point of general jurisdiction theory is to permit suit in the defendant's 'home'-the one or
two places where a person or entity has settled").
276. See Wood, supra note 133, at 614-15 (arguing that general jurisdiction "should not
be found in every state where a defendant has a significant amount of business," but in-
stead should be "confined to those few places that can legitimately be viewed as... [a]
corporation's base of operations"); but see Brilmayer, General Look, supra note 210, at
741-43 (arguing that place of incorporation and principal place of business are not the only
legitimate places for general jurisdiction and that "[t]he nonunique relationship of continu-
ous and systematic activities ... satisfies the reciprocal benefits and burdens rationale as
well as do unique affiliations .... ").
277. SCOLES & HAY, supra note 253, at 351 (stating that courts "are severely divided as
to whether substantial in-state sales" support general personal jurisdiction) (footnotes
omitted).
278. See CASAD, supra note 153, § 108.41[3] (stating that "lower courts have evinced a
reluctance to assert general jurisdiction over ... foreign corporations even where the con-
tacts with the forum are quite extensive").
279. Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 897 F.2d 377, 381 (9th Cir. 1990).
280. 423 F.2d 584 (1st Cir. 1970); see supra note 260 (discussing Seymour).
281. 818 F.2d 370 (5th Cir. 1987).
282. Id. at 372-73.
283. Id. at 375-76 (stating that defendant "has not afforded itself the benefits and pro-
tections of the laws of Texas, but instead has calculatedly avoided them").
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On the other hand, some lower courts have based general jurisdiction
on sales in the forum state. For example, the Second Circuit in Metropol-
itan Life Insurance Co. v. Robertson-CeCo Corp. found general jurisdic-
tion where the defendant had less than one percent of its total sales in the
forum.284 In Ex Parte Newco Mfg. Co.,285 the Alabama Supreme Court,
in stark contrast to the Fifth Circuit in Bearry, based general jurisdiction
on sales ranging only from $65,000 to $85,000 over a five-year period,
even though the defendant structured its sales to occur either through
independent agents or through mail from its home state of Kansas.286
Thus, there is conflicting authority as to whether sales volume can sup-
port general jurisdiction.287
A policy analysis argues against basing general jurisdiction on mere
sales volume. First, there is no proportionality. The reciprocity policy
requires that the burdens of entering a state (extent of jurisdiction) be
proportional to the benefits (sales). In the problem class action, the de-
fendant has a small benefit (two percent of total sales volume) relative to
the unlimited burden of defending all possible claims, by all consumers,
nationwide. Orderly administration of laws also argues against this low
threshold for general jurisdiction because the defendant would have little
opportunity for meaningful planning. It would have to assume that any
regular sales volume would expose it to jurisdiction on any suit, no matter
how unrelated to the forum. Likewise, the state would have a weak sov-
ereignty interest in basing general jurisdiction on sales alone. The activity
underlying the claims of the unnamed class members did not occur in the
forum state's borders, and the defendant is far from being a forum citi-
zen. A corporation is not a state citizen merely because it sells two per-
cent of its products there. The corporation certainly would not view this
state as its home.
Finally, reasonableness analysis does not support general jurisdiction
based on sales alone. By definition, the claims are unrelated to the defen-
dant's forum activities, so the defendant bears evidentiary and other bur-
dens in defending in the forum, and the out-of-state plaintiffs have low
interest in the forum. Contrast this mix of factors with general jurisdic-
284. 84 F.3d 560, 570 (2d Cir. 1990). The defendant was a Delaware corporation, based
in Pennsylvania, whose St. Louis division contracted with plaintiff Met-Life to build "cur-
tain walls" for a building in Miami. Met-Life filed suit in Vermont, which had a long limi-
tation period, and conceded that "none of the activities that served as a basis for [its]
complaint took place in Vermont." Id. at 565.
285. 481 So. 2d 867 (Ala. 1985).
286. Id. at 869; see also Ex Parte United Bhd. of Carpenters, 688 So. 2d 246, 251-52
(Ala. 1997) (reaffirming Newco and permitting general jurisdiction over defendant union
based on ten local affiliates with Alabama membership constituting only one half of one
percent of total membership).
287. In the sales cases, product sales usually are not the defendant's only contacts with
the forum. The defendant necessarily has marketing activities, such as national advertising,
local dealerships, and phone help lines, to facilitate the sales. The courts rely on these
other contacts to varying degrees, but the marketing contacts do not seem to distinguish
the different holdings. Cf Twitchell, Doing Business, supra note 210, at 187-89 (surveying




tion in the defendant's home state. To be sure, when the forum is the
defendant's home state, the defendant also might face some evidentiary
burdens in defending unrelated claims, but these burdens would be offset
by other efficiencies of defending at its home. Moreover, the forum state
would have an interest in providing a forum in which its citizens can de-
fend themselves. This balance is not present when the defendant merely
sells products in the forum.
Some courts and commentators have suggested a blending between the
two key factors of general personal jurisdiction-degree of relationship
and extent of contacts. 288 They object to strict characterization of a case
as falling in one category or the other-specific versus general personal
jurisdiction. They suggest a "sliding scale" or "hybrid" approach, under
which a moderate amount of contacts would justify jurisdiction over a
claim that has marginal relationship to those contacts.289 For example, as
applied to the problem class action, the marginal relationship of the
claims (product similarity) would justify jurisdiction because the defen-
dant has regular, rather than merely isolated, sales in the forum.2 90
This theory could explain the holdings in cases such as Metropolitan
Life and Newco. 291 In both cases, the claim was marginally related to the
defendant's forum contacts, even though the claim did not arise out those
contacts. In Metropolitan Life, the claim concerned curtain walls in-
stalled in Florida, but which the defendant also sold in the Vermont fo-
rum.292 In Newco, the out-of-state claims likewise concerned a product
similar to those sold by the defendant in the forum state.293 Neither court
likely would have based jurisdiction on a clearly unrelated claim-for ex-
ample, an employment contract claim brought by an employee who
worked in another state. This is not to say that either court back-
handedly used a lesser relationship test. Neither court likely would have
found specific jurisdiction over an out-of-state consumer claim if the de-
fendant had only a single sale in the forum state. Instead, jurisdiction
seemingly resulted from a blending of the two factors.
288. See William M. Richman, Jurisdiction in Civil Actions: By Robert C. Casad, 72
CAL. L. REV. 1328 (1984) (book review).
289. Cf. Shutt v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 897 F.2d 377, 385 n.7 (9th Cir. 1990) (noting
"that where the defendant has only one contact with the forum state, a close nexus be-
tween its forum-related activities and the cause of the plaintiffs' harm may be required").
290. Richman, supra note 288, at 1343-44 (arguing for jurisdiction in a product similar-
ity case even though the case "satisfies neither paradigm" of specific or general personal
jurisdiction); cf. Simard, supra note 210, at 580-82 (noting problems with sliding scale the-
ory as applied to product similarity cases and arguing for a restrained specific personal
jurisdiction approach for "hybrid" cases).
291. See Twitchell, Doing Business, supra note 210, at 191-93 (studying hundreds of
cases and concluding that in most cases in which the court found general jurisdiction, the
claim was somehow related to the defendant's forum contacts).
292. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Robertson-CeCo Corp., 84 F.3d 560, 565 (2d Cir. 1990). See
supra note 284 (discussing Metropolitan Life).




Policy analysis, however, argues against jurisdiction based on a sliding
scale theory. As set out in the preceding section (Part II(B)(1)), mere
similarity in product is not a sufficient relationship on which to base juris-
diction because sale of a similar product does not give sufficient reciproc-
ity, predictability or state interest. These failures are not cured by
increasing the amount of sales in the forum from isolated to regular sales.
The benefits of selling two percent of the defendant's total sales volume is
not reciprocal to the burden of having to defend product claims based on
all national sales. Mere regularity does not equalize the burdens. The
defendant is not given fair warning of potential exposure to suit; it instead
must assume that a steady stream of product sales, even sales as low as
two percent of total sales, will expose it to unlimited jurisdiction as to all
sales. Although the state has an interest in the products sold within its
borders, it has little interest in products sold elsewhere, unless the defen-
dant has enough of a substantial connection with the state to make it the
equivalent of a state citizen. In short, an assertion of jurisdiction that is
otherwise unfair is not made fair by making relatively minor adjustments
in either the degree of relationship or the extent of local contacts. The
policy reasons underlying personal jurisdiction argue for more clear-cut
standards for jurisdiction.
Accordingly, although there might be some support in the case law for
general jurisdiction based on regular sales volume as low as two percent,
the better view is that a state court's exercise of jurisdiction under these
circumstances would violate due process. Jurisdiction over the out-of-
state claims in the problem class action therefore likely cannot rest
merely on the defendant's forum contacts. In other words, the problem
class action fails minimum contacts analysis. Neither specific, nor gen-
eral, personal jurisdiction, based on the defendant's forum contacts, is
justified.
3. Defendant's Consent to General Jurisdiction Through Corporate
Registration in the Forum State
The next argument also relies on general jurisdiction, but it uses corpo-
rate registration, not forum contacts, as the basis for that broad jurisdic-
tion. This argument asserts that an out-of-state corporation that has
registered to do business in a state has thereby consented to general juris-
diction in that state. Corporate registration seems to be a commonly as-
sumed basis for jurisdiction over out-of-state corporations. Indeed, such
assumption probably explains the lack of debate concerning jurisdiction
over the defendant in nationwide class actions, 294 but jurisdiction under
this theory is far from a foregone conclusion. First, by definition, the ar-
gument applies only to corporations who register to do business in the
forum state. Second, the statutes vary from state to state, and courts can-
not agree as to their effect. Finally, even in the states that broadly inter-




pret their statutes to confer general jurisdiction, such extracted consent
might violate due process and the dormant commerce clause. The follow-
ing analysis of jurisdiction in the problem class action will assume that the
first hurdle is cleared; the defendant has complied with the foreign corpo-
ration registration statute in the forum and has appointed an agent there
for service of process.2 95
A preliminary question is whether in-state service on the appointed
agent establishes general jurisdiction over the corporation, independent
of consent, under a tag jurisdiction theory. The Court has not directly
addressed the question, but the likely answer is no. Even under Pen-
noyer, where service was the primary means of securing jurisdiction,296
corporate jurisdiction was based on theories of implied consent or pres-
ence through business activities, not the mere fact of in-state service.2
97
Indeed, the Court in the Pennoyer era repeatedly held that in-state ser-
vice on a corporate agent was not enough to confer jurisdiction where the
corporation otherwise did not do sufficient business in the state.298 Inter-
national Shoe did not change this view. In fact, in International Shoe it-
self, the defendant's salesman was served in the forum, but the Court
based jurisdiction on contacts rather than in-state service.299 Likewise, in
Perkins, the defendant's president was served in Ohio while acting in his
corporate capacity, but the Court based general jurisdiction on the corpo-
ration's forum contacts, not in-state service.300
Nevertheless, some courts have used Burnham to justify tag jurisdic-
tion over corporations. 30 This likely is an erroneous view, for the rea-
295. Without registration and actual appointment of an agent, there is no basis on
which to argue consent. The Court in International Shoe rejected the theory of implied
consent based on business activity and substituted minimum contacts analysis. Int'l Shoe
Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316-18 (1945); see supra note 167 (quoting International
Shoe concerning implied consent).
296. See supra notes 144-52 (discussing Pennoyer). By contrast, today service is largely
seen as a question of notice, distinct from amenability to jurisdiction. See FRIEDENTHAL,
supra note 5, at 176 ("Due process not only requires that the court must have power to
adjudicate, it also demands that the defendant have notice of the institution of proceedings
against him. The constitutional obligation to provide the defendant with proper notice and
an opportunity to be heard is an additional aspect of the due-process limitation on a court's
ability to exercise jurisdiction.").
297. See supra notes 148-62 (discussing corporate jurisdiction under Pennoyer).
298. See, e.g., Riverside & Dan River Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Menefee, 237 U.S. 189 (1915)
(service on corporate director who is forum resident insufficient to confer jurisdiction);
Goldey v. Morning News of New Haven, 156 U.S. 518 (1895) (service on defendant's presi-
dent who was temporarily in forum insufficient to confer jurisdiction).
299. Int'l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 312, 320.
300. Perkins v. Banquet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 438-440 (1952) (noting ser-
vice). The Court stated that statutes requiring corporations to obtain a license and desig-
nate a statutory agent for service is "not a conclusive test" as to jurisdiction. Id. at 445. See
supra notes 185-86 & 223-25 and accompanying text (discussing Perkins).
301. See Allied-Signal Inc. v. Purex Indus., Inc., 576 A.2d 942 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1990) (applying Burnham and holding that service on the corporate defendant's registered
agent conferred general jurisdiction on unrelated claims); but see Siemer v. Learjet Acqui-
sition Corp., 966 F.2d 179, 182-83 (5th Cir. 1992) (rejecting argument that Burnham, estab-
lishes that service on an in-state agent "automatically subjects the corporation to
jurisdiction"); MBM Fisheries, Inc. v. Bollinger Mach. Shop Shipyard, Inc., 804 P.2d 627,
631 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991) (distinguishing Burnham, and holding that in-state service on
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sons stated above. Moreover, Burnham involved in-state service on a
natural person, and Justice Scalia, who wrote the primary opinion on
which these courts rely, suggested that tag jurisdiction is limited to natu-
ral persons.302 Service on an ordinary corporate agent may have different
jurisdictional consequences than service on an agent officially designated
as the corporation's agent for in-state service, but the significance, if any,
derives from the corporation's consent to jurisdiction through the official
appointment itself.
Most courts that rely on corporate registration to confer jurisdiction do
so on a consent theory. In the Pennoyer era, the Court suggested that
actual appointment of an in-state agent pursuant to a corporate registra-
tion statute could confer general personal jurisdiction and not offend due
process.30 3 Moreover, as illustrated by Bauxites, consent has clearly sur-
vived International Shoe as a basis for jurisdiction, 30 4 but this does not
mean that corporate registration is a valid form of consent. It certainly
does not mean that corporate registration is the easy answer to jurisdic-
tion in the problem class action.
First, not all registration statutes confer general jurisdiction. Registra-
tion statutes vary in each state, and most do not specify the effects of
registration. 305 Instead, registration statutes typically require simply that
the corporation name an in-state agent for service and do not mention
"jurisdiction. '30 6 Accordingly, whether the appointment of an agent con-
corporate officer "cannot alone confer general jurisdiction"). See supra notes 204-07 and
accompanying text (discussing Burnham).
302. Justice Scalia compared contacts-based general jurisdiction over corporations to
in-state tag service on a private person. Burnham, 495 U.S. at 610 n.1. Citing Perkins,
Justice Scalia noted that the only case in which the Court had upheld general jurisdiction
on a corporation included in-state service on the defendant corporation's president but
that the Court based jurisdiction on contacts, not service. He suggested that contacts-
based general jurisdiction may be limited to corporations because they "have never fitted
comfortably in a jurisdictional regime based primarily upon 'de facto power over the de-
fendant's person."' Id. (quoting Int'l Shoe Co., 362 U.S. at 316).
303. Pa. Fire Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co., 243 U.S. 93 (1917); see supra
notes 148-62 (discussing Gold Issue Mining and other Pennoyer-era consent cases).
304. See supra notes 200-02 (discussing Ins. Corp. of Ir., Ltd. v. Compagnie des Baux-
ites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694 (1982)).
305. See Matthew Kipp, Inferring Express Consent: The Paradox of Permitting Registra-
tion Statutes to Confer General Jurisdiction, 9 REV. LITIG. 1 (1990) (collecting statutes and
stating that "each state mandates that an agent be appointed" but that "most statutes fail
to discuss the effects of appointment on the state's jurisdiction over the foreign corpora-
tion"). Registration statutes are relics of the Pennoyer era. See supra notes 144-52 (dis-
cussing Pennoyer consent statutes); see also In re Mid-At. Toyota Antitrust Litig., 525 F.
Supp. 1265, 1278 n.10 (D. Md. 1981) ("consent statutes are largely obsolete and serve only
to confuse matters"); William L. Walker, Foreign Corporation Laws: A Current Account, 47
N.C. L. REV. 733, 734-38 (1969) (arguing that the requirement that corporations appoint
local agents has no jurisdictional purpose after International Shoe and that registrations
statutes "have encouraged inappropriate expansions of unlimited general jurisdiction and
discouraged worthwhile analysis").
306. See MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. § 15.03 (1998) (providing that an application
for a certificate of authority to transact business in the state must set forth the name and
addressed of the corporation's registered agent in the state); § 15.10 (providing that "[t]he
registered agent of a foreign corporation authorized to transact business in this state is the
corporation's agent for service of process, notice or demand required or permitted by law
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fers jurisdiction usually depends on statutory interpretation by local
courts. A few states interpret the appointment of agent requirement only
as a means of facilitating service where jurisdiction is otherwise proper
under the long-arm statute or as merely one contact to be analyzed in
minimum contacts analysis. 30 7 Some courts hold that the local registra-
tion statute confers consent to jurisdiction, but they limit it to specific
jurisdiction over claims arising out of the corporation's in-state activi-
ties. 308 In these states, corporate registration would not confer jurisdic-
tion over the defendant in the problem class action.
A number of states, however, interpret their registration statutes as
conferring general jurisdiction, 30 9 and the remaining analysis will assume
that class counsel has selected one of these states as the forum for the
problem class action. In these states, the question is whether it is consti-
tutional for courts to assert general jurisdiction based solely on corporate
registration. The Supreme Court has not directly addressed the issue. A
few scholars have argued that forced consent to general jurisdiction
through a corporate registration statute is unconstitutional. 310 Lower
courts are split on the issue. Some courts hold that as matter of due pro-
to be served on the foreign corporation"). A very few states have modified their statutes
to specify that they have no impact on a foreign corporation's amenability to suit. See FLA.
STAT. § 607.1501(4) (2001) (providing that requirement of certificate of authority "has no
application to the question of whether any foreign corporation is subject to service of pro-
cess and suit in this state").
307. See Freeman v. Dist. Ct. of Washoe County, 1 P.3d 963, 968 (Nev. 2000) (holding
that "the appointment of an agent to receive service of legal process pursuant to [the Ne-
vada foreign insurance corporation registration statute] does not in itself subject a non-
resident insurance company to the personal jurisdiction of Nevada Courts").
308. See Freeman Funeral Home, Inc. v. Diamond S. Constructors, Inc., 266 So. 2d 794,
795-96 (Ala. Civ. App. 1972) (holding that "a statutory agent may be served with process
only in cases where the cause of action arose in [Alabama]" because the Alabama foreign
registration statute was "enacted to protect the citizens of the state as to causes of action
arising within the state and resulting from the doing of business by foreign corporations in
this state" and thus a corporation's consent to jurisdiction "is confined to transactions or
causes of action arising in this state and not those arising in other states"); Gray Line Tours
v. Reynolds Elec. & Eng'g Co., 238 Cal. Rptr. 419, 421 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that
California statute requiring consent to service on in-state agent did not confer jurisdiction
on suits not arising out of business done in California); see generally CASAD, supra note
153, § 108.41[4] (stating that some statutes are limited to specific jurisdiction and others are
interpreted to confer only specific personal jurisdiction).
309. See ROBERT C. CASAD & WILLIAM B. RICHMAN, JURISDICTION IN CIVIL AcrIONS
§ 3-2[2][a] (3d ed. 1998) (surveying interpretations of statutes); Kipp, supra note 305, at 44
(stating that "only a few states have registration statutes that expressly provide for the
assertion of general jurisdiction").
310. See CASAD & RICHMAN, supra note 309, § 3.2[2][a][ii] (stating that consent
through registration statutes "may raise due process problems if the required consent is
held to extend to causes of action unrelated to the state and to claims by persons having no
connection with the state"); Brilmayer, A General Look, supra note 210, at 756-60 (ques-
tioning consent to jurisdiction and stating that the "most formidable constitutional issue
surrounding general jurisdiction by consent arises when consent derives from a statutorily
required appointment rather than from contract"); D. Craig Lewis, Jurisdiction Over For-
eign Corporations Based On Registration and Appointment of an Agent: An Unconstitu-
tional Condition Perpetuated, 15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1 (1990) (arguing that the doctrine of
"unconstitutional conditions" bars states from using corporate registration statutes to exact
consent not otherwise sufficient under minimum contacts analysis).
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cess, International Shoe requires minimum contacts analysis as to all as-
sertions of state court jurisdiction over out-of-state corporations.31'
Others hold that registration-consent may confer general jurisdiction,
consistent with due process, independent of minimum contacts analy-
sis. 312 These courts may be dividing on the wrong grounds. The first
group of courts runs afoul of the Court's clear precedent under Bauxites
that due process permits jurisdiction based on consent without minimum
contacts analysis. 313 The second group does not look closely enough at
the consent itself.
State-extracted waiver or consent to jurisdiction is subject to a due pro-
cess inquiry, although the test is difficult to identify. In Bauxites, the
Court applied the due process standards applicable to procedural sanc-
tions to test a finding that a defendant waived its jurisdictional chal-
lenge. 314 In Shutts, the Court looked to a variety of procedural
protections to assess the fairness of basing jurisdiction on absent class
members' failure to opt out of the class.315 In Carnival Cruise, the Court
used a "fundamental fairness" test to assess a forum selection clause in a
private contract. 316 Nevertheless, regardless of its wording, the due pro-
cess test seemingly sets a low threshold, since the Court found the "con-
sent" to be valid in all three cases.
These holdings might suggest that the Court would approve of consent
through corporate registration. Indeed, in Bauxites, the court in a dictum
broadly endorsed a variety of forms of consent to jurisdiction, including
"constructive consent to the personal jurisdiction of the state court in the
voluntary use of certain state procedures. '317 Although the Bauxites
Court did not list corporate registration as an example of consent through
voluntary use of state procedures, the Court two years earlier, in Rush,
311. See Siemer v. Learjet Acquisition Corp., 966 F.2d 179, 183-84 (5th Cir. 1992) (hold-
ing that Texas registration statute may extend only jurisdiction that is otherwise "constitu-
tionally permissible" under independent minimum contacts analysis).
312. Knowlton v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., 900 F.2d 1196, 1199 (8th Cir. 1990) (interpret-
ing Minnesota registration statute as conferring general jurisdiction and stating that "[o]ne
of the most solidly established ways of giving such consent is to designate an agent for
service of process within the State").
313. Ins. Corp. of Ir., Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 703(1982). See supra notes 200-02 (discussing Bauxites).
314. The Court upheld a trial court's sanction under which the court ruled that a for-
eign defendant waived its jurisdictional challenge through its misconduct in discovery. The
Court asked whether it was valid to presume "[']that the refusal to produce evidence mate-
rial... was but an admission of the want of merit in the asserted defense."' Bauxites, 456
U.S. at 704-06 (quoting Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas, 212 U.S. 322, 350-51 (1909)).
"Due process is violated only if the behavior of the defendant will not support the Ham-
mond Packing presumption." Id. at 706.
315. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985) (noting that the "essen-
tial question" was "how stringent the requirement for a showing of consent will be"); id. at
814 (citing Bauxites and concluding that the "interests of the absent plaintiff are suffi-
ciently protected by the forum State when those plaintiffs are provided with a request for
exclusion that can be returned within a reasonable time to the court").
316. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 595 (1991) (stating that forum
selection clauses are "subject to judicial scrutiny for fundamental fairness").
317. Bauxites, 456 U.S. at 703-04.
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seemingly approved such consent in dictum, stating that State Farm was
"doing business" and subject to general jurisdiction in every state.318 As
I note above, this statement likely referred to corporation registration,
given that State Farm was registered to do business in Minnesota and had
in fact appointed an in-state agent.
319
Nevertheless, arguments can be made that the consent through corpo-
rate registration does not comport with due process. The state is coercing
the consent, usually without explicit warning.320 In Bauxites, the discov-
ery sanction rule did not mention consent to jurisdiction, but the trial
court previously warned the defendant that it must comply with its dis-
covery order or waive its challenge to jurisdiction.321 More importantly,
the consent at issue in the problem class action registration is unlimited,
conferring jurisdiction over all claims on any matter by any person. In
Bauxites, there was reciprocity in the behavior that constituted waiver
and the consequences of that behavior; the jurisdiction was limited to the
particular suit. Likewise, jurisdiction in Shutts extended only to the roy-
alty claim, and the Carnival Cruise consent was limited to suits arising
from the cruise.322 In the problem class action, the unlimited nature of
the jurisdiction may tip the scales and render this "consent" fundamen-
tally unfair.
That the state is reaching out to claims that arise outside the forum
suggests another constitutional problem under the dormant commerce
clause. Full analysis of this issue is beyond the scope of this article, but
some commentators have suggested that when corporate registration stat-
utes confer general jurisdiction, they impermissibly interfere with inter-
state commerce. 323 Before International Shoe, the Court invalidated
some state court exercises of general jurisdiction on dormant commerce
clause grounds,32 4 but that test faded as the due process minimum con-
tacts test developed. In the case of corporate registration, however, reli-
ance on the dormant commerce clause rather than due process might
impact the outcome. As I note above, courts in due process cases set a
low threshold for consent, which in turn might allow a court to avoid a
negative outcome under due process analysis. Consent plays a different
role in dormant commerce clause analysis.
318. Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 330 (1980).
319. See supra notes 266-72 and accompanying text (discussing Rush).
320. See supra notes 305-06 and accompanying text (noting lack of specificity as to juris-
dictional effect of corporate registration).
321. Bauxites, 456 U.S. at 699.
322. See supra notes 244-56 and accompanying text (discussing Ninth Circuit and Su-
preme Court decisions in Carnival Cruise Lines).
323. Lee Scott Taylor, Note, Registration Statutes, Personal Jurisdiction and the Problem
of Predictability, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1163, 1189 (2003) (noting that registration-consent
statutes might be "obnoxious" to the Commerce Clause); T. Griffin Vincent, Comment,
Toward a Better Analysis for General Jurisdiction Based on Appointment of Corporate
Agents, 41 BAYLOR L. REv. 461, 493 (1989) (exploring arguments and concluding that
registration-consent may violate the Commerce Clause).
324. See supra notes 155-56 (discussing Davis v. Farmers' Co-op Equity Co., 262 U.S.
312 (1923) and related cases).
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In Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises,32 5 the Court invali-
dated Ohio's scheme in which the state penalized out-of-state corpora-
tions that refused to register and consent to general jurisdiction. 326
Bendix was a dormant commerce clause challenge to an Ohio law that
forced out-of-state corporations to choose between registration-consent
to general jurisdiction and the statute of limitation defense. 327 The Court
found that the law impermissibly burdened interstate commerce. 328 The
Court's analysis focused on the forfeiture of the statute of limitation de-
fense and did not address the consent to general jurisdiction standing
alone.329 Nevertheless, that Ohio required the corporation to consent to
general jurisdiction, as opposed to more limited specific jurisdiction, was
critical to the Court's holding. The Court stated that the "designation of
an agent subjects the foreign corporation to the general jurisdiction of the
Ohio courts in a manner to which Ohio's tenuous relation would not oth-
erwise extend. '330 It described general jurisdiction as a "significant bur-
den" 331 and concluded that the "exaction" of the consent through waiver
of the limitation defense was "an unreasonable burden on commerce. '332
The repercussions of Bendix are not certain. Scholars and lower courts
debate its impact. 333 Moreover, as a result of Bendix, most state foreign
registration schemes today do not force the choice between consent to
general jurisdiction and waiver of the statute of limitation defense. Yet,
registration statutes are still coercive. They penalize non-registration
325. 486 U.S. 888 (1988).
326. Id. at 895 (noting that "a designation with the Ohio Secretary of State of an agent
for the service of process likely would have subjected [defendant] to the general jurisdic-
tion of Ohio's courts over transactions in which Ohio had no interest").
327. "The statute [of limitation] is tolled ... for any period that a person or corporation
is not 'present' in the state. To be present in Ohio, a foreign corporation must appoint an
agent for service of process, which operates as consent to general jurisdiction of the Ohio
courts." Id. at 889.
328. Id. at 894-95. The Court majority seemingly found that the Ohio scheme violated
both tiers of dormant commerce clause analysis. It first suggested that the Ohio law imper-
missibly discriminated against interstate commerce. The Court found that the Ohio statute
"imposes a greater burden on out-of-state companies than it does on Ohio companies,
subjecting the activities of foreign and domestic corporations to inconsistent regulation."
Id. at 894. This alone would have been enough to invalidate the statute. Indeed, Justice
Scalia's concurrence rested on this ground alone. Id. at 898. The majority, however, pro-
ceeded to find that the Ohio scheme also violated the balancing test.
329. Some scholars have questioned why the Court did not independently condemn this
aspect of the Ohio law as a matter of due process. See Wendy Collins Perdue, Personal
Jurisdiction and the Beetle in the Box, 32 B.C. L. REV. 529, 550-51 & 557-60 n.152 (1991)(analyzing Bendix and questioning why "none of the Justices seemed troubled by this ex-
torted waiver of a constitutional right").
330. Bendix Autolite Corp., 486 U.S. at 892-93 (citing World-Wide Volkswagen).
331. Id. at 893.
332. Id. at 894-95.
333. See Sternberg v. O'Neil, 550 A.2d 1105, 1107, 1109 (Del. 1988) (relying in part on
Bendix to hold that registration-consent remains a viable basis for jurisdiction); see also
Lea Brilmayer, Consent, Contract and Territory, 74 MINN. L. REV. 1, 29 n.86 (1989) (citing
Bendix and stating that "[a]lthough the case law on this issue is not entirely clear, such
assertions of jurisdiction may be unconstitutional"); Kipp, supra note 305, at 32-33 (arguing
that the Bendix case is ambiguous and that use of registration statutes to infer consent to




through a variety of means, including fines and forfeiture of the right to
sue in local courts.334 Given the Bendix Court's condemnation of consent
to general jurisdiction as a "substantial burden," Bendix at least raises
doubt about the constitutionality of any statute that purports to coerce
this consent.
In sum, the proper effect of corporate registration statutes raises issues
that warrant more in-depth study. It is safe to say for this analysis that
jurisdiction based on corporate registration does not clearly establish ju-
risdiction in the problem class action. This form of jurisdiction, if permit-
ted at all, applies only to corporations who register in the forum state,
and it applies only in states that broadly interpret their registrations stat-
utes to confer general jurisdiction. Even then, jurisdiction in the problem
class action presents uncertainty as to both the due process fairness of the
consent and its effect on interstate commerce.
4. Special Jurisdiction in Nationwide Class Actions Based on Joinder
Unlike the prior arguments, which look to the class claims as separate
suits, the final argument views the class claims as one unit. Under this
view, the principal jurisdictional focus is on the claims of the named
plaintiffs rather than the claims of the absent members. So long as some
of the claims arise out of the defendant's forum activity-the named
plaintiff's claims in the problem class action-the court has personal juris-
diction over the remaining claims based on their joinder to the local
claims. Some legal observers call this doctrine "pendent" personal juris-
diction, but because that doctrine has a particular meaning in federal
court, I use the term "joinder" jurisdiction.335
One Supreme Court case, Keeton v. Hustler,336 arguably supports this
theory. In Keeton, a New York resident brought a defamation suit in New
Hampshire against Hustler, an Ohio magazine publisher. The plaintiff
had virtually no relationship with New Hampshire, 337 and only a small
percentage of the offending copies of the magazine were sold in New
Hampshire. 338 New Hampshire allowed the plaintiff to sue for all of her
nationwide damages, not just those arising in New Hampshire, and its six-
year limitation period made New Hampshire the only state in which her
334. MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. § 15.02(a) (1998) (providing that a "foreign corpo-
ration transacting business in this state without a certificate of authority may not maintain
a proceeding in any court in this state until it obtains a certificate of authority"); id.
§ 15.02(d) (providing civil penalties for transacting business without a certificate of
authority).
335. See Linda Samstrom Simard, Exploring the Limits of Specific Personal Jurisdiction,
62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1619 (2001) (arguing that state and federal courts can exercise pendent
personal jurisdiction) [hereinafter Simard, Exploring the Limits]; see also Ex Parte Dill,
Dill, Carr, Stonbraker & Hutchins, 866 So. 2d 519, 544-47 (see dissent) (arguing application
of "pendent personal jurisdiction" to justify state court personal jurisdiction over related
out-of-state claim). I discuss the federal doctrine infra in Part III(B).
336. Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984).
337. Plaintiff was a resident of New York and her only connection with New Hampshire
was that she was an editor of Penthouse magazine with sales in New Hampshire. Id. at 772.
338. Id. at 772-73, 775.
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claim was not time-barred. 339 The case thus presented a situation similar,
but not identical, to the problem class action-the plaintiff was injured by
an act (publication of the magazine) in the forum and she sought dam-
ages for this injury, but the bulk of her damages arose from injuries suf-
fered elsewhere, primarily as a result of defendant's publication outside
the forum.340
In Keeton, the Court acknowledged that personal jurisdiction must bejudged in light of the plaintiff's341 nationwide claim: whether it is "'fair'
to compel [defendant] to defend a multi-state lawsuit in New Hampshire
seeking multi-state damages for all copies of the five issues in questions,
even though only a small portion of those copies were distributed in New
Hampshire. '342 Yet, the Court evidently concluded that the claim was
sufficiently related to New Hampshire because it characterized Keeton as
a specific rather than general jurisdiction case and stated that plaintiff's
"cause of action arises out of the very activity being conducted, in part, in
New Hampshire." 343 Keeton thus suggests that only part of the plaintiff's
claim must arise in the forum to satisfy the first prong of the World-Wide
Volkswagen test for specific jurisdiction. 344 This is significant because
once a case passes the first prong, the burden shifts to the defendant to
show a compelling case of unreasonableness. The Court has only once
held that jurisdiction was unreasonable under the second prong, and that
case involved foreign national parties and other extraordinary facts.345
Despite this broad suggestion of personal jurisdiction based on joinder
to in-state claims, Keeton does not conclusively establish jurisdiction in
the problem class action. Keeton did not involve joinder of parties. In
Calder v. Jones, a companion case to Keeton, the Court suggested that
party joinder does not lessen jurisdictional standards at least as to joined
defendants; the claim against each defendant must be judged indepen-
dently for jurisdictional purposes. 346 Keeton involved one person's claim
for damages that occurred in multiple places.347 The appropriate analogy
339. Id. at 773; see Walker, supra note 83, at 19 (noting that New Hampshire had be-
come a well known "haven" for forum shopping plaintiffs due to its long limitation period).
340. Keeton, 465 U.S. at 770.
341. The out-of-state plaintiff's lack of relationship to the forum was not by itselfgrounds to deny jurisdiction. The Court explained that forum shopping is a normal aspect
of litigation and the plaintiff need not have minimum contacts with the forum. Id. at 779.
342. Id. at 775 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
343. Id.
344. See Simard, Exploring the Limits, supra note 335, at 1661 (arguing that the Keeton
case provides "evidence that the Due Process Clause is broad enough to permit adjudica-
tion of entire controversies" based on a pendent jurisdiction theory).345. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Sup. Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 116 (1987) (finding juris-diction unreasonable under second prong where California asserted jurisdiction over a Jap-
anese third-party defendant to an indemnity claim brought through impleader by a
Taiwanese primary defendant after the main claim had settled).
346. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 790 (1984) ("The requirements of InternationalShoe.. . must be met as to each defendant over whom a state court exercises jurisdiction.")
(quoting Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 322 (1980)).347. Professor Kennedy distinguishes the plaintiff class members in Shutts on this basis:
Plaintiff Keeton's claim was a compulsory, indivisible claim that required a
unitary adjudication in one forum. In contrast, in Shutts, the nonresident
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to the problem class action would be a class action in which a class of
nationwide magazine purchasers sued Hustler in New Hampshire for con-
sumer fraud. Such a class action would be an extension of the Keeton
holding.
A policy analysis of Keeton shows that its holding already stretched the
justifications for jurisdiction 348 and that any extension to the problem
class action would violate the policies underlying minimum contacts anal-
ysis. First, as to reciprocity, in the actual Keeton case, the benefits of Hus-
tler entering the New Hampshire market and selling a low volume of a
particular magazine arguably did not match the burden of Hustler having
to defend a suit for nationwide defamation damages. In the problem
class action, the imbalance would be greater. The defendant (Hustler in
this variation) would have to bear the burden of defending in any state all
claims by magazine purchasers throughout the country, not just the
claims of the persons it potentially defames in each issue. The same com-
parison applies to the predictability rationale. In the actual case, Hustler
likely did not predict that any person defamed in its magazine could sue
in any state in which it sold a copy of the magazine, but in the Hustler
version of the problem class action, the warning would be even less. Hus-
tler's potential for suit no longer would be limited to defamation suits by
persons targeted in its magazine; 349 it would extend to every form of con-
sumer suit in every state.
As to state sovereignty, the Court in the actual case said that New
Hampshire had three different interests: first, regulating defamation that
entered its borders and impacted New Hampshire readers; second, re-
dressing plaintiff's harm occurring in its borders; and third, cooperating
with other states to efficiently resolve defamation suits in one setting.
350
The first two interests are local and justify jurisdiction over the plaintiff's
harm in New Hampshire, as it would justify jurisdiction in the problem
class action over the local claims of the named class plaintiffs. Neither
interest was implicated by the out-of-state harm suffered by the plaintiff
members were permissibly joinable parties with permissibly joinable claims
that did not arise out of Phillips' act in Kansas. If a second permissibly join-
able co-plaintiff had joined Keeton to sue for a version of the story not pub-
lished in New Hampshire,... the co-plaintiff's consent should not be able to
overcome the limitation that the co-plaintiffs' claim must arise out of Hus-
tler's acts in New Hampshire.
Kennedy, supra note 139, at 281-82, n.140.
348. The mere fact that Keeton involved a defamation claim might be grounds to limit
its holding. Although the Court in Calder, 465 U.S. at 790-91, refused to develop special
jurisdictional rules for defamation cases, lower courts have limited the Court's personal
jurisdiction holdings in defamation cases, largely due to the unusual damages in defama-
tion cases-intangible injuries suffered by an individual that transcend state borders. See
Griffis v. Luban, 646 N.W.2d 527, 532-35 (Minn. 2002) (surveying differing interpretations
of Calder and joining majority of courts that are cautious and narrowly interpret Calder).
349. In Calder, the Court suggested that such targeting was an essential component in
its expansion of jurisdictional theory to individual defendants in defamation cases. Calder,
465 U.S. at 788-89; see also Keeton, 465 U.S. at 789-90 (contrasting "mere untargeted negli-
gence" from the deliberate defamation of a forum citizen).
350. Keeton, 465 U.S. at 776-78.
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in Keeton. Only the third interest, interstate judicial cooperation and effi-
ciency, was relevant to New Hampshire asserting jurisdiction to remedy
harm occurring outside the state, and this interest arguably extends to the
problem class action. A primary aim of class action procedure is efficient
resolution of multiple claims in a single setting. Yet, there is both a quali-
tative and quantitative difference in the effect on state sovereignty be-
tween a case such as Keeton, in which a state expands an existing
plaintiff's claim to include all of her personal harm, and one such as the
problem class action, in which a state expands a single plaintiff's suit to
include thousands of other plaintiffs with no local connection. In sum,
the problem class action would push the policy limits beyond the already
weak underpinnings of the Keeton holding.
Shutts, decided one year after Keeton, also argues against extending
personal jurisdiction over the defendant in the problem class action. 351
The Court in Shutts did not address personal jurisdiction over Phillips,
but Shutts, taken in context with the Court's other decisions, shows that
class action joinder does not justify lesser standards of jurisdiction as to
the defendant. To be sure, the Court in Shutts acknowledged that class
actions serve special state and judicial interests.35 2 The Court recounted
the history and purpose of class actions and stated that in an action such
as that against Phillips, where each claim averaged $100, "most of the
plaintiffs would have no realistic day in court if a class action were not
available. '353 Some courts have used this statement as justification for
special jurisdictional standards for defendants in complex tort cases based
on special need and state interests, 354 but this is an erroneous reading of
Shutts.
First, expansion of Shutts to create jurisdiction by necessity over class
action defendants is not consistent with the Court's other cases concern-
ing jurisdiction and so-called necessity. The case most often cited for a
doctrine of jurisdiction by necessity is Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank
& Trust Co. 355 In Mullane, a New York trust company petitioned for ajudicial settlement of accounts pursuant to a New York statute regulating
common trust funds.356 Many beneficiaries were unknown, and some
beneficiaries were not residents of New York. 357 A special guardian act-
ing on behalf of the beneficiaries challenged both jurisdiction and no-
tice. 358 Mullane has become a landmark case for the Court setting a
351. See supra Part I(C) (discussing Shutts).
352. Shutts, 472 U.S. at 806.
353. Shutts, 472 U.S. at 809.
354. Most notable is Judge Weinstein's assertion of jurisdiction over out-of-state de-
fendants to correspond to the forum state's market share liability law. In re DES Cases,
789 F. Supp. 552, 572 (E.D.N.Y. 1992); see id. at 576-77 (discussing Shutts' special jurisdic-
tional rules for plaintiff class and stating that although Shutts expressly did not apply to
defendants, "the difficulties raised by mass litigation ... warrant a restatement of jurisdic-
tional due process law that can function in ... mass torts").
355. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
356. Id. at 306.
357. Id. at 309.
358. Id. at 311.
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flexible reasonableness standard for notice,359 but the Court gave rela-
tively little attention to the jurisdictional challenge. It simply observed
that the case did not fit into any existing categories of jurisdiction 360 and
held that "the interest of each state in providing means to close trusts that
exist by the grace of its laws and are administered under the supervision
of its courts is so insistent and rooted in custom as to establish beyond
doubt the right of its courts to determine the interests of all claimants,
resident or nonresident. '361
Although many observers interpret Mullane as establishing a doctrine
of jurisdiction by necessity,362 the Court has not relied upon it to justify
jurisdiction over defendants in other cases. To the contrary, the Court
has denied jurisdiction where the doctrine has been urged. In Hanson,
the Court, citing Mullane, stated that in-rem jurisdiction and minimum
contacts standards did "not exhaust all the situations that give rise to ju-
risdiction, '363 but it rejected jurisdiction without considering any other
basis, even though Justice Brennan in dissent argued that Mullane justi-
fied jurisdiction.364 In Shaffer, the Court stated that it was not addressing
"whether the presence of a defendant's property in a State is a sufficient
basis for jurisdiction when no other forum is available to the plaintiff, 365
and, in dissent, Justice Brennan again cited Mullane and argued that state
interests justified jurisdiction. 366 In Helicopteros, the plaintiffs argued ne-
cessity as an alternative basis for jurisdiction, but the Court rejected it.367
The Court stated that plaintiffs' "failed to carry their burden of showing
that all three defendants could not be sued together in a single forum,"
and it declined "to consider adoption of a doctrine of jurisdiction by ne-
cessity-a potentially far-reaching modification of existing law-in ab-
359. Id. at 314 (requiring "notice reasonably calculated under all the circumstances to
apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to
present their objections").
360. Id. at 312.
361. Id. at 313.
362. See George B. Fraser, Jurisdiction By Necessity-An Analysis of the Mullane Case,
100 U. PA. L. REV. 305, at 311-12 (1951) (arguing that Mullane is an example of jurisdiction
by necessity); SCOLES & HAY, supra note 253, § 6.6, at 341-42 n.1, 343 (collecting authori-
ties addressing jurisdiction by necessity and concluding that "the consensus appears to be
that Mullane-at the very least-is a sui generics departure from conventional jurisdiction
categories"); von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 171, at 1173-75 (noting that "the estab-
lishment in the forum state of a legal entity such as the trust in the Mullane case has been
recognized as an appropriate basis for the exercise of what might be called jurisdiction by
necessity").
363. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 246 n.13 (1958) (citing Mullane, 399 U.S. at 312; Fra-
ser, supra note 362, at 305). In rem jurisdiction was not applicable because the Florida
forum was not the situs of the trust assets. ld. at 246-47 & n.16. See supra note 170-74
(discussing lack of purposeful availment in Hanson).
364. Hanson, 357 U.S. at 260-61 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("the same kind of considera-
tions are present here [as in Mullane] supporting Florida's jurisdiction over the non-resi-
dent defendant").
365. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 211 n.37 (1977); see supra notes 194-98 & 226-31
and accompanying text (discussing Shaffer).
366. Id. at 223-24 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
367. Helicopteros Nationales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 419 n.13 (1989); see
also supra notes 187-91 & 238-43 and accompanying text (discussing Helicopteros).
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sence of a more complete record. '368
These cases show that if the doctrine of jurisdiction by necessity is
valid-an uncertain proposition-it has limited application.369 Necessity
might help justify jurisdiction over unnamed plaintiff class members in a
case like Shutt, 370 and it also might justify jurisdiction over defendants,
but only in cases of true necessity, not simply forum state interest.371 In
Mullane, where the Court arguably relied upon jurisdiction by necessity,
New York was the best, if only, available forum.372 Likewise, in Hanson,
Helicopteros, and Shaffer; the forum was not the only alternative, and the
Court denied jurisdiction even though the states arguably had interests in
resolving the dispute. 373
In the problem class action, there is no genuine necessity to file in class
counsel's preferred forum. The plaintiff class has alternative forums for
jurisdiction over the defendant-the defendant's principal place of busi-
ness and state of incorporation-through general jurisdiction. By con-
trast, jurisdiction as to the plaintiff class in the problem class action comes
closer to true necessity, no matter where counsel chooses to file. The
plaintiffs are consumers who bought the defendant's products in their
home states. They do not have a purposeful affiliation with the defen-
dant's home state or any other state in which the defendant sells its prod-
uct. Without special standards of jurisdiction applicable to the plaintiff
class, the action might not be able to be maintained on a nationwide ba-
sis, because there is not a single state with which all consumers have de-
liberately associated themselves.
Returning to Shutts, this necessity helps explain the Court's adoption of
special jurisdictional standards for the plaintiff class. Indeed, the unique
nature of the plaintiff class was a recurring theme in the personal jurisdic-
tion portion of the Shutts opinion. The Court listed a number of differ-
ences between the plaintiff class and the defendant "in a normal civil
suit" 374 and concluded that the burdens placed on the plaintiff class are
"not of the same order of magnitude as those [placed] upon an absent
368. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 419 n.13.
369. See SCOLES & HAY, supra note 253, § 6.6, at 342 (noting that to the extent that the
doctrine is recognized it is limited to "circumstances in which no reasonable alternative
forum exists, and the connection of the parties and events makes the chosen forum a fair
one"); see also CASAD, supra note 153, § 108.43 (stating that jurisdiction by necessity is
"probably not" an alternative ground for jurisdiction and that lack of an alternative forum
is instead a factor under the reasonableness prong).
370. The Court in Shutts did not rely on Mullane for its jurisdictional holding even
though it otherwise cited Mullane for general due process standards. Phillips Petroleum
Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S 797, 807, 812 (1985).
371. See Brilmayer, How Contacts Count, supra note 248, at 108-10 (arguing that juris-
diction by necessity be limited to cases of true necessity, if recognized at all).
372. See supra notes 362-68 (discussing Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,
397 U.S. 306 (1950)).
373. See supra notes 172-74 (discussing Hanson), notes 187-91 & 238-43 (discussing
Helicopteros), and notes 194-98 & 226-31 (discussing Shaffer).
374. Shutts, 472 U.S. at 810.
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defendant. ' 375 For this reason, the Court held that the minimum contacts
test, which is designed to protect the defendant, does not apply to the
plaintiff class. 376 This reasoning does not extend to the defendant in class
actions. Indeed, it would turn the Court's logic on its head to conclude
that because plaintiff class members have less burden and greater protec-
tion in class actions, that the defendant in a class action should not get the
full protection of the minimum contacts test. Under the logic of Shutts,
the defendant in a nationwide class action arguably warrants additional,
not less, protection than a defendant in a normal suit because the defen-
dant faces far greater costs and risks in a class action than in a normal
civil suit.
This theme also is shown in the choice of law portion of the Shutts
opinion, where the Court held that the class action device did not warrant
a special exception to the due process protections due the defendant.
3 77
To be sure, choice of law is a distinct constitutional inquiry from personal
jurisdiction, but both are tests under due process that look at contacts and
the relationship of the claims with the forum. The due process test for
personal jurisdiction is usually more demanding than the choice of law
test. In personal jurisdiction analysis, unlike choice of law, the Court re-
quires that the defendant deliberately affiliate itself with the forum as an
added protection of the defendant's expectations. In Hanson, for exam-
ple, the Court observed that the forum likely had sufficient interest in the
trust dispute to apply its own law, but it denied jurisdiction because the
defendant trust company had not deliberately affiliated itself with the
forum.378
In Shutts, Kansas' interests were not sufficient to meet the less strict
due process standard for choice of law. The Court acknowledged that
Kansas had an interest in the Kansas leases, but this interest did not ex-
tend to the out-of-state leases. The parties to these other leases had no
expectation that Kansas law would apply. The fact that the claims were
joined as a class action did not overcome these deficiencies. The same
conclusion can apply to personal jurisdiction. If the relationship between
the claims of the unnamed class members and the forum were insufficient
to meet the test-for choice of law, then it seemingly would be insufficient
to meet the more demanding due process test for personal jurisdiction
over the defendant. Put another way, if the class action device did not
warrant reduced due process protections for the defendant as to choice of
375. Id. at 808; see supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text (Shutts contrast of plaintiff
class from defendant).
376. Shutts, 472 U.S at 807 ("The purpose of this test, of course, is to protect a defen-
dant from the travail of defending in a distant forum, unless the defendant's contacts with
the forum make it just to force him to defend there.").
377. Id. at 820-21; see also id. at 823 ("the constitutional limitations . . . must be
respected even in nationwide class actions").
378. Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253 (noting that "[f]or choice of law purposes [a ruling of
sufficient forum interest] may be justified, but we think it an insubstantial connection ...
for purposes of determining the question of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defen-
dant"); see supra notes 172-74 and accompanying text (discussing Hanson).
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law, it should not justify lower due process protections for the defendant
as to personal jurisdiction.
Keeton creates some uncertainty as to the proper "joinder" distinctions,
if any, to be made in personal jurisdiction analysis. Both common sense
and policy analysis, however, show that the joinder of the claims in a na-
tionwide class action is "not of the same order of magnitude" 379 as the
claim in Keeton. Shutts, when viewed in context of the Court's other deci-
sions regarding both jurisdiction and choice of law, argues for drawing
the line on the side of greater protection for the defendant. Accordingly,
the joinder argument does not justify jurisdiction in the problem class
action.
In sum, all four possible arguments for jurisdiction fail to conclusively
establish jurisdiction in the problem class action. Assertion of either spe-
cific or general jurisdiction based on contacts likely violates the due pro-
cess rights of the defendant. The third argument, consent through
registration, is a stronger argument for personal jurisdiction in some
states, but it by no means settles jurisdiction in the problem class action.
Finally, the unique nature of class actions is not sufficient reason to lessen
the defendant's due process protections. Thus, far from being easily as-
sumed, state court personal jurisdiction over the defendant in nationwide
class actions is at best uncertain and more likely unconstitutional, no mat-
ter the theory of jurisdiction.
III. THE PERSONAL JURISDICTION PROBLEM IN
NATIONWIDE CLASS ACTIONS FILED IN
FEDERAL COURT
Personal jurisdiction in federal court involves different analyses than
jurisdiction in state court. First, due process requires that federal courts
have proper jurisdiction, but the due process standards governing federal
courts derive from the Fifth Amendment, not the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.380 Under most articulations of the due process standards for fed-
eral courts, the relationship of the defendant to a particular state takes on
far less significance than under minimum contacts analysis for state court
jurisdiction. This is because the sovereign at issue in jurisdictional analy-
sis for federal courts is the United States as a whole, rather than a partic-
ular state. Similarly, the dormant commerce clause by definition limits
only exercise of state power, and it does not limit the jurisdiction of fed-
eral courts. The broader constitutional reach of federal courts, however,
is rarely seen in practice because Congress has not given federal courts
the full range of their potential jurisdiction. Due to statutory limits on
their power, federal courts in most cases have only as much personal ju-
risdiction as their state court counterparts, which means that federal
379. See supra note 375-76 and accompanying text (quoting Shutts).
380. The Fifth Amendment by its terms applies to the federal government, while the




courts also face problems and uncertainty in asserting jurisdiction over
defendants in nationwide class actions.
A. THE CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS FOR FEDERAL COURT
PERSONAL JURISDICTION AND THE LIMITED ROLE
OF RELATIONSHIP
Since the early nineteenth century, the Supreme Court has suggested
that a different standard governs personal jurisdiction in federal court
than in state court, and that Congress may authorize federal courts to
serve process anywhere in the United States.38 1 The Court explained in
1878 that Congress has the discretion to establish lower federal courts
and that Congress may either broadly establish lower federal courts on a
nationwide basis or strictly limit their territorial reach by state borders or
otherwise.382 In the Pennoyer era, this broad service of process power
meant broad personal jurisdiction of the federal courts. Just as a state
court had sovereignty and power over persons and property found within
the state borders, the federal courts had potential power over all persons
and property within the national borders.
International Shoe set new due process standards under the Fourteenth
Amendment for assessing jurisdiction in state court, but the Court has
never addressed how, if at all, minimum contacts analysis applies to fed-
eral courts. 383 In absence of definitive word from the Court, lower fed-
eral courts have struggled to define the due process limits on their
381. Toland v. Sprague, 37 U.S. 300, 328 (1838) ("Congress might have authorized civil
process from any circuit court, to have run into any state of the Union. It has not done
so.").
382. United States v. Union Pac. R.R., 98 U.S. 569, 604 (1878) (stating that there "is
nothing in the Constitution which forbids Congress to enact that, as to a class of cases or a
case of special character, a circuit court-any circuit court-in which the suit may be
brought, shall, by process served anywhere in the United States, have the power to bring
before it all the parties necessary to its decision"); see Maryellen Fullerton, Constitutional
Limits on Nationwide Personal Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts, 79 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 23-
30 (1984) (examining the "textual argument" that Article III permits Congress to develop
one nationwide federal court).
383. The Court has noted and reserved the issue. See Omni Capital Int'l Ltd. v. Rudolf
Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 103 n.5 (1987) (noting that it had "no occasion to consider the
constitutional issues raised by" petitioner's argument that a "federal court could exercise
personal jurisdiction, consistent with the Fifth Amendment, based on an aggregation of the
defendant's contacts with the Nation as a whole, rather than on its contacts with the State
in which the federal court sits"); see also Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 480
U.S. 102, 113 (1987) (stating that it had "no occasion here to determine whether Congress
could, consistent with the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, authorize federal
court jurisdiction over alien defendants based on the aggregate of national contacts, rather
than on the contacts between the defendant and the State in which the federal court sits")
(emphasis in original). As post-International Shoe authority for broader jurisdictional
reach of federal courts, commentators and lower courts cite the 1946 Supreme Court case
of Miss. Publ'g Co. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438 (1946). See FED. R. Civ. P. 4 advisory
committee's notes (1963), reprinted in 31 F.R.D. 587, 629 (1963) (stating "[a]s to the
Court's power to amend [Rule 4 regarding territorial reach of federal courts] see Mur-
phree"). Murphree was a venue case, in which the Court stated in a dictum that "Congress
could provide for service of process anywhere in the United States." 326 U.S. at 442. The
case makes no mention of minimum contacts, even though Murphree was decided one
month after International Shoe and Chief Justice Stone wrote both opinions. Id.
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jurisdiction. Most courts and academic commentators agree that the due
process limitation on a federal court's personal jurisdiction is different
from that applicable to state court jurisdiction,384 but they cannot agree
as to how federal jurisdiction is different.385 A few authorities suggest a
strict territorial power approach to federal court jurisdiction-if the per-
son is found within the United States, he is subject to the jurisdiction of
any federal court.386 Most modern observers, however, argue for a modi-
fied form of minimum contacts analysis, under which the relevant con-
tacts are the defendant's contacts with the United States as a whole,
rather than the defendant's contacts with a particular state. 387
This change in focus for federal court minimum contacts analysis
causes a significant difference in outcome from that applicable to a state
court sitting in the same location as the federal court. Whereas the first
prong is usually the deciding factor in state court minimum contacts anal-
ysis, the expanded focus on national contacts means that virtually every
suit against a domestic corporation will pass the first prong for the simple
reason that the corporation is based in the United States. The first
prong's contacts analysis would be a limiting factor only where the defen-
dant is an alien.
The difference in outcome can be reconciled through policy analysis by
accounting for the different sovereign at issue. The burden of defending
suits in the United States is reciprocal to the benefit of conducting its
business in the United States. The defendant can expect suit in the
United States. Moreover, a primary function of the first prong of mini-
mum contacts analysis is to guarantee that the court does not exceed its
384. A small minority view holds that due process analysis for federal court jurisdiction
is the same as that for state courts and requires minimum contacts with the forum state.
See Fed. Fountain, Inc. v. KR Entm't, Inc., 143 F.3d 1138, 1139 (8th Cir. 1998) (reaffirming
that "service of process outside the forum state under a national service of process statute
confers personal jurisdiction over a defendant only if that defendant has the requisite mini-
mum contacts with the forum state"); see also Gerald Abraham, Constitutional Limitations
Upon the Territorial Reach of Federal Process, 8 VILL. L. REV. 520 (1963) (arguing that
Fifth Amendment and Erie considerations limit the nationwide process of federal courts).
385. See CASAD, supra note 153, § 108.123[21[b](ii] (surveying split in federal cases);
CASAD & RICHMAN, supra note 309, at 1600-06 (collecting cases and summarizing "four
views of what Fifth Amendment due process requires").
386. See Mariash v. Morrill, 496 F.2d. 1138, 1143 (2d Cir. 1974) ("the minimum contacts
principle does not, in our view, seem particularly relevant in evaluating the constitutional-
ity of in personam jurisdiction based on nationwide, but not extraterritorial service of pro-
cess") (emphasis in original); see also CASAD & RICHMAN, supra note 307, at 1600-01
(reporting view that minimum contacts analysis is irrelevant where a defendant is served
inside the United States); David D. Siegel, The New (Dec. 1, 1993) Rule 4 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure: Changes in Summons, Service and Personal Jurisdiction, 152
F.R.D. 249, 253 (1994) (arguing that where defendant is served within national borders,
jurisdiction in federal court should be "just as available against that person as were he
served within the borders of a particular state").
387. See Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527, 554 (1980) (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("due pro-
cess requires only certain minimum contacts between the defendant and the sovereign that
has created the court"); Busch v. Buchman, Buchman, & O'Brien, 11 F.3d 1255, 1258 (5th
Cir. 1994) (holding that due process standard for federal courts is "whether the defendant
has had minimum contacts with the United States").
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sovereignty.388 In federal court, the sovereign is the United States, and it
does not exceed its power when it exercises jurisdiction over its citizens
or persons who act within its national borders.
There is relative agreement as to this change to a national focus in the
first prong of the World-Wide Volkswagen test (at least as to federal ques-
tion cases), but commentators and courts disagree as to two secondary
issues: whether the second prong of the test also applies and further limits
jurisdiction and whether the national contacts test is limited to federal
question cases, as opposed to federal diversity cases. As to the first issue,
the proponents of the full two-prong approach argue that jurisdiction can
be unfair even given the defendant's purposeful and related contacts with
the national forum. 389 They propose a modified form of the second
prong of the minimum contacts test. The modified reasonableness analy-
sis might include some localized facts, such as the burden associated with
trying the case in the particular locale, the location of witnesses and other
evidence, and the plaintiff's interests in the chosen location.390 Other fac-
tors, such as the forum's interest in the suit, also would include a national
rather than local focus. 39
1
The addition of the second prong would not make much practical dif-
ference. Federal courts still would have proper jurisdiction in most cases
against domestic defendants. 39 2 Under World-Wide Volkswagen, the de-
fendant must make a compelling case of unreasonableness under the sec-
ond prong to render jurisdiction unconstitutional. 39 3 Furthermore,
federal courts have procedural options not available in state court, such
388. See supra notes 176-77 & 202 (discussing the sovereignty function of the minimum
contacts test); see also Busch, 11 F.3d at 1257-58 (addressing sovereignty rationale as ap-
plied to federal courts after Bauxites clarified that minimum contacts analysis was a func-
tion of due process as opposed to federalism).
389. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4 advisory committee's notes (1993) ("There also may be a
further Fifth Amendment constraint in that a plaintiff's forum selection might be so incon-
venient to a defendant that is would be a denial of 'fair play and substantial justice' re-
quired by the due process clause, even though the defendant had significant affiliating
contacts with the United States"); Republic of Pan. v. BCCI Holdings (Luxemborg) S.A.,
119 F.3d 935, 945-47 (11th Cir. 1997) (applying reasonableness analysis to test federal court
personal jurisdiction); Robert A. Lusardi, Nationwide Service of Process: Due Process Lim-
itations on the Power of the Sovereign, 33 VILL. L. REV. 1, 34-39 (1988) (collecting argu-
ments and concluding that reasonablenss analysis should apply to federal courts).
390. Some have argued that the reasonableness analysis should be more localized for
federal courts than state courts, in that federal courts should look to the fairness of placing
the litigation in a particular district. See Fullerton, supra note 382, at 44-56 (considering
different focal points for analysis of inconvenience, including the state, the district, and the
general region).
391. Id. at 56-60 (surveying different federal governmental interests, including desire to
provide a federal forum for suits beyond effective reach of any state, judicial economy, and
foreign relations concerns in suits involving non-citizens).
392. See Republic of Pan., 119 F.3d at 947 (emphasizing that "it is only in highly unusual
cases that inconvenience will rise to a level of constitutional concern").
393. See supra notes 180-81 (discussing presumption of reasonableness); but see gener-
ally Fullerton, supra note 382 (arguing against the presumption of reasonableness and ad-
vancing a three-part fairness test for federal personal jurisdiction).
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as venue transfer within the federal system, to address inconvenience. 394
Only aliens are likely to show sufficient burden to overcome the pre-
sumption of reasonableness. 395
The second point of contention is whether federal courts sitting in di-
versity must use the minimum contacts analysis applicable to state courts.
The proponents of this view argue that even though federal courts in fed-
eral question cases have broader territorial reach depending on a proper
authorizing statute, federal courts sitting in diversity are limited by the
more narrow state-focused minimum contacts analysis applicable to state
courts.396 This may be a wise policy choice in many diversity cases, but it
almost certainly is not a constitutional mandate. 397 First, due process
does not require this distinction. The Fifth Amendment assures due pro-
cess in federal courts, regardless of the basis for federal subject-matter
jurisdiction. If application of a national contacts approach complies with
due process in federal question cases, it seemingly would satisfy due pro-
cess in diversity cases.398
It may seem unfair for parties in state law disputes to be subject to
different rules as to the territorial reach of the court depending on
whether the case is in federal or state court, but this "accident of diver-
sity" 399 is true of virtually every procedural difference in diversity cases.
The perceived unfairness is not a problem of due process but instead a
394. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (providing for discretionary transfer to another federal
court: "[fjor the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district
court may transfer any civil action to any other district or divisions where it might have
been brought").
395. See supra note 345 (discussing Asahi holding as to unreasonablenss of jurisdiction
over Japanese defendant).
396. See Willingway Hosp., Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 870 F. Supp. 1102 (S.D.
Ga. 1994) ("Personal jurisdiction in diversity cases are determined under the Fourteenth
Amendment due process standard enunciated in International Shoe .. "); WRIGHT, supra
note 37, § 1068.1, at 592 ("When a federal court adjudicates state-created rights under
subject-matter jurisdiction bases on diversity of citizenship, the constitutional inquiry re-
garding questions of personal jurisdiction is guided by the Constitution's Fourteenth
Amendment due process standards .. "); Abraham, supra note 384 (arguing that Erie
doctrine requires application of state standards for jurisdiction in federal diversity cases);
CASAD & RiCHMAN, supra note 309, § 5-1, at 528-29 (stating that Erie doctrine "may pose
limits on how far Congress can extend the range of a federal court's process beyond that of
the courts of the state in which the federal court sits").
397. The current federal long-arm provision sets this limitation for most federal suits,
whether based on diversity or federal question. See infra notes 411-12 (discussing long-arm
provisions).
398. Indeed, Congress already has extended federal court personal jurisdiction beyond
that of state courts in a few types of diversity suits, such as interpleader actions. See infra
note 419 (discussing interpleader statute).
399. The Court has used the phrase "accident of diversity" as a short-hand reference to
the aim underlying the Erie doctrine, that case outcomes do not turn on whether the par-
ties are diverse and therefore able to gain access to federal court. See Stewart Org., Inc. v.
Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 40 (1988) (stating Erie aim that "decision of an important legal
issue should not turn on this accident of diversity of citizenship"); Klaxon v. Stentor Mfg.,
313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941) (stating aim of Erie to not disturb "equal administration of jus-
tice" in "coordinate state and federal courts sitting side by side" due simply to the "acci-
dent of diversity of citizenship").
1378 [Vol. 58
"Class Action Fairness"
question under the principles announced in Erie4° ° and Hanna v.
Plumer.4 0 1 Congress has the power to regulate the procedure of federal
courts,40 2 and this federal procedural power includes laws that are partly
substantive.403 The constitutional test for federal procedural law-making
is whether the federal law is arguably procedural. 40 4 A statute that sets
the territorial reach of federal courts easily meets the constitutional test.
Assume there is a federal long-arm statute that grants nationwide per-
sonal jurisdiction in all federal cases, including diversity suits. The statute
would be procedural in that it limits the extent of the power of the federal
courts and specifies the types of cases, in terms of defending parties, that
the federal court may hear. To be sure, this law would impact litigants.
The broader territorial reach of a federal court might lessen the plaintiff's
burden in litigation by allowing a single suit in one location against all
wrongdoers, for example, and it likewise might increase the burdens and
costs imposed on some defendants. But these interests are procedural.
Even assuming substantive repercussions, the statute would pass the con-
stitutional test, which asks only if the law can rationally be classified as
procedure. Laws that fall into the grey area of substance and procedure
are within the Congressional rule-making power. Therefore, a statute au-
thorizing nationwide jurisdiction of federal courts in diversity cases would
be constitutional under Erie and Hanna.
40 5
In summary, under most statements of the Fifth Amendment due pro-
cess standards for federal court jurisdiction the defendant need only have
minimum contacts with the United States as a whole. The problem class
400. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
401. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
402. Under Article I of the Constitution, Congress has the enumerated power to estab-
lish inferior federal courts and also the general power to enact laws "necessary and proper"
to carry out its enumerated powers. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8.
403. In Hanna, the Court stated that Congress has the "power to make rules governing
the practice and pleading in those courts, which in turn includes power to regulate matters
which, though falling within the uncertain area between substance and procedure, are ra-
tionally capable of classification as either." 380 U.S. at 472.
404. See id. at 476 (Harlan, J., concurring) (describing majority test of constitutional
rulemaking power as "arguably procedural, ergo constitutional").
405. See Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l, 320 F.2d 219, 226 (2d Cir. 1963) (stating that
"the constitutional doctrine announced in Erie would not prevent Congress or its rule-
making delegate from authorizing a district court to assume jurisdiction over a foreign
corporation in an ordinary diversity case although the state court would not"); see also
Fullerton, supra note 382, at 4 n.9 (reporting "general agreement" that practice of applying
state court jurisdiction standards in federal diversity cases "is not constitutionally man-
dated"); Siegel, supra note 386, at 251 (noting that many lawyers "automatically assume"
that the federal court reference to state law is by "mandate of the Erie doctrine" but that
Rule 4 applies to most federal cases, whether based on diversity or not). If the long-arm
provision were in a rule of civil procedure, paragraph (b) of the Rules Enabling Act (28
U.S.C. § 2072) would impose the added restriction that the rule not infringe a substantive
right. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471 (stating a presumption in favor of validity of rule). A rule of
procedure granting broad territorial reach would meet this test. See WRIGHT, supra note
37, § 1075, at 410 (concluding that a federal rule of civil procedure would pass the Hanna
tests); Siegel, supra note 386, at 253 (arguing that expansion of Rule 4 to include nation-
wide contacts would pass Hanna analysis because it is "not designed to change in any
particular the substantive law to be applied . . . ,but only to add the federal courts to the
list of forums that can hear the action").
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action would pass this test. The corporate defendant has extensive, pur-
poseful, and related contacts with the United States. It is incorporated
and based in the United States. All claims arise out of the defendant's
activities in the United States-product sales and injuries in all fifty
states. Under the second prong, the defendant would be burdened and
inconvenienced by defending in a distant federal court almost as much as
the comparable state court. The travel would be the same, but federal
courts offer procedures, such as stream-lined discovery outside the dis-
trict and state that might lessen the evidentiary burden. Moreover, the
analysis is shifted to reflect the national government's interest in provid-
ing a forum not limited by state borders, and any inconvenience can be
addressed through means short of constitutional declarations, such as
transfer to another forum. The defendant likely could not show a com-
pelling case of burden. Thus, federal courts may assert personal jurisdic-
tion over the defendant in the problem class action without violating the
Fifth Amendment.
Finally, the Commerce Clause of the federal constitution does not pre-
sent an obstacle to federal courts exercising jurisdiction in the problem
class action. The dormant commerce clause may prevent a state court
from exercising jurisdiction over claims that have little or no relation to
the forum,406 but this limitation arises from the limitation on states gener-
ally: states may not unduly interfere with interstate commerce. The fed-
eral government does not face this limit. To the contrary, the federal
constitution gives Congress the affirmative power to regulate interstate
commerce. 40 7 Congress is free to authorize the federal courts to hear
claims regardless of whether their local state court counterparts could do
so. This leads to the real problem facing federal court jurisdiction in the
problem class action-the lack of a federal authorizing statute.
B. STATUTORY LIMITATIONS ON FEDERAL COURT
PERSONAL JURISDICTION
Constitutional power by itself does not mean that a federal court may
assert personal jurisdiction over the defendant in the problem class ac-
tion. The federal court must have statutory authority for personal juris-
diction.40 8 This is also true for state courts, but most states have broad
"long-arm" statutes that allow their courts to exercise personal jurisdic-
tion to the limits of due process.40 9 In most states, Fourteenth Amend-
406. See supra notes 155-56 (discussing early twentieth century cases holding that dor-
mant commerce clause limits state court jurisdiction) and 325-32 (discussing Bendix and
possible dormant commerce clause limitations on general jurisdiction).
407. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8 (giving Congress the power to "regulate Commerce ...
among the several states").
408. Congress has addressed territorial power of federal courts in a few specialized stat-
utes, but for the most part Congress has delegated this authority to the Supreme Court
through a general procedure for promulgation of court rules. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-73; see
generally WRIGHT, supra note 37, § 4509 (discussing Rules Enabling Act).
409. Only a few states have long-arm provisions that in practice act to limit the jurisdic-
tion of the state courts short of that permitted under the Fourteenth Amendment. See
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ment due process analysis is the limiting factor for personal jurisdiction,
and statutory authority rarely is an obstacle. In federal court, the author-
izing statutes are narrower than the limits of Fifth Amendment due pro-
cess, thereby making the statutes the primary determinant of permissible
federal court personal jurisdiction.
Congress from its very beginning has limited the territorial reach of
federal courts in most cases, usually along state lines. 41 0 Today, there are
scores of statutes addressing the personal jurisdiction of federal courts,
but these speak to particular types of cases, usually based on federal
law.41 1  In absence of a specific authorizing statute, the governing long-
arm provision is Rule 4(k) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The
most general provision is Rule 4(k)(1)(A), which allows a federal court to
assert personal jurisdiction to the same extent as the state courts in the
state in which the federal court sits.4 1 2 This direction applies to both fed-
eral question and diversity cases, and it is the basis for personal jurisdic-
tion in most cases in federal court. Accordingly, federal courts under the
directive of Rule 4(k)(1)(A) usually assess their own personal jurisdiction
by applying the local state long-arm statute and International Shoe mini-
mum contacts standards applicable to state courts, including the require-
ment that the claim relate to the defendant's local state activities.
41 3
Other provisions of Rule 4 permit federal courts to extend personal
jurisdiction beyond that of their state court counterparts in a narrow set
of cases. For example, Rule 4(k)(1)(B) allows a federal court to extend
its jurisdiction into a neighboring state to a maximum of one hundred
miles, but it is limited to defendants joined through impleader or the nec-
essary party rule.4 14 Rule 4(k)(1)(C) and (D) also allows jurisdiction
where otherwise permitted by the federal interpleader statute or other
federal statute.4 15 None of these extensions apply to the problem class
action.
generally CASAD & RICHMAN, supra note 309, ch. 4 (surveying various long-arm statutes);
FRIlEDENTHAL, supra note 5, §§ 3.12 & 3.13 (same).
410. See Robert C. Casad, Personal Jurisdiction in Federal Question Cases, 70 TEX. L.
REV. 1589, 1593-94 (1992) (surveying history and noting that since the Judiciary Act of
1789, Congress has established that federal process extend to its district borders, which are
the same as those of the states).
411. See generally CASAD, supra note 153, § 108.123[2] (discussing statutes authorizing
broader territorial reach of federal courts).
412. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(A) (stating that service is "effective to establish jurisdic-
tion over the person of a defendant (A) who could be subjected to the jurisdiction of a
court of general jurisdiction in the state in which the district court is located").
413. For this reason, a few of the Supreme Court's seminal decisions regarding mini-
mum contacts analysis, including Burger King (see supra notes 181-82), and Keeton (see
supra notes 336-43), were in cases pending in federal court, rather than state court.
414. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(B) (stating that service is "effective to establish jurisdiction
over the person of a defendant . . . (B) who is a party under Rule 14 or Rule 19 and is
served at a place within a judicial district of the United States and not more than 100 miles
from the place from which the summons issues").
415. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(C) (providing for jurisdiction over a defendant "who is
subject to the federal interpleader jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1335"); FED. R. Civ. P.




Some federal courts use a doctrine of "pendent personal jurisdiction"
to fill gaps in the federal long-arm statutes and rules.416 It is a judge-
made doctrine of statutory construction. 417 Under pendent personal ju-
risdiction, federal courts look first to whether a federal statute authorizes
nationwide jurisdiction on any portion of the suit. If so, they ask whether
the remaining claims are sufficiently related to the main claim to "piggy-
back" on its national jurisdiction. In other words, they broadly interpret
the underlying statute to extend nationwide jurisdiction over all claims
factually related to the main claim.
Pendent jurisdiction at first blush might seem to cure the statutory
problem with personal jurisdiction in federal courts. In other words, if
the federal court has jurisdiction over the named representative's claims
under Rule 4(k)(1)(A), the pendent jurisdiction doctrine might allow per-
sonal jurisdiction over all the claims. This is an erroneous application of
the doctrine. The doctrine depends on an anchor claim (usually a federal
question) for which there is broad jurisdiction.418 Jurisdiction under Rule
4(k)(1)(A) is limited to that of the local state court. The state court likely
has jurisdiction over the claims by the named class representative, but
that jurisdiction is local, not national. As I explain in Part II(B) above,
the state court cannot reach outside its borders to assert nationwide juris-
diction over the unrelated absent class claims. Because Rule 4(k)(1)(A)
does not extend nationwide jurisdiction as to any claim, there is no na-
tional anchor claim on which to append related claims and the doctrine of
pendent personal jurisdiction fails. Federal courts do not have statutory
power to assert personal jurisdiction over the defendant in the problem
class action.
In short, the limitations of state courts in asserting jurisdiction over the
defendant in nationwide class actions are imputed to the federal courts.
However, unlike the due process issue in state court, the federal court's
personal jurisdiction problem can be cured by statute or rule. Just as the
federal interpleader statute applies special standards of personal jurisdic-
tion to federal diversity cases based on the procedure by which the claim
is asserted,419 a similar law can do so for nationwide class actions. This is
a matter of policy, political debate and legislative action. Yet, until Con-
gress or federal rule-makers change the federal long-arm provision, fed-
416. See generally James S. Cochran, Note, Personal Jurisdiction and the Joinder of
Claims in the Federal Courts, 64 TEX. L. REV. 1463 (1986); Jon Heller, Note, Pendent Per-
sonal Jurisdiction and Nationwide Service of Process, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 113 (1989).
417. The doctrine has never been approved by the Supreme Court. Its status is some-
what doubtful given that it is similar to the ancillary and pendent subject-matter jurisdic-
tion doctrine that courts used prior to 1989, when the Supreme Court put a stop to the
practice in Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545 (1989). In response to Finley, Congress
enacted an authorizing statute for supplemental subject-matter jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C.§ 1367. Some federal courts cite Section 1367 as their authority to assert pendent personaljurisdiction. See WRIGHT, supra note 37, § 1069.7 (noting debate as to whether section
1367 includes pendent personal jurisdiction and concluding that it does not).
418. See generally WRIGHT, supra note 37, § 1069.7.
419. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1335, 1397, 2361 (addressing subject-matter jurisdiction, venue,
and personal jurisdiction under federal interpleader statute).
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eral courts, like their state court counterparts, will not be able to assert
personal jurisdiction over the defendant in many nationwide class actions.
IV. CONCLUSION
This article shows that nationwide class actions raise personal jurisdic-
tion concerns that were overlooked in the recent national debate about
class action fairness. State courts likely violate the due process rights of
the defendant and also may impermissibly infringe on interstate com-
merce. Federal courts exceed their statutory authority in asserting juris-
diction in nationwide class actions. At the very least, there is far more
uncertainty as to personal jurisdiction than the debate has suggested. The
problem with personal jurisdiction, however, does not mean an end to
nationwide class actions. There are many alternatives that will enable
large class actions to continue.
First, Congress can cure the problem in federal court by enacting a stat-
ute authorizing nationwide jurisdiction in specified class actions. There is
precedent for such a statute. Congress enacted a comprehensive scheme
regarding diversity interpleader actions in federal court, including both
subject-matter and personal jurisdiction. 420 CAFA stopped short and did
not address personal jurisdiction, but a relatively simple statute could au-
thorize federal courts to assert personal jurisdiction to correspond to
their new subject-matter jurisdiction over nationwide class actions. This
statute should not be more politically charged than CAFA itself. It would
merely effectuate the aim of CAFA, which was to enable federal courts to
hear nationwide class actions.
The jurisdictional problem in state court cannot be cured by statute. It
is a constitutional limitation on the power of state courts. CAFA made
this issue moot to a large degree by allowing more class actions to be filed
in, or removed to, federal court. CAFA, however, does not require that
all actions go to federal court. Presumably, some actions will remain in
state court, which will require litigants and state courts to more carefully
consider personal jurisdiction from the defendant's perspective. The de-
fendant and court must consider an objection to jurisdiction once the
class action is filed in state court, but most of the analysis must be done
by class counsel in selecting the forum.
Class counsel will have several options to find a state court with per-
sonal jurisdiction. They can rely on general jurisdiction by filing the na-
tionwide class action in the state court of the defendant's home state.
They can rely on specific jurisdiction by filing in a state in which the de-
fendant acted collectively with respect to the national class, such as the
state of the product's manufacture. Class counsel also could localize the
class. In the problem class action, for example, a statewide class of con-
sumers who bought the product in the forum state not only would solve




federal subject-matter jurisdiction under CAFA. Finally, to the extent
that CAFA motivates counsel to otherwise avoid federal subject-matterjurisdiction by joining a large number of multi-state plaintiffs under tradi-
tional party joinder rather than the class action device, counsel must bear
in mind that the personal jurisdiction problem arises in this type of party
joinder as well.
By highlighting the problems with personal jurisdiction in nationwide
class actions, I do not advocate an end to large-scale class action practice,
but I instead join the debate concerning the fairness of some state court
class actions. I add to the debate by offering a constitutional basis for
questioning the propriety of state court jurisdiction and by outlining the
parameters of the constitutional objections. I also offer one more reason
that federal courts are better suited than state courts to hear many na-
tionwide class actions. Federal courts do not face the same due process
limitations and dormant commerce clause concerns of state courts. A
statute to extend the personal jurisdiction of federal courts will both cure
the problem in federal court and fully implement the principal aim be-
hind CAFA-to make federal courts an available forum for interstate
class actions. In sum, the debate about "class action fairness" may not yet
be over, but it is now more complete.
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